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PREFACE 
The motivation for this work emerged during the work with my Master’s 
thesis in 2009. Moreover, after five years as a professional fire safety 
engineering consultant, it was liberating to be able to dig into the problems 
that so often had made professional life frustrating. Engineering in real life 
turned out to be something more than what is taught at the universities. The 
dimensions the problems take on are often different and more multi-faceted, 
and, in reality, a professional cannot spend years searching for a perfect 
answer. The needs are urgent: the new school is needed before next semester; 
the shopping center must be renovated in time for Christmas shopping; the 
arena must be prepared for a large concert in two months, and the tickets are 
(of course) sold. Decisions need to be taken based on the available 
knowledge. Hence, my aim was to get a better understanding of these 
engineering problems and contexts and, maybe, to contribute to some 
development in the field. This thesis is submitted with that goal and in 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD) at 
the University of Stavanger. 
My main interest is safety design, which involves applying concepts from 
different branches of research in order to design and build useful and safe 
artifacts. The chaos of different perspectives and viewpoints has made it an 
interesting, and sometimes frustrating, journey. Research into a new concept 
seldom leads to instant clarity but usually reveals its multiple perspectives and 
interpretations from different philosophical and professional fields. To dig 
deeper often leads to realizing that one should be an expert in so many fields, 
only to find out that time is limited.  
This also illustrates the complexity of professional design. Everyone is 
involved, on some level, in designing for themselves, in their own lives. In 
this individual sense, however, this type of design often involves small 
projects and non-critical decisions. Moreover, the concepts, goals and values 
are usually clearly defined: they are your own. However, designing in the 
professional sense is about synthesizing conceptions, goals and values from 
all relevant stakeholders, which are often conflicting. Different stakeholders 
hold different perspectives on important concepts. Some are even unaware of 
what perspectives (in a theoretical sense) they have, but all of them have some 
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goals and values. In some cases, however, these goals may only be tacitly 
known. The stakeholders are unaware of what they actually want before their 
tacit goals and values are triggered by the design process. This is why design 
processes often are non-linear. 
A rule of thumb in the professional design process is that the more people 
involved, the more complexity is added to the design situation. The challenge 
is, in a way, to both compromise and not compromise at the same time. That 
is, you should include all stakeholders’ values and goals and create a design 
that all of them judge as the best solution possible. What you want to avoid is 
a design that all stakeholders judge as mediocre, or one that a few important 
stakeholders judge a total failure, for instance, the “safety stakeholder”. It 
basically seems like an impossible task. This is also what makes it so 
interesting. 
The thesis is written for an audience of safety engineering professionals and 
safety regulators in general and those operating within the field of fire safety 
engineering in particular. I hope that it manages to challenge the current way 
of thinking about safety engineering, especially in the way we think about 
knowledge for design.  
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SUMMARY 
A continuously changing and increasingly complex society leads to new 
challenges in safety design. Modern buildings and road tunnels are being 
packed with new technology that creates new failure modes, multiple sub-
system interactions and tight couplings between different socio-technical 
systems. Meanwhile, safety is largely designed into these systems using 
prescriptive design rules that have evolved through reactions to accidents in 
systems with limited resemblance to modern systems.  
The traditional prescriptive approach to safety design was developed to avoid 
the re-occurrence of previously experienced accidents. New types of systems 
and accidents need a different design philosophy. The focus should be on the 
future instead of the past. Hence, the following question was outlined as the 
major issue of this thesis: what promotes and inhibits performance-based 
safety management of design processes? 
Performance-based design principles and regulations are nothing new. In 
Norway, performance-based fire safety legislations were introduced in the 
onshore building industry in 1997, and the international fire safety science 
community had a great focus on promoting these issues during the 1990s. 
However, experience with the performance-based legislation regime shows 
that the majority of fire safety designing activity is still based on prescriptive 
design rules, even in the most novel and complex cases. This is an unfortunate 
practice, considering that the prescriptive design rules have a boundary of 
validity associated with historically appropriate designs. Another matter is the 
restricted empirical foundation for the prescriptive design rules. Accidents are 
relatively rare events in socio-technical systems. Hence, the ‘test of time’ is a 
rather weak test in terms of determining the appropriateness of the 
prescriptive design rules. Strengthening the performance-based alternative to 
safety management of design process is thus of major importance. 
Four research questions were developed to support the major issue. The 
research questions were associated with: (1) understanding current fire safety 
engineering practice, (2) investigating the scientific foundation of the 
concepts of fire safety level and safety margin, (3) investigating 
methodological challenges associated with current practice, and (4) 
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transforming the understanding associated with current challenges into 
proposals for improvement. The research was limited to issues associated with 
engineering practice, safety science and safety regulation, explored through 
six case studies: 
A. A study of fire safety engineering practice in Norway in the period 
from 1997 to 2012. 
B. A study of fire safety science’s treatment of major concepts 
associated with the measurement of safety levels and safety margins. 
C. A study of 40 different technical fire safety strategies (combinations 
of safety measures) for multi-story residential apartment buildings. 
D. A study of the application of an engineering methodology to a 
specific design example: a concert hall. 
E. A study of the risk analyses and uncertainty management process in 
the Rogfast road tunnel project. 
F. A study of the application of a Bayesian Network model for risk 
analysis in road tunnels generally and in the Rogfast tunnel 
specifically. 
The data the case studies dealt with has mainly been written documents, either 
collected from the different projects or through literature surveys associated 
with the topic. Documents have been analyzed using qualitative text analyses, 
except for case studies C, D and F, which also include quantitative risk and 
fire modeling approaches. 
The major finding of the project is that there is a mismatch between current 
fire safety engineering practices and fire safety science. Fire safety 
engineering practice builds largely on the application of prescriptive design 
rules. Deviations from these design rules are often made, and the 
consequences of these deviations are often documented qualitatively using 
engineering judgment and argumentation. Fire safety science, on the other 
hand, builds on a rather narrow scientific framework, greatly inspired by the 
natural sciences. Fire safety is preferably measured by the application of 
quantitative relationships and models. The type of qualitative knowledge 
reflected by the fire safety engineering practice is poorly reflected in fire 
safety science, and the type of quantitative rigor reflected in fire safety 
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science is poorly reflected in fire safety engineering practice. Obviously there 
is a need to increase the common understanding. 
I argue that the scientific framework for fire safety science is too narrow to 
capture the essence of the concept of fire safety. The traditional framework 
builds on scientific reductionism, which leads to great simplifications in the 
treatment of systems and environmental complexity and excludes critical 
issues that are difficult to quantify dependably. Examples of the latter are 
human and organizational behavior. Similar conclusions are drawn with 
regards to the risk concept from the Rogfast cases. Overemphasis on model 
concepts, such as relative frequencies or universal causal structures, excludes 
the individual knowledge safety experts may bring to the table in novel 
designs. 
An alternative scientific framework is suggested, which builds on a 
constructivist systems thinking perspective. A fundamental assumption is that 
complex socio-technical systems, such as certain modern buildings and road 
tunnels, are modeled as social hierarchies. The macro-level includes social 
institutions, such as national safety authorities and fire departments, while the 
micro-levels include the building’s components, sub-systems, and nuts and 
bolts. Fire safety, then, is a property of the system as a whole and cannot be 
associated with any lower layer in the hierarchy, for instance by only 
considering the technical infrastructure or the reliability of an automatic 
sprinkler system. Moreover, complex socio-technical systems are constantly 
adapting to changes within themselves and in the environment. Hence, safety 
design is a matter of creating a control structure that enables the system to 
change in a safe manner. 
Application of the proposed framework would lead to a more holistic 
approach to safety design, regardless if one applies a risk-based methodology 
or a systems safety methodology. For instance, it would broaden the view on 
what knowledge is relevant in design processes and what measures could be 
used to achieve safety. Knowledge associated with the individual engineer’s 
experience would become more important. This knowledge may be tacitly 
known, and works, for instance, in terms of how the engineer creatively 
frames and reframes design problems to the stakeholders’ needs. A holistic 
perspective on safety measures includes, in principle, all thinkable measures, 
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and not only those measures associated with quantitative knowledge. A 
consequence of this would be that mathematical rigor would have to give way 
to more qualitative and discursive decision processes. Alternative processes 
and supplementing methods to traditional quantitative modeling and analysis 
for determining quality and coherence of the documentation would have to be 
developed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A valuable thesis about safety engineering, with special focus on fire safety 
design of buildings and road tunnels, is, to me, a thesis about how to deal with 
the increased complexity of socio-technical systems. Is current safety 
engineering practice appropriate for the tasks at hand?  
Fire safety engineering is often contrasted with fire safety designing by 
prescriptive design rules, by making a reference to scientific and engineering 
principles. For instance, Hurley (2009) defines fire safety engineering as the 
“application of science and engineering principles to protect people and their 
environment from destructive fire.” In this context science and engineering 
principles generally mean natural science and quantitative engineering 
principles, such as models, empirical relationships and simulation tools 
(Bjelland, Njå, Braut, & Heskestad, Submitted). But science is more than the 
natural sciences, and engineering principles may be more than quantitative 
models. Hence, a fundamental question is whether we have the appropriate 
scientific foundation for our fire safety engineering practice, or could there be 
valuable contributions from other fields as well? 
A major contribution to knowledge from this thesis is increased understanding 
of the capabilities and limitations of modern fire safety engineering practice. 
Broadly speaking, a large part of the capabilities may be attributed to the 
breadth of engineering knowledge and skills, while a large part of the 
limitation is associated with how this knowledge is utilized in a normative 
scientific and regulative framework. This insight emerged from exploring and 
contrasting current safety engineering practice with the needs and nature of 
design projects. Hence, a contribution to knowledge is also the innovative 
application of existing knowledge in the fields of design science and systems 
thinking to the field of fire safety design and engineering. 
1.1 Complexity of socio-technical systems 
During the 20th century, we saw enormous changes in the way we live our 
lives, in the way we work, in the technology that surrounds us, in the ability to 
create impressive structures, and in the sciences, to name a few (Funtowicz & 
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Ravetz, 1992; Leveson, 2011b). A consequence of modernity is increased 
complexity in buildings and infrastructures. During the late 19th century, the 
first modern city building codes were established in Norway, due to 
urbanization and risk associated with large city fires (Stenstad, 1983). More 
buildings in smaller areas led to tighter couplings, using Charles Perrow’s 
(1999) term. The major aim of the fire codes was to prevent fire spreading 
between buildings; the means was the enforcement of fire resistant materials, 
such as brick and masonry walls.  
The buildings as such were not that complex at that time. The amount of 
available construction technology limited their size, and controls within the 
structures were largely manual or mechanical, for instance the 
opening/closing of windows and doors and locks. Today, modern buildings 
are packed with technology. What used to be controlled by humans directly or 
by mechanical means are now often connected to electromechanical controls 
dependent on computers and software. While previous systems, sub-systems  
and components were largely segregated and loosely connected, modern 
systems are integrated – causing interactions and dependencies that are both 
unanticipated and unwanted (Leveson, 2004, 2011b; Perrow, 1999, 2011). 
Moreover, developments in construction technology mean that our 
imagination is the most effective boundary of increasingly taller buildings 
serving multiple societal needs. For instance, an urban building may be a 
subway station below the ground level, a shopping mall on the ground and 
first floor, and contain offices, hotels or apartments on the remaining floors. 
The work of this thesis has been directed at the fields of fire safety design, 
using buildings and road tunnels as objects for the study. What we find in 
these fields is that a set of accepted safety solutions (prescriptive codes) has a 
great impact on the way thinking about safety is conducted in design. These 
solutions are based on experiences with previous buildings and road tunnels 
that over time has made them references of what is to be acceptable safety. 
We can say the solutions, or design rules, has not yet been falsified, using 
Popper’s terms (Blockley, 1980). However, are we sure that these experiences 
are still relevant in the world we live in today and for the future? Moreover, 
are we sure that previous experiences are a good source of knowledge for 
safety design? Serious accidents are rare. The absence of a serious accident 
during some time period is not necessarily good evidence for not having a 
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serious accident in the future. To paraphrase Law & Beever (1995:79): The 
fact that no babies have been killed due to a fire in a parking building is poor 
evidence of the success of the prescriptive fire safety codes. When technology 
is moving as fast as it does today, there is no possibility of gaining widespread 
experience with design rules before they are implemented (Leveson, 2011b). 
Thus, there is an urgent need for scientific and engineering principles to 
support design decisions. 
1.2 Science and scientific 
The underlying scientific framework is crucial to understanding the 
worldview of any professional discipline. In the early 20th century, the 
scientific landscape was influenced by the logical positivists (see section 2.1). 
For them, the only meaningful propositions worth considering were either 
analytical, such as logic and mathematics, or empirical, which express 
knowledge of the world (Giere & Richardson, 1996; Godfrey-Smith, 2003; 
Schön, 1991; Stadler, 2003). According to Schön (1991:33-34): 
Practical knowledge was to be construed as knowledge of the 
relationship of means to ends. (…) The question, “How ought I to 
act?” could become a scientific one, and the best means could be 
selected by the use of science-based technique.”  
According to the logical positivists, then, there is no fundamental difference 
between science, engineering and decision making. Engineers should apply 
science to measure the level of risk or safety and make a scientifically sound 
decision. In this framework, science and engineering principles are not 
supporting decisions but practically making the decisions. 
For instance, research in the social sciences has shown that science is not 
objective and universally true, as the positivists liked to believe. Data from 
experiments are based on our underlying models and conceptions and are, 
thus, value-laden (Checkland, 1999). Moreover, complex socio-technical 
systems are not suitable to study by repeating experiments (Blockley, 1980; 
Blockley & Godfrey, 2000). The question of what is the correct action in a 
high-risk technology project cannot be decided by science alone.  
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In systems thinking, the concept of a system “embodies the idea of a set of 
elements connected together which form a whole, this showing properties 
which are properties of the whole, rather than properties of its constituent 
parts” (Checkland, 1999:3). Properties such as safety or accidents may be 
seen as such holistic properties of the system (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000; 
LeCoze, 2005; Leveson, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & 
Marais, 2004; Wallace & Ross, 2006). A holistic system property can only be 
found or described at a macro level of the system. A common example is the 
“wetness of water,” which cannot be found by looking at the individual 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms. The traditional way of dealing with complexity 
in the natural sciences is by decomposing the system into its constituent parts, 
to atoms and electrons, and then try to explain how the system functions as 
the sum of these constituent parts. This is called scientific reductionism. 
Complex socio-technical systems do not submit well to scientific 
reductionism without losing important understandings of holistic system 
characteristics. The systems studied by the natural sciences are stable. The 
system is what it is no matter what a scientist might believe about it. 
However, changes occur continuously in complex socio-technical systems, 
and the scientists’ predictions about system behavior also have the potential to 
change future behavior (which should be a relief to managers of such systems) 
(Checkland, 1999). 
An engineering approach influenced by social science and systems thinking 
may lead to a more constructivist worldview (LeCoze, 2012; Wallace & Ross, 
2006). In such a framework, science and engineering principles are seen as 
tools for producing decision support (Aven, 2012a; Nilsen & Aven, 2003). 
The results presented by engineers and risk analysts, for instance, are not 
objective values representing the truth but are, rather, descriptions of 
uncertainty or knowledge that are dependent on the analyst’s or engineer’s 
background experience and knowledge. 
1.3 The power of truth: decision making 
Authors such as Shrader-Frechette (1991), Beck (1992) and Perrow (1999) 
make a connection between the technical rationality regime and power 
structures in the society. A major concern is that people or organizations with 
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power may, with the help of scientists, engineers and professional risk 
analysts, impose risks on people who are uninformed or ignorant about the 
risks. If science tells us that the risk of a certain technology is low, then it 
must be so, and it would irrational to believe otherwise. Beck and Perrow are 
strong critics of risk analysts. They argue that risk analysts are claiming that 
they know the truth about risk. Risk analysts see the public as ignorant 
regarding risks and that, if properly informed, the public will adjust their 
perception of high risks to the scientifically correct view. This builds on an 
assumption of risk analysts sharing the positivists’ values.  
However, engineers are seldom acting solely in their own interest. They are 
usually working as consultants for resourceful actors in the society, e.g., 
property developers, industrial entrepreneurs or governmental agencies. It will 
surely be in the engineer’s own economic interest to provide the answers their 
clients want, which may cause a conflict between attending to the well-being 
of the client or the ethics of the profession (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992:257). 
However, they are not necessarily “committed to the cause” or benefitting 
from the activities the same way their clients are. One day an engineering 
company may work with the nuclear industry, while the next they are 
concerned with solar energy or providing consulting services to 
environmental organizations. Those most interested in using the “weapon of 
truth” are not the engineers but, rather, their clients, who need support for 
their case or project. If it could be argued that the engineers or risk analysts 
are presenting the truth and nothing but the truth (as they say in the courts), 
they would be considered far more credible than if they started questioning 
their theories, models and methods.  
Hence, it is open to question whether or not the focus on technical rationality 
and the accompanying focus on truth and objectivity comes from within the 
engineering discipline or from their clients, whoever they are. Moreover, it is 
open to question to what degree risk analysts or engineers really care about 
issues related to the truth content of the theories they apply. Nevertheless, a 
fundamental assumption for this thesis is that engineers should care about the 
implications of their theories and the scientific foundation of their profession. 
Otherwise, engineers may become “useful puppets” for any social actor with 
resources and a cause. 
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It has been pointed out that engineers contribute little to the public debate 
about politics and societal development (see, e.g., Anon, 2003; Gram, 2012; 
Haugstad, 2010, 2012; Lamvik, 2001). It is suggested that this lack of interest 
in the public debate is due to engineers’ being “very cautious giving public 
statements about something they do not have definitive answers to” 
(Haugstad, 2012). Other views are that “engineers would rather solve 
problems than talk about them” and that the role of a public debater “is not 
desirable to engineers, as it may be seen as a way of creating problems rather 
than solving them” (Drevon, 2013). This suggests a picture of engineers as 
cautious and conservative professionals with a tight connection to their 
clients. Obviously, there is a desire to avoid conflicts with previous, current 
and future clients. The picture of engineers as problem solvers is probably a 
good one. However, it could be questioned whether or not engineers are 
solving the right problems. This is associated with how scientific principles 
and theories are perceived, the engineers’ role in the design processes and the 
nature of design processes. 
1.4 The design task and dynamic societal values 
Designing and engineering is about balancing different stakeholders’ 
requirements and needs while having in mind general societal values and 
professional rigor and ethics. The major challenge is that, while designing, we 
are unable to be certain about how the artifact will perform. The quality of the 
design, meaning its real performance relative to some performance criteria, 
will reveal itself only after the artifact is put into use or operation. At the time 
of design, we must rely on predictions about how it will perform. This 
introduces challenges about knowledge. What knowledge is relevant or 
appropriate when we are to make predictions about the future performance of 
an artifact? To what extent can we rely on knowledge from the past, from 
comparable designs and their performance? How much reliance can we place 
on our engineering models and methods derived from the natural sciences and 
empirical evidence? Who has the reliable and appropriate knowledge to 
analyze and make decisions about the future performance of artifacts?  
By creating a new artifact, we are changing the world to some extent. For 
instance, one could say that the introduction of skyscrapers has changed the 
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world in many ways, and one of them is by creating a new target for terror. At 
the time the first skyscrapers were designed, the shortage of land in big cities 
was the main concern, and one can imagine that the predicted performance of 
the buildings was largely associated with how the land-shortage concern was 
tackled by the new design. However, safety was also a concern. It is claimed 
that the specific event of a plane crash was considered by the designers of the 
New York City Twin Towers, although the criteria and execution of the 
impact assessment is not documented (Shyam-Sunder, 2005:55). Evidently, 
the towers did withstand the collision impact, and it is suggested that the 
progressive collapse was initiated by the fire that followed. There are, 
however, different theories of how the fire caused the initial collapse, two of 
which are presented in Quintiere et al. (2002) and Usmani et al. (2003). 
The symbolic value of the Twin Towers in 2001 was not a direct result of the 
design characteristics of the buildings. Such values are created when the 
artifact and its content and users interact with the society, and these values are 
constantly changing. One can say that the events on 9/11 changed the world, 
or, since the world is constantly changing, maybe it is more precise to say that 
the events showed that the world had changed. The events made it clear that 
high-rise buildings should be evaluated against performance criteria related to 
terror attacks. This might not have been precisely acknowledged during 
design, and the events were a milestone in the world development regarding 
design loads. Furthermore, this illustrates that the values we (the society) 
place on artifacts today are not necessarily the same in the future. The 
artifacts, including their content and activities, and large events, such as terror 
attacks and fires, are changing the world, the way we look at it and the things 
we value. This has consequences for design and engineering. The artifacts we 
considered good yesterday might be considered dangerous today. This makes 
evaluation of the quality of design a relative question. 
Consider the Norwegian Grue church fire in 1822, when as many as 113 
people were killed. In hindsight, it was found that the church’s doors had two 
major design flaws. First, the opening direction was into the church; second, 
when placed in the open position they also blocked the passage from the 
upstairs galleries. Reports from the fire say that a stampede occurred when 
people rushed towards the doors, causing increased pressure on the doors 
from the inside, rendering them unable to open. Consequently, people were 
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trapped inside the church, especially those seated on the gallery (Østberg, 
1897). It is said that it is as a consequence of this fire that the present 
Norwegian fire safety regulation (KRD & MD, 2010) specify that all doors in 
means of egress should have an outward direction. It is also interesting to note 
that the galleries were reserved for unmarried women and that only seven 
grown men were among the fatalities, which points to some social 
characteristics of the time (Østberg, 1897). Nevertheless, the Grue church fire 
created awareness about fire risk that was not present before the event. The 
church was probably considered safe up until the day the fire occurred. The 
hazard associated with the doors was not recognized before the fire. 
As a final example of how the changing world affects our values and 
performance criteria, consider the social development in Norway during the 
last century. Along with the member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Norway experienced 
economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, optimistic 
predictions for continuous economic growth were made. Then, oil was found 
in the North Sea in the early 1960s. In 1973 the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo to punish 
countries that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur war. The embargo led to 
greatly increased oil prizes, which, of course, was very positive for Norway’s 
economic growth (Bjerkholt, Offerdal, & Strøm, 1985). Hence, the oil and gas 
activities are a major reason for Norway’s economic position today. During 
the depression years before the Second World War and during the 
reconstruction of the nation after the war, the basic needs of the population 
were prioritized. However, economic growth and “well-being” leads to new 
opportunities and priorities.  
The Norwegian Opera house was opened in Oslo in 2008. The building is 
designed by the well-known Norwegian architect company Snøhetta, which 
also was responsible for the design of the recognized Bibliotheca Alexandrina 
in Egypt. Compared with the largest skyscrapers in the world, the Norwegian 
Opera house is modest in its dimensions. However, the building is a good 
example of an artifact that is something more than just a building to cover 
basic needs. The building is, rather, the result of a design idea that integrates 
the necessary functionality, internal and external beauty, landscaping details 
and the creation of a landmark. We could also say that the building is a result 
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of the Norwegian wealth and ability to see the world with new eyes, that is, to 
develop what we consider as important values in a building. 
As previously mentioned, designing is about balancing the concerns from 
different stakeholders. Some of the examples may seem a little far-fetched, 
but the point is that changes in the world we live in lead to different priorities 
and values. These are dynamic, not static, values that are affected by a 
complex and globalized world. The continuously changing world will lead to 
new needs in the society. Developments in technology will drive new and 
novel designs forward, and our needs and worldview will affect the values we 
use when balancing different concerns. The way we deal with different 
concerns in design and engineering thus needs to be flexible. However, this is 
not the same as saying that our values are completely relative, and that, for 
some good reason, for example, we can forsake safety at the benefit of, for 
instance, beauty, functionality or cost. Rather, we should be aware of what we 
mean when we talk about safety, for instance, fire safety in a building or a 
road tunnel. Safety with regards to a design is not an end, or goal, in itself. If 
safety comes at a too high cost of other important concerns, the design will 
probably not be realized. Again, finding the right balance is the key. 
1.5 Major issue and research questions 
The work associated with this thesis is best regarded as an exploratory 
journey. The starting point was defined in terms of research into the issues of 
risk management and technical safety in the Norwegian fire safety 
engineering field. Otherwise, the road was fairly open. The following major 
issue was developed to give directional guidance during the research: 
What promotes and inhibits performance-based safety management 
of design processes? 
The major issue is broad in terms of asking what promotes and inhibits. For 
reasons discussed in the opening of section 1, it was decided to focus on 
engineering practice; safety science, and; safety regulations (cf., Figure 1). If 
performance-based safety design is to have any impact on the novel designs of 
the future, there is a need to have a clear understanding of the limitations and 
possibilities of the way we work, think and state societal demands. 
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The concepts that are applied in engineering practice are closely connected to 
their scientific foundation. This is often forgotten, or taken as given, by the 
practitioners. During periods characterized by change, for instance after 
implementation of, and adapting to, a new regulation regime, the fundamental 
understanding of important concepts become vitally important. It is no longer 
possible to rely on the agreed-upon practice and common understanding. 
Normal science and practice develops, in Thomas Kuhn’s (1996) terms, 
towards a paradigm change. There is the possibility of “sticking with the old” 
as far as possible or developing something entirely new. In any case, current 
practice needs to be understood: both the practice on the “scientific side” and 
the “professional side” involving consultants/engineers. Figure 1 depicts the 
two major targets of research, the domains of “practice and knowledge” and 
“safety management,” and a link between them. The assumption is that all that 
is included in practice and knowledge affects how safety management is 
conducted. Moreover, current safety management models affect practice, for 
instance with regards to where we search for knowledge. In both domains, we 
need to ask: What are the consequences of sticking with the old? What are the 
limitations, and what are the opportunities? Is there a need for a change of 
practice, both in science and practice? Are the old knowledge and practice 
compatible with future needs? What are the future needs, and whose needs are 
they? How do these issues affect safety management? 
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Figure 1: Major issues and research focus connected to a model for safety 
management (Aven, Boyesen, Njå, Olsen, & Sandve, 2004:68). 
Based on this starting point, it was considered important to gain an 
understanding of the current fire safety engineering practice and science. The 
introduction of goal-oriented safety regulations in several sectors during the 
last decades has promoted the use of risk management and scientific 
engineering principles. This led to the development of the first research 
question: 
• Research question 1: What characterizes current fire safety 
engineering practice after the introduction of performance-based 
regulations and promotion of scientific engineering principles? 
(papers 1, 2 and 3) 
A major reason for implementing a performance-based fire safety legislation 
regime was to allow alternative solutions that provided the same level of 
safety at a lower cost, or a higher level of safety at equal costs. Another 
reason was that the prescriptive legislation simply did not fit for novel and 
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complex designs. New measurements for safety, such as risk and fire 
modeling, were thus promoted by the authorities in cases where one deviated 
from the prescribed design rules. In the work associated with research 
question 1, I set out to increase understanding of how this new legislation 
regime was adopted by the fire safety engineers. How did they relate to the 
new freedom of choosing alternative solutions? How did they build 
documentation that showed that the designs had an appropriate level of fire 
safety? How did they relate to the new1 concept of risk, which was suggested 
as an appropriate measure of fire safety? 
As a consequence of the findings from the initial studies, it was decided to 
look into the understanding of some major concepts within fire safety 
engineering. The concepts of “safety” and “safety level” were chosen, with an 
aim to identify not only how the fire safety science community thinks about 
these concepts but also whether or not there is a need for broadening 
understanding. Hence, the following research question was developed: 
• Research question 2: How are the concepts of “safety” and “safety 
level” reflected in the fire safety engineering research community? 
(papers 4 and 3) 
Another finding from the initial research into current engineering practice 
identified some characteristic methodological issues. When analytical tools 
are introduced to fire safety engineering processes, there is a great focus on 
“relative safety” through “comparative analyses.” That is, a design alternative 
is analyzed in comparison with a “prescribed” design alternative. Focus is on 
the differences, and everything else is assumed to be equal. Research question 
3 was developed in order to investigate the consequences of such a 
methodology: 
• Research question 3: Why are current fire safety engineering practice, 
fire safety science and fire safety regulations focusing on “relative 
safety” and the associated “equivalence approach” for evaluating fire 
safety levels? (papers 5, 6 and 7) 
                                                    
1
 The risk concept itself is not new (see, e.g., Bernstein, 1996; Covello & Mumpower, 
1985), but it was new to the fire safety engineering industry. 
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While the three first research questions deal with current practice, the final 
research question is associated with the future. The research is founded on the 
findings from current practice from the perspective of how things might 
possibly be done differently: 
• Research question 4: What can we learn from current engineering 
practice, safety science and regulations in order to promote 
performance-based safety management of design processes in the 
future? (papers 4, 7 and 8) 
The major results are presented in Section 6 and in the papers in Part II. 
1.6 Theoretical prerequisites 
In order to answer the research questions presented in the previous section, a 
theoretical platform is needed. This platform is presented in section 2 and 3, 
but first I will give a brief explanation of the theoretical perspectives that are 
selected. 
Searching for answers to the research questions solely within the engineering 
sciences, typically those associated with the technical rationality framework 
or positivism, seemed futile. For instance, there has been discussion about 
“acceptable risk” for decades (Aven, 2007; Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Derby, & Keeney, 1981; Kaplan, 1982; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Starr, 1969). 
However, no one has come any closer to a definitive answer in terms of 
finding “the acceptable level of risk.” A possibility is that there are no such 
universally acceptable levels of risk. Rather, risk and safety are properties that 
cannot be associated only with the activity in question but must also involve 
elements from who is analyzing risk and safety. If this is the case, there is a 
need to broaden the scientific perspective on what is relevant knowledge in 
safety engineering. Elements of practitioners’ tacit knowledge, creativity and 
experience may play an important role in achieving functional and safe 
designs. Designing for safety is not just about solving problems but also about 
finding the right problems to solve – which makes the activity more than an 
exercise in logic and mathematics. 
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From this background it was decided to include a discussion of philosophical 
issues associated with the technical rationality paradigm and an alternative, 
and more appropriate, holistic perspective. Also, it was decided to include 
elements from design science, for two reasons: First, findings from the design 
science literature are an empirical foundation to my own case studies, for 
instance with regards to how designers may think and act and how design 
processes evolve. Secondly, this project is design science, i.e. research 
associated with the activity of fire safety design, which, in my opinion, calls 
for an introduction to the field.  
1.7 The structure of this thesis 
This thesis comprises two parts: Part I provides a general background and a 
description of the major research questions. Furthermore, it provides a 
theoretical foundation for design science, risk management and associated 
concepts, along with methodological issues. 
Part II contains the research papers that have been written in association with 
this Ph.D.-project. Eight papers have been included in the thesis: 
1. Bjelland, H., & Njå, O. (2012a). Fourteen years of experience with 
performance-based fire safety engineering in Norway – lessons 
learned. Paper presented at the 9th International Conference on 
Performance-Based Code and Fire Safety Design Methods. 
2. Bjelland, H., & Njå, O. (2012b). Interpretation of safety margin in 
ASET/RSET assessments in the Norwegian building industry. Paper 
presented at the 11th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
and Management Conference (PSAM11) and The Annual European 
Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL2012). 
3. Bjelland, H., & Njå, O. (2012d). Safety factors in fire safety 
engineering. Paper presented at the Advances in safety, reliability and 
risk management: proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability 
Conference, ESREL 2011, Troyes, France, 18-22 September 2011. 
4. Bjelland, H., Njå, O., Braut, G. S., & Heskestad, A. W. (Submitted). 
A Discussion of the Concepts of Safety Level and Safety Margin: 
Applications in Fire Safety Design for Occupants in Buildings. 
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5. Bjelland, H., & Njå, O. (2012c). Performance-based fire safety: risk 
associated with different designs. Paper presented at the Advances in 
safety, reliability and risk management: proceedings of the European 
Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2011, Troyes, France, 18-
22 September 2011. 
6. Bjelland, H., & Borg, A. (2013). On the use of scenario analysis in 
combination with prescriptive fire safety design requirements. 
Environment, Systems & Decisions, 33(1):33-42. 
7. Bjelland, H., & Aven, T. (2013). Treatment of Uncertainty in Risk 
Assessments in the Rogfast Road Tunnel Project. Safety Science, 
55:34-44. 
8. Borg, A., Bjelland, H., & Njå, O. (Submitted). Reflections on 
Bayesian Network models for road tunnel safety design: A case study 
from Norway. 
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2 SCIENTIFIC PLATFORM 
The underlying scientific framework of an engineering discipline will affect, 
for instance, what is regarded as meaningful questions to pursue and what 
knowledge is relevant to answer the questions. In that respect it may be useful 
to pinpoint some major contrasts in how science is perceived by different 
philosophies of science and how this has affected safety science. The general 
scientific foundation for safety and risk assessment in the engineering 
disciplines are what may be called Technical Rationality (TR) (Blockley & 
Godfrey, 2000; Schön, 1991; Wallace & Ross, 2006). Section 2.1 aims to 
clarify what is meant by TR in this context. The complexity dealt with by the 
social sciences and in systems engineering requires a broad scientific 
framework. In this context it has been suggested that the TR framework is 
unsuitably narrow (Checkland, 1999; Wallace & Ross, 2006). To contrast the 
paradigm of TR, we take a look at some features of alternative theories in 
section 2.2, which I have come to favor over the traditional TR perspective in 
engineering. In section 2.3 I discuss some implications of these contrasts and 
historical developments into the interpretation of major concepts of safety 
science and how this discussion can be related to fire safety science and 
engineering. 
2.1 Technical rationality 
A fundamental contrast within epistemology is that between rationalism and 
empiricism. Rationalism is the idea that things are known a priori, i.e., 
independent of experience. Pure reasoning is the route to knowledge, as the 
knowledge is within our intuition and part of our nature (Markie, 2013). 
Empiricism, on the other hand, is the idea that the only source of knowledge 
about the world is sense experience (Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Markie, 2013). 
Our knowledge is dependent on our sense experiences; thus, we can only 
know things a posteriori. 
Positivism may be seen as a branch of empiricism and is an important 
contributor to what we shall call technical rationality. Positivism was coined 
by the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Inspired by the 
successes in physics, Comte aimed at developing a scientific sociology. The 
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new science was to be based on the observable, countable, measurable and 
certain aspects of social life. The structure of society was to be discovered by 
the same means that physics discovered the structure of nature, a perspective 
where religion and metaphysics had no place. Hence, the aim was to discover 
the relationships among positively given (observable) entities without 
searching for possible underlying (unobservable and, hence, metaphysical) 
structures behind these relationships (Wormnæs, 1987:25).  
Positivism, under the flag of “logical positivism,” gained reinforced interest 
with the Vienna Circle during the 1920s, associated with names such as 
Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. Similar to Comte’s, the new 
positivism was strongly focused on science, inspired by successes within the 
natural sciences and, especially, the achievements of Einstein. Moreover, the 
positivists’ view was in opposition to the traditional philosophy of science at 
the time, especially all forms of mysticism and idealism (which is often 
connected to forms of nationalism). This may be related to the political 
climate in Europe in the 1930s (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). As with the early 
positivism, metaphysical claims were rejected as meaningless to science 
(Wormnæs, 1987). Instead, they focused all their attention on experiencing 
the world: “what every scientist seeks, and seeks alone, are… the rules which 
govern the connection of experiences, and by which alone they can be 
predicted” (Moritz Schlick, quoted in Godfrey-Smith, 2003:29). Experience 
was considered to be the only source of meaning and knowledge (Godfrey-
Smith, 2003). As mentioned in the introduction, the positivists only 
considered propositions that are analytic (logic and mathematics) or empirical 
as meaningful for scientific and philosophical study. 
Positivism had a strong position within science in the period between the 
World Wars and after World War II. This led to a great focus on “the 
scientific method” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Nola & Sankey, 2007). In safety 
science this is reflected by, for example, Heinrich’s book Industrial accident 
prevention: a scientific approach (Heinrich, 1931). However, during the 
1950s and 1960s positivism disappeared due to irreconcilable difficulties 
with, for instance, the problem of induction and their focus on verification of 
scientific theories. Thomas Kuhn (1996) is often mentioned as influential on 
the fall of positivism by his pointing out that science did not progress by the 
application of a single scientific method. Kuhn found that science was better 
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represented by paradigms of shared ideas, problems and methods through 
which scientists progressed in a modest, puzzle-solving matter. At times, 
controversies built up within the existing paradigm of “normal science” and 
practice progressed towards a state of “revolutionary science.” At this point, 
the agreed upon fundamentals, problems and methods of the existing 
paradigm is lost and open to challenge. The revolutionary science continues 
until an alternative paradigm emerges, and once again practice settles into a 
stage of normal science. An interesting issue in this regard is that the 
settlement of a new paradigm may be the result of social power-structures 
during the time (Feenberg, 1999). 
Another source of influence on what we call technical rationality is scientific 
realism. However, a fundamental difference between positivism and scientific 
realism is that realism does not reject a metaphysical or ontological stance 
about the external world, which cannot be tested empirically and thus has to 
accepted at “face value” (Chakravartty, 2011a, 2011b; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Sankey, 2008). The aim of science for a scientific realist is to discover and 
explain the truth about the external world. Scientific progress is about 
accumulating knowledge about the world in order to advance towards the 
discovery of the true structure of the external world (Chakravartty, 2011a). 
Knowledge gained from scientific inquiry into both observable and 
unobservable entities is genuine, objective and independent of the inquirer 
(Sankey, 2008; Sardar, 2001). That is, the truth of a statement is not 
dependent on whether or not you believe it is true but is “entirely determined 
by how things stand in the world, independent of us” (Sankey, 2008:18). 
An observed phenomenon, e.g., the motion of a car, is explained through 
underlying unobservable causal processes, which are responsible for the 
observed phenomenon. This claim has both ontological and semantic 
dimensions. First, the ontological dimension is associated with the existence 
of such underlying, unobservable causal processes. That is, they do actually, 
or literally, exist in the world and not merely as human constructions and are 
useful for explaining certain phenomena (Chakravartty, 2011b). Second, the 
semantic dimension is associated with the requirement to interpret theories 
literally (Chakravartty, 2011b; Suárez, 2011). That is, their relations of 
reference are, rather, directed towards the unobservable entities, e.g., to genes 
and quarks and whether or not they exist, not to a specific theory (Sankey, 
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2008). Consequently, “one can successfully refer to an entity despite 
significant or even radical changes in theoretical descriptions of its 
properties; this allows for stability of epistemic commitment when theories 
change over time” (Chakravartty, 2011a). 
The empiricist ideal is described by the correspondence theory, which asserts 
that for a statement to be true, it has to correspond to the observable facts. 
This has implications for the predictive nature of realist statements or laws. 
For instance, for a law or statement to be considered as true, the predictions it 
provides need to correspond with the actual outcomes of an experiment or 
reality (Sankey, 2008). 
To summarize, what is called technical rationalism in this thesis has the 
following attributes: 
• The natural sciences are generally considered as a major inspiration. 
Some claim that all sciences could eventually be reduced to physics 
(Checkland, 1999). 
• Science applies scientific methods associated with empiricism. 
Scientific propositions should be tested in carefully designed 
experiments that generate empirical data. 
• Science aims to discover universally objective or true laws that 
explain the true structure of the society or the external world. 
Attitudes towards metaphysical claims may vary (c.f., positivism 
versus scientific realism), but this is of minor concern here. 
• Inspired by successes in the natural sciences, complex systems are 
decomposed into their constituent parts where scientific knowledge is 
available. The behavior of the system is perceived as the sum of its 
constituent parts (Checkland, 1999; LeCoze, 2005; Leveson, 2004, 
2011b). 
• Quantitative methods and data are preferred over qualitative data 
(e.g., Wallace & Ross, 2006). 
• There is a search in safety science for root causes and causal 
relationships between components, events and barriers (e.g., Heinrich, 
1931). 
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2.2 An alternative holistic perspective 
“To a living science nature will not be dead, but alive; and it will be 
like a friend about whom one can learn in sweet intimacy how to 
penetrate the soul and spirit, to know the tastes and inclinations, and 
to understand the character, impulses and abandonments” (de Finetti, 
1989:170). 
The growing complexity of our society during the 20th century led to an 
increased focus on systems theory in safety engineering (Leveson, 2011b; 
McIntyre, 2000; Wallace & Ross, 2006). Instead of decomposing complex 
systems into their constituent parts, it is acknowledged that complex systems 
have properties that are properties of the whole. Such properties, e.g., safety, 
risk or accidents, are only meaningful to speak of at an elevated system level. 
This involves looking at complex systems as socio-technical hierarchies, 
which blurs the distinction between a system and its environment. This makes 
it problematic to apply the thinking associated with technical rationality. For 
instance; it becomes impossible to conduct scientific experiments of complex 
socio-technical systems as a whole; there will be important issues where 
quantitative data and models are non-existent, and there will be stakeholders 
with contrasting values. It seems obvious that there is a need for a broader 
scientific framework. In what follows, I will discuss elements of a more 
holistic scientific framework, which I have come to prefer. 
The work of Kuhn (1996/1962) is considered important with respect to 
broadening the perspective on what could be regarded as science and 
scientific methods. Others have tried to broaden the perspective even more, 
Paul Feyerabend, for instance, who argues for epistemological anarchism in 
his book Against Method (Feyerabend, 2010/1975). Whether or not he was 
successful is another matter, but what is interesting with Feyerabend, at least 
for the sake of this thesis, is his view of theory-laden observations in 
experiments and perceiving scientific methods as straightjackets and 
constraining creativity. For instance, Kuhn’s notion and “acceptance” of the 
“puzzles” of normal science was regarded by Feyerabend as 
professionalization and narrow-mindedness that excluded unorthodox ideas 
(Godfrey-Smith, 2003:112). Feyerabend proposed the principle of tenacity 
and proliferation as guides for science. Tenacity is concerned with holding 
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onto attractive theories despite initial problems, while proliferation is 
concerned with the parallel production of new theories and ideas (Godfrey-
Smith, 2003:115). Most scientists will argue that the scientific method is 
important and that the application of a scientific method is what distinguishes 
science from pseudo-science. Although Kuhn’s work undermines Popper’s 
(2002/1963) scientific method of conjectures and refutations (falsificationism) 
on a historical account, the principles of Popper are still important to science. 
What Kuhn showed was that Popper’s principles are not exclusive to what is 
traditionally called science. 
In the social sciences, the concept of social constructivism is important and 
may be a candidate for a foundation for systems thinking (Wallace & Ross, 
2006). Having a social constructivist perspective on science implies that one 
believes that scientific facts, theories or concepts are social constructions 
(epistemological dimension). An even stronger position holds that reality, i.e., 
the entities reflected by our scientific theories, is constructed (metaphysical 
dimension). Hence, reality is not an external, objective and independent world 
that we are to discover through scientific inquiry but something that is created 
by and dependent on its observers and players (Kukla, 2000; LeCoze, 2012; 
Yeganeh & Su, 2005). 
Scientific realism is often separated into the three dimensions: metaphysical; 
epistemological, and semantic; the same dimensions may also be attributed to 
social constructivism. Kukla (2000) argues that there exist “degrees” of realist 
and constructivist perspectives.  You do not necessarily have to accept all the 
dimensions of either realism or constructivism if you define yourself as either 
a realist or a constructivist. For instance, you may take a position of 
metaphysical constructivism while still favoring a position of epistemological 
realism. In that context, this may include perspectives that claim that the 
concepts of safety and risk are socially constructed, but our ideas about these 
concepts may be true or false in an absolute sense. 
The knowledge gained from scientific inquiry in a constructivist perspective is 
context-specific, not universal and objective. This may seem to undermine the 
knowledge gained from such inquires in comparison with the view of 
knowledge in scientific realism. However, the key issue is that the phenomena 
under consideration are not amenable to universal descriptions (Weinberg, 
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1972). Rather, they are unique, one-off events that require exploration and 
understanding instead of explanation through observation and generalization 
(Wallace & Ross, 2006). For instance, in fire safety science great efforts have 
been put into the discovery of the true statistical relationships governing 
human reaction time in case of a fire (see, e.g., Gwynne, Galea, Parke, & 
Hickson, 2003; MacLennan, Regan, & Ware, 1999; Nilsson & Johansson, 
2009; Nilsson, Johansson, & Frantzich, 2009; Olsson & Regan, 2001; Purser 
& Bensilum, 2001; Shi et al., 2009; Xudong et al., 2009). Data is usually 
obtained through unannounced evacuation drills resembling controlled 
scientific experiments. However, the results of such inquiries may be seen, 
rather, as constructed, e.g., in terms of what categories the data are grouped 
into (detection time, warning time, reaction time, travel time), and highly 
context-dependent in terms of experiment/reality differences (e.g., lack of 
stress, aggression and fear associated with a real fire situation) (Wallace & 
Ross, 2006). 
Since different people tend to have different views on reality, constructivists 
make use of hermeneutical, rather than positivistic, approaches. The aim is to 
understand the phenomena (the meaning of action), not to produce 
explanations through generalization (Yeganeh & Su, 2005). This leads to 
results that are both subjective and context-specific (low external validity). 
However, the knowledge gained from inquiries enables rich descriptions and 
understanding (high internal validity) of the situation. When the context of a 
certain situation is adequately known, this knowledge may be used for 
accurate predictions. In contrast, generalizations obtained from positivist 
inquiries may have a high external validity, i.e., are universal, but lack 
relevance to most practical cases due to a low internal validity (Wallace & 
Ross, 2006). A parallel can be drawn to Schön’s (1991) dilemma of rigor or 
relevance, to De Bono’s intelligence trap (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000:119; de 
Bono, 1978, 2007) and to the concept of “lamp-posting” (Ravetz, 1997:21-
22). 
In fire safety science, for example, it does not seem problematic that a TR 
paradigm functions side-by-side with more constructivist ideas. In fact, this is 
a mixture that seems necessary in order to strengthen the field. The fire 
phenomenon is effectively studied in the laboratory, where it is possible to 
develop generalizations in terms of models and relationships that may be 
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useful to fire safety engineers. However, fire safety engineering is a lot more 
than describing or predicting a fire. The human factor and the interactions 
between humans, buildings, the environment and fire are not amenable to 
laboratory studies. In sum, we end up with a design or engineering situation 
that is highly situation-specific, wherein models and methodologies become 
tools for the design/building to achieve some future purpose while being 
maintained in a safe state (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). The narrow-minded 
focus on objectivity and truth may become more of a straightjacket, in 
Feyerabend’s terms, than a constructive mindset contributing to social 
development. I will discuss some implications of this broad(er) philosophy of 
science for safety science in the following section. 
2.3 Implications for safety science 
In this section I discuss some important concepts within safety science and 
how they traditionally have been viewed within a technical rationality 
framework and then contrast that with an alternative holistic view. I will also 
connect some important findings from the fire safety science literature to the 
discussion. The aim is to present a broader understanding than that provided 
by the common technical rationality perspective and to point at how fire 
safety science relates to this understanding. 
2.3.1 Risk 
The risk concept has different interpretations and meanings in different fields 
of science and professional disciplines (for a broad overview see Adams, 
1995; Althaus, 2005; Apostolakis, 2004; Aven, 2010a, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b; 
Aven, Renn, & Rosa, 2011; U. Beck, 1992; Bernstein, 1996; Covello & 
Mumpower, 1985; Damodaran, 2008; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Holton, 
2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Mairal, 2008; Paté-Cornell, 2012; Renn, 
2008; Rosa, 2010; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Solberg & Njå, 2012; Wilde, 
2001). In a safety engineering context, risk is associated with possible future 
losses and the associated uncertainties (Aven, 2012a), that is, the 
consequences of initiating an activity, e.g., operating a road tunnel or having a 
large arrangement at a concert arena. Accidents could occur, and people and 
structures may be affected.  
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In a traditional TR framework, risk is seen as an objective property of the 
activity. The risk analyst aims at estimating this true risk using models and 
underlying causal relationships. Risk is usually understood as the combination 
of future consequences and the associated probabilities (see, e.g., Kaplan & 
Garrick, 1981). The analyst makes an estimate, r*, of the true risk, r, 
associated with an activity. Uncertainty, then, is associated with the error of 
estimate relative to the true value. This type of uncertainty is usually 
measured by a (1-α)100% confidence interval. A confidence interval is a 
stochastic interval that either contains the true value of r or does not. If the 
situation under consideration is repeated an infinite number of times, and a 
confidence interval is calculated each time, one would find that the true value 
of r is contained within the interval in (1-α)100% of the trials (Aven, 
2012a:12). Hence, the interval is a reflection of the variation in a population 
(aleatory uncertainty), from which we assume repeated sampling of data. This 
thinking makes sense in a classical statistics setting, when operating with 
large populations. However, when we are interested in analyzing the risk of a 
specific unit, say a one-of-a-kind building, we run into problems of defining a 
population of similar units. 
An alternative view is to claim that risk is a construction of the analyst, rather 
than an objective property of the activity, building, road tunnel, etc. The aim 
of the analyst is, thus, not to discover the true risk but to express his/her 
uncertainty about the possible future consequences of the activity (Aven, 
2012a). In a TR framework, such a view of risk is perceived as subjective and 
relativistic. However, the underlying phenomena of safety science and the 
interactions between phenomena, structures, humans, organizations and 
society is not amenable to universal and objective descriptions by laws. 
Hence, a subjective framework may be the only way forward. In fact, the 
application of the TR framework is no less subjective than a constructivist 
approach, although the subjectivity is usually introduced “through the back 
door” and is, thus, improperly handled (Wallace & Ross, 2006). For instance, 
the definition of a “population of similar units” involves, in most practical 
cases, a great deal of subjective judgments, which are not reflected by the 
aleatory uncertainty reflected by a confidence interval. A subjective 
framework, often called a Bayesian or knowledge-based framework, does not 
suppress the subjectivity in the analysis but makes the subjectivity specific 
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and visible to the decision-makers (Apostolakis, 1990; Aven, 2012a; Njå, 
1998; Singpurwalla, 2006). Instead of making reference to thought-
constructed populations of similar units, from which confidence intervals are 
established in the TR framework, the uncertainty associated with the future 
performance/outcome of a specific unit may be reflected by a credibility 
interval (Aven, 2012a:18). For instance, Y may represent the number of 
deaths due to building fires in Norway next year. A 90% credibility interval 
for Y is, say, [40, 90], meaning that our subjective probability is 90% that the 
true number of deaths next year will be between 40 and 90 people. 
The quality of a subjective risk assessment is determined by the background 
knowledge on which it is based (Aven, 2011, 2012a; Bjelland & Aven, 2013). 
Background knowledge includes everything that the assessment is 
conditioned on, for example, physical models; causal models; data; 
simulations; the analysts’ competency; stakeholder involvement, and expert 
knowledge introduced to the analysis. That is, the uncertainty description 
includes all of our lack of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty), including the 
aleatory uncertainty associated with variations in data. The risk assessment is 
a foundation for decision making, and it will be useful as such if there is a 
relationship based on trust between the analysts, stakeholders and the 
decision-makers. 
Decision making about safety on the basis of risk analyses should be 
influenced by the underlying assumptions about the ontological status of risk. 
Either the risk analysis represents estimations of the truth, or they are 
subjective constructions of the analysts. This discussion is not intrusive in the 
major fire safety science journals and literature. Compared with research on, 
for instance, the fire phenomenon, smoke spread and materials’ or 
constructions’ reactions to fire, the risk concept is not discussed to any large 
extent in fire safety science. There are some examples, though. The traditional 
TR understanding of the risk concept is most commonly found (see, e.g., V. 
R. Beck & Yung, 1990; Frantzich, 1998; Hall Jr & Sekizawa, 1991; Lundin & 
Johansson, 2003; Ramachandran, 1988). The fundamental TR understanding 
of risk seems to be an axiomatic assumption and is not discussed. Some 
authors do, however, provide a critical debate about different interpretations 
of risk (see, e.g., Meacham, 2001, 2004a, 2004b; Noonan & Fitzgerald, 1991; 
Wade & Whiting, 1996; Watts Jr, 1991), but these examples are not 
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representative for the community as a whole. A diverse debate about the 
foundations of major concepts in the discipline is inevitable in order to reach a 
higher scientific maturity. 
2.3.2 Uncertainty and probability 
Designing is about proposing or devising actions that will solve some 
problems in the future. That is, we generally propose statements in the form of 
“this design will work in the specified circumstances.” For instance, in fire 
safety engineering, we propose the introduction of a sprinkler system in a 
building while at the same time proposing a statement of its performance: 
“the sprinkler system will save lives in case of a future fire.” Uncertainty is a 
state of not knowing whether these statements are true (Holton, 2004; 
Lindley, 2006). In most cases, the best we can do is gather evidence to 
support them (Blockley, 1980; Blockley & Godfrey, 2000). 
But can we not just act as if we were certain? For instance, when we design in 
accordance with prescribed fire safety solutions, we do not incorporate 
uncertainty specifically. We simply act as if fire safety is achieved through the 
application of the prescribed solutions. According to Puchovsky (1996), this 
practice seems to have served us well during the last century. The great 
reliance on prescriptive regulations in the US and in large parts of Europe 
(e.g., France and Germany), suggests that many actors perceive them as 
successful. 
Maybe we can act as if we are certain in many cases. However, an obvious 
motivation for taking uncertainty seriously in safety design is that certainty 
does not exist, especially when faced with novelty and complexity. Why 
would we then want to describe the world as black and white when we know 
this is not the case? In fact, omitting a description of uncertainty may be seen 
as a value judgment made by the analyst. As different people tend to have 
different values, omitting uncertainties may be the same as misleading people, 
by not presenting the complete information (Paté-Cornell, 1994:153). In 
decision-making about risk in design projects, two different decisions could 
be made, simply based on whether uncertainty is presented or not (Aven, 
2010b; Bjelland & Aven, 2013). 
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Probabilities are measures of uncertainty, which makes probability a useful 
concept in risk and safety assessments. However, there are several 
interpretations or types of probabilities that may be attributed to one’s 
scientific foundation, that is, a TR or a constructivist foundation. The major 
difference between a TR and a constructivist perspective is whether the 
probability is an objective property of a population (the frequentist 
perspective) or a subjective degree of belief, dependent on the background 
knowledge of the analyst (the Bayesian perspective). For a thorough 
discussion of these differences, see de Finetti (1989), Lindley (2006), Bedford 
& Cooke (2001), Aven (2012a), Franklin (2009), Singpurwalla (2006), 
Apostolakis (1990), Wallace & Ross (2006), Holton (2004). 
In fire safety science, as with the risk concept, there is little discussion about 
the philosophical foundation of probabilities, even though probabilities are 
important to many authors. When risk and probabilities are discussed, the 
frequentist perspective is often encountered (see, e.g., Frantzich, 1998; Hall Jr 
& Sekizawa, 1991; Ramachandran, 1988), while the supporters of the 
Bayesian, or subjective, perspective are more rare (Fitzgerald, 1991; Noonan 
& Fitzgerald, 1991). The frequentist perspective has severe limitations in the 
context of fire safety engineering, and a more diverse debate is inevitable, 
both for the sake of scientific maturity and for the sake of more appropriate 
decision making. Paper 7 (Bjelland & Aven, 2013) discusses safety 
engineering based on risk in more detail, while Paper 4 (Bjelland, et al., 
Submitted) discusses a framework for fire safety engineering that omits the 
use of risk and probability. The latter paper builds on the recognition that the 
great complexity of socio-technical systems and human intentionality is not 
easily quantified in terms of probabilities. That is, in a Bayesian perspective, 
probabilities may always be assigned, as they represent the subjective degree 
of belief of the analysts. However, it could be questioned whether such an 
assignment is dependable; for instance, in cases where the probabilistic data 
material is scarce, knowledge is represented in non-probabilistic terms and 
“the language of probability” is poorly understood by the actors involved in 
the processes. 
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2.3.3 Models 
Generally, one can say that the “purpose of models in science and technology 
is to make complex phenomena mentally manageable” (Östberg, 2003:257). 
This should be valid whether one takes the position of a technical rationality 
framework or a constructivist framework. 
However, the position of models, laws and causal relationships in the 
technical rationality tradition is more prominent than in the constructivist 
position. According to Wallace & Ross (2006:2) technical rationality 
“presupposes that science is the disinterested discovery of objective laws of 
nature that are not context specific (i.e., are universal) and should be 
mathematically expressed if possible.” 
Hence, the discovery of models that describe reality, i.e., truth, is a 
fundamental aim for science within a technical rationality framework. In a 
constructivist framework, however, acquiring a rich understanding of the 
situations of scientific interest is the goal. Models are not passively 
discovered but, rather, are generated actively during the scientific inquiry or 
engineering process in order to make sense of the perceived complexity of 
reality. “Models are active designs, related to the purpose of the modeler” 
(LeCoze, 2005:621). 
A model may be judged on the basis of whether or not it is a good 
representation of reality. This would be the technical rationality view, and in 
fire safety science it may be represented by, for instance, Beck & Yung 
(1990) or Hadjisophocleous & Fu (2007). Other possibilities are whether the 
model is useful for its purpose, a constructivist or instrumentalist view 
(LeCoze, 2005; Wallace & Ross, 2006), or empirically adequate, a 
constructive empiricist view, when the aim is to discover facts about the 
observable world (Monton & Mohler, 2012). In any case a model needs to 
capture the relevant (observable) structure of reality in order to be useful 
(March & Smith, 1995). Borg & Njå (2013) provide a broad discussion of the 
concept of validation of fire models in a fire safety engineering context and 
aim to release the concept of validation from its traditional TR interpretation 
in fire safety science. Meacham (1997) is also expressing similar concerns 
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about the narrow TR perspective of validation of fire models, and proposes 
that “validation” is substituted by the term “confidence”. 
2.3.4 Data 
In a TR framework, certain data will be given more credit than other data 
(Wallace & Ross, 2006). According to Singpurwalla (2003), data is that 
which is directly observable and, therefore, measurable, i.e., an empiricist 
view. In this case, data may simply be called facts or factual (Lindley, 2006; 
Singpurwalla, 2003). In the TR framework, quantitative data will also 
generally be favored before qualitative data. This may be statistics in terms of, 
for example, historical failure or accident frequencies that may be applied into 
the quantitative models of the technical rationality framework. 
Designing is a creative task of imagining and conceptualizing/representing 
future improved realities. Safety engineering is also a multidisciplinary task. 
Even though there is a safety engineer associated with a project, information 
and designing of safety-related issues come from many engineering 
disciplines. The conceptualizations of optional designs have a potential of 
being a catalyst for realizing tacit knowledge from the involved stakeholders. 
A broad perspective on safety engineering epistemology hence acknowledges 
a broad perspective on data relevant for design. Much of this data may not be 
realized before it is “activated” through possible design solutions, which 
fundamentally results from creative innovation. 
A strict empiricist, or TR, perspective may be too narrow to capture all 
relevant data/evidence in a design project. Take the difference of novices and 
experts (Cross & Cross, 1998; Dorst, 2008; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; 
Lawson & Dorst, 2009; Rust, 2004; Wood, Rust, & Horne, 2009). Novice 
designers and engineers within their respective disciplines will have different 
qualifications and mental capabilities. The difference in their competency may 
not be associated with their formal training and qualifications but with their 
potential for activating tacit knowledge, a knowledge of which they may be 
unaware until presented with a problem that requires it. The technical 
rationality framework would generally reject the possibility of tacit 
knowledge, as experience is seen as the only source of knowledge. Moreover, 
quantitative data would be preferred over qualitative data. However, 
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according to Wallace & Ross there should not be a prima-facie acceptance or 
priority of data in a specific form: “[t]he source of the data does not really 
matter because the key point is that data gathered from whatever source and 
in whatever form (e.g., textual or numeric) have to be treated similarly: as 
information to be classified and analyzed” (Wallace & Ross, 2006:31).  
Fire safety science builds on a strong empiricist tradition, and there is a great 
emphasis on obtaining fire and casualty statistics (see, e.g., Banks & 
Montgomery, 1983; Brennan, 1999; DSB, 2013; FEMA, 2013; Hasofer & 
Thomas, 2006; Holborn, Nolan, & Golt, 2003; Kose, 1999; Lizhong, 
Xiaodong, Zhihua, Weicheng, & Qing'an, 2002; Rahikainen & Keski-
Rahkonen, 1998; Ramsay, 1979; Richardson, 2001; Rosenberg, 1999; Spinna 
Jr, Spinna, & Dunn, 1984; Steen-Hansen, 1995) with, among others, the aim 
of using the data in design. However, the statistics are often coarse or relevant 
on a national level, while design projects are very specific and context 
dependent. This may be illustrated by the recent governmental work on fire 
safety for vulnerable groups (MJPS, 2012). Although fire safety for 
vulnerable groups is of major concern to the society, it is not possible to 
“rationalize” this concern using available statistics in benefit-cost analyses. 
The question, then, is whether the statistics represent the truth or whether 
there should be other sources of data also implemented in the analysis. 
Although fire statistics and other empirical data, e.g., fire tests or experiments, 
are important, the task of fire safety design may benefit from a broader 
perspective. 
2.3.5 Systems 
Systems are important “objects” within safety engineering and play a major 
role in both a technical rationality and a constructivist approach. However, the 
approach towards describing a system is fundamentally different. 
In a technical rationality framework, systems are described through 
decomposition into subsystems, components and individual parts. This is a 
reductionist framework. A fundamental assumption is of the existence of a 
linear “cause/effect-relationship” between components governed by 
underlying deterministic or probabilistic relationships. The system boundaries 
are effectively determined through the specification of components and 
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interactions, and, thus, there is a clear distinction between the system and its 
outer environment. According to Wallace & Ross (2006), this leads to a false 
simplicity. A narrow focus on individual components and reliability misses 
important “component interaction” failures. That is, there are cases when the 
systems components work reliably and “as intended,” but the system still 
fails, a problem positively correlated with increasing system complexity 
(Berk, 2009; Leveson, 2004, 2011b; McIntyre, 2000; Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 
1993; Wallace & Ross, 2006). 
According to Checkland (1999), the scientific method of reductionism, 
carefully executed experiments, and refutations of conjectures encounters 
problems in the face of increased system complexity; the social sciences, and 
real-life management and decision making. The keyword is complexity, and 
the systems are characterized as “open to the environment.” In contrast with 
the structured systems of natural sciences, it is difficult to draw a clear line 
between a social system and its environment. There “may be exchange of 
materials, energy, and information” (Checkland, 1999:82-83) between the 
system and its environment. Hence, the system as you knew it yesterday may 
not be the same system today. The predictions you make about the system 
may actually change the future behavior of the system. The search for 
fundamental and universal laws is exchanged with understanding “the logic of 
situations” (Checkland, 1999:71). At best one may be able to make 
predictions about a system’s behavior, given some clear assumptions about 
the situation. The difficulties of the scientific method to bring clarity to such 
complex situations led to the development of systems theory.  
Systems theory builds, according to Checkland (1999), on two pairs of 
fundamental ideas: emergence2 and hierarchy and communication and 
control. All complex systems can be modeled in terms of hierarchical levels 
of organizational control (Checkland, 1999; Leveson, 2004, 2011b; Jens 
Rasmussen, 1997; J Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Simonovic, 2010; 
Sydenham, 2003). System properties are emergent at a specific hierarchical 
level of the system and make sense only at this level. The systems behavior or 
                                                    
2
 The concept of emergence does not have a precise philosophical definition. For a 
background, see, for example, O’Connor  (1994); O’Connor & Wong  (2012); 
Johnson (2006); Pepper (1926); Meehl & Sellars (1956); Bedau (2003; 1997); Bedau 
& Humphreys (2008). 
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performance is controlled by the higher levels of system hierarchy imposing 
constraints on the lower levels. In order for this control to be effective, there is 
a need for communication, feed-back and feed-forward, about the state of the 
system (Leveson, 2011b). A holistic scientific framework needs to reject the 
reductionist thinking and would better off building on systems thinking. 
Systems thinking is not commonly adopted in the fire safety science literature, 
although some examples exist: e.g., Beard (1982) and Santos-Reyes & Beard 
(2001). The traditional view, more in line with the reliability engineering 
school (e.g., McIntyre, 2000), is associated with scientific reductionism with a 
focus on failure events and causal modeling (V. R. Beck, 1987; V. R. Beck & 
Yung, 1990; Frantzich, 1998; Hasofer & Beck, 1997; He, 2010; He, Horasan, 
Taylor, & Ramsay, 2002; Magnusson, Frantzich, Karlsson, & Särdqvist, 
1994). 
2.3.6 System performance 
The traditional TR perspective may be summarized by saying that a system’s 
performance is described as the sum of its parts (Checkland, 1999). Safety 
performance is measured in terms of a low risk. As we mentioned earlier, risk 
is an objective property of the system in a TR framework, thus performance 
may also be seen as an objective property of the system. The focus is on 
estimating this true performance (e.g., risk) using underlying causal 
relationships between system components. 
In systems theory the performance of a system cannot be described by 
decomposition into its constituent components. According to Wallace & Ross 
(2006), the performance of systems are best understood as a self-regulating 
process towards a point of natural homeostasis, which is context-dependent 
and may change over time (rheostasis). The key issue is to acknowledge the 
need for flow of open and precise/reliable information from top to bottom and 
from bottom to top in the system hierarchy to empower necessary adaptations 
at all levels (Checkland, 1999; Leveson, 2011b; Wallace & Ross, 2006). Such 
self-regulating system processes are also described by Gerald Wilde (2001) 
and John Adams (1995) as risk homeostasis. Safety management then 
becomes associated with the task of imposing controls and creating an 
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environment that enables the system to be kept within a safe state (Bjelland, et 
al., Submitted).  
In the interface between fire safety science and regulation, there is focus on 
verification of fire safety performance (Bukowski & Babrauskas, 1994; 
Bukowski & Tanaka, 1991; Lundin & Johansson, 2003; Magnusson, 
Frantzich, & Harada, 1996; NKB, 1994; Wolski, Dembsey, & Meacham, 
2000). The verification process, associated with fire safety for occupants, 
involves checking, for instance, whether the available safe egress time 
(ASET) is larger than the required safe egress time (RSET), either 
deterministically or probabilistically. This kind of verification makes sense in 
a technical rationality perspective. However, in an alternative holistic 
perspective, where system performance is constantly changing or adapting to 
the environment, the concept of verification of safety is more difficult to 
understand. Paper 4 deals with this issue, and a holistic framework for fire 
safety engineering is proposed (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). 
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3 DESIGN SCIENCE 
Selected topics from a design science perspective are presented in this section. 
The purpose of discussing design science is twofold, as mentioned in section 
1.6. First, design science involves, among other things, research into how 
designers work, how design processes evolve, and design methods. Hence, 
findings from the field of design science are an empirical foundation (data 
source) into the case studies conducted in this thesis (see section 5). Second, 
the work conducted in this project is design science, although the connection 
between fire safety engineering and design science is, to my knowledge, not 
often encountered. Hence, it was considered interesting to investigate design 
science with two questions in mind:  
• Why are designing and safety engineering perceived as different 
activities, demanding different knowledge and approaches?  
• What can safety engineering learn from the field of design science, 
with respect to increased understanding of what promotes and inhibits 
performance-based safety management of safety design? 
3.1 Simon’s positivism 
The field of design science emerged during the 1950s and is continuously 
evolving (Cross, 2007; Dorst, 2008; Galle, 2008). The early phase, which 
coincided with the positivistic tradition within the philosophy of science, is 
greatly influenced by Herbert A. Simon’s book The Sciences of the Artificial 
(Simon, 1996). Simon argues that design is about the activities we perform in 
making existing situations into preferred ones. Although Simon’s work and 
definition of designing has been quite influential (Cross, 2007; Dorst, 1997; 
Galle, 2011; Krippendorff, 2006; Lawson & Dorst, 2009; Schön, 1991), it is 
quite broad and unspecific. According to the definition, nearly everything can 
be called designing. 
Simon argues that an artifact “can be thought of as a meeting point – an 
“interface” in today’s terms – between an “inner” environment, the 
substance and organization of the artifact itself, and an “outer” environment, 
the environment in which it operates” (Simon, 1996:6). This distinction 
DESIGN SCIENCE 
36 
illustrates that the attainment of an artifact’s functions and goals are not 
entirely dependent on the artifact itself but must be seen in relation to the 
context in which it operates, that is, the outer environment and how this 
environment affects the artifact. Given that the outer environment is known, 
the behavior of the inner environment can be explained, much like the 
rationality of the “economic man” in economic theory (Simon, 1996). 
Examples of operationalization of such mechanist decision-making 
approaches are found in, for instance, Hazelrigg (1998) and Wassenaar & 
Chen (2001). 
Simon was influenced by the positivistic technical rationality tradition and 
aimed to develop a science of design capable of solving design problems 
within a technical rationality paradigm. As a basic assumption for this 
paradigm, he argues that there is no clear distinction between well-structured 
and ill-structured problems, and as such, the same principles to problem-
solving could be usable for both kinds (Simon, 1973). According to Simon, 
“no one in his right mind will satisfice if he can equally well optimize; no one 
will settle for good or better if he can have the best” (Simon, 1996:119). 
However, to accommodate the practical problems of the real world, he 
acknowledged that sometimes one would have to choose a satisficing solution 
instead of the optimal solution, since the number of possible designs is 
infinite. This is associated with the concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 
Egidi, Marris, & Viale, 1992), which is closely associated with Herbert Simon 
as well. 
Following Simon’s principles, safety engineering becomes an activity of 
structuring goals and performance criteria into a mathematical language 
(Cross, 2011; Dorst, 1997). Modeling, calculations and simulations are then 
devised to identify design alternatives that best fulfill the goals and 
performance criteria. This is an important part of safety engineering, which is 
emphasized in engineering practice, engineering education, safety regulations 
and safety standards development. However, technical rationality is not a 
solution to all design problems. For instance, it is not straightforward for 
developing goals and performance criteria for novel designs. Different 
stakeholders will have different opinions. Furthermore, there are great 
uncertainties associated with phenomena involved in safety engineering, e.g., 
how fires occur and develop and how people react in accident situations. A 
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great deal of knowledge about accidents, causal factors, human behavior etc., 
may only be present in qualitative form and sometimes only be tacitly 
understood. This makes the knowledge difficult to formalize in mathematical 
language and to transfer focus to individual engineer’s and expert’s skills. 
3.2 Schön’s reflective practice 
Donald Schön claims that design is a reflective conversation with the situation 
(Schön, 1991:79). The focus of his work is on the skills and experience a 
designer brings to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value 
conflict (Galle, 2011:84-85), and he is a strong critic of Simon’s technical 
rationality paradigm. His thoughts have influenced a great deal of recent work 
within design research (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000; Cross, 1999, 2001, 2011; 
Cross & Cross, 1998; Galle, 2011; Lawson & Dorst, 2009).  
Schön argues that technical rationality within design is only useful when the 
problems are well-structured, which important design problem are not. He 
uses a landscape analogy to illustrate this point, where it is argued that the 
major problems of professional design practice are revealed in the “swampy 
lowland,” whereas the well-structured part of design problems is the “high, 
hard ground” (Schön, 1991:42). While the technical rationalist tradition could 
produce tools to tackle those high, hard ground problems, such questions are 
relatively unimportant. It is the problems associated with the landscape of 
swampy lowlands that are of greatest human concern.  
Schön describes this as a dilemma of rigor or relevance in the development of 
instrumental design science theory. On the one hand, one could apply 
sophisticated technical methods to relatively unimportant problems; on the 
other hand, one could face the “messy but crucially important” problems that 
are outside the scope of technically sophisticated methods. In such cases one 
must rely on “experience, trial and error, intuition and muddling through” 
(Schön, 1991:43). Schön refers to messiness as situations involving 
complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value-conflict. To resolve 
these issues, he seeks an epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, 
intuitive processes that some practitioners seem to bring to such situations 
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(Cross, 1999, 2011; Galle, 2011; Lawson & Dorst, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 
1984; Schön, 1991).  
In my view, Schön contributes to safety engineering by expanding the notion 
of relevant knowledge for engineering problems into a more holistic 
perspective. Designing is not just about technical rationality but about what 
skillful practitioners brings to the table in design projects (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
1986). An important skill of the designer is the ability to frame the design 
problems in different ways (Cross & Cross, 1998; Dorst, 2011; Schön, 1991). 
In fire safety engineering, a practitioner may, for instance, frame fire safety 
within a historical context. For him, design solutions that were acceptable 
yesterday must be acceptable today (Bjelland & Njå, 2012a). Another 
practitioner may frame the issue of fire safety as an emergent property of a 
system (Leveson, 2011b). The way these two practitioners go about solving a 
design problem, their epistemological framework, and how they evaluate the 
quality of the finished design will be considerably different. 
Another important skill is associated with the designer’s ability to structure 
the “solution space” and mode of thinking in a certain design context by 
building on a repertoire of previous experience (Schön, 1991:315-317). An 
example from fire safety engineering is the study of common sets of design 
problems in different occupancy classes. If one deals with a hospital, one 
knows that there will be people unable to rescue themselves in a fire, and the 
knowledge of how this was solved in similar cases will guide the design – 
even if the design situation is new to the designer.  
A major challenge with recognizing reflection-in-action as a source of 
knowledge in engineering is that practitioners are unaware of what they 
knows and why they know it. Consequently, it is a challenge to justify the 
quality and rigor of an approach based on this knowledge. Schön argues that 
this is an important reason for studying reflection-in-action with the goal to 
develop an epistemology of practice. In this epistemology, technical problem 
solving is placed within a broader context of reflective inquiry, i.e., it is a part 
of, but not the sole content of, the epistemology. Furthermore, it would show 
how reflection-in-action is rigorous in its own right and be relevant to the 
messiness of the spiral and co-evolving process of problem framing and 
problem solving that goes on in real-life projects (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000; 
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Dorst, 2011; Schön, 1991). The goal of the design process becomes one of 
developing a matching pair of design problems and design solutions (Cross, 
2011; Lawson & Dorst, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1984): “What you need to 
know about the problem only becomes apparent as you’re trying to solve it” 
(Cross, 2011:14). Creativity then becomes an important part of the designer’s 
repertoire of thinking skills and knowledge (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000; de 
Bono, 1990; Dorst & Cross, 2001). The need for a broadening of the 
knowledge base, from technical rationality to more social and human skills, is 
also increasingly emphasized within the engineering community (e.g., ASCE, 
2008). 
3.3 Krippendorff’s second-order knowledge 
Klaus Krippendorff argues that design is the activity of proposing realizable 
artifacts to others (Krippendorff, 2006:25). The artifact does not exist at the 
time of designing. What we want is to create an artifact that will have a set of 
properties that will fulfill its stakeholders’ needs. Since it does not exist at the 
time of designing, it cannot have any properties, so the only way to succeed is 
to predict the properties of the artifact when it is put into use. According to 
Dorst (2003:6), a design project is a “problem-solving process for the outside 
world.” This process needs to be controlled and justified to the stakeholders. 
Consequently, the designer anticipates and justifies what the design will mean 
to others, a second-order knowledge (Galle, 2011:87; Krippendorff, 2006). 
Based on this we see that while Schön focuses on the reflective designer’s 
knowledge, Krippendorff focuses on the design/artifact’s stakeholders: What 
will be the technological, social and cultural consequences of the artifact for 
the different stakeholders?  
A science for design needs to build on a distinct type of epistemology that has 
the potential to reflect the revolutionary and innovative characteristics of 
design. What worked previously is a poor standard for new designs, as is 
common with the conventions and rules set forth by authorities. Conversely, 
what Krippendorff argues for is a search for variability – to create spaces of 
possibility. Furthermore, since designers are concerned with making artifacts 
that will produce new, desirable futures (anticipated by the designer), there is 
a need to inquire into sources of resistance to change and how to circumvent 
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them. The designer must rely on others, the stakeholders, to realize a design. 
As such, the designers’ visions of desirable futures must be shared by the 
stakeholders’ visions. 
This is an invitation to conduct a broad search for possible stakeholder needs 
and values. When dealing with issues of risk and safety, costs and benefits are 
often distributed among different stakeholders. A narrow perspective may 
lead to poor designs when seen from the society’s perspective, in which risks 
are unfairly distributed across different groups. In the context of human-
centered design, Krippendorff argues for a broad methodology that can 
capture the user’s understanding and learning processes about how interfaces 
between the design and its users evolve, how stakeholders will talk about the 
design, and which communities are likely or unlikely to embrace the design 
(Krippendorff, 2006:211). 
3.4 Evaluating quality in design decisions 
The search for quality in design is not a search for truth. Even Simon (1996), 
who argues from a positivistic tradition, admits that one often will have to 
satisfice rather than optimize. The real world is not a cold, rational and logical 
world. Designing is, thus, “rather about getting agreement about what is best 
in the context – it is a social process” (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000:66). 
Moreover, it is “fortunate that strict truth and precision are not necessary for 
practice – for if it were, nothing would ever get done!” (Blockley & Godfrey, 
2000:113). 
While search for truth is the goal in natural science, safety is the goal of safety 
engineering. Consequently, the truth may not be necessary as long as the 
evidence (for safety) is dependable. Truth is (of course) sufficient but 
unnecessary for dependability. Testing the evidence through scientific 
experiments is one way to achieve dependability, but this is not always 
possible, especially when dealing with “soft systems” (Blockley & Godfrey, 
2000:95). The amount of “verification” of the evidence depends on the 
context and what problem to solve. If the specific problem is critical for the 
design, more efforts should be put into obtaining supporting evidence in order 
to achieve dependability. According to Krippendorff’s (2006), designers must 
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substantiate what are essentially semantic claims without bypassing the 
stakeholders involved. 
Quality is multi-faceted and not just a straightforwardly measurable property 
of the design. According to Weinberg (1972) and Funtowicz & Ravetz (1992), 
there are limits to what can be answered by “normal science,” which is also 
relevant for design issues. Some parts of the design may be evaluated using 
the technical rationality of quantitative models and formulas. Other qualities 
need to be evaluated qualitatively, subjectively and even creatively, as the 
design may be a solution to problems with which we have no previous 
experience. The idea that a regime of technical rationality will solve all the 
problems seems to miss what design is all about. Knowledge in design is 
about understanding what stakeholders want, whether they are a building’s 
owner or users, its regulators, or a new building’s neighbors. According to 
(1972:218), “he whose shoe pinches can tell something to the shoemaker.” 
Some values will be quantitative, others will not. The design process must 
resolve conflicts and attend to the different demands using the appropriate 
skills and knowledge. A designer has a responsibility to act on the basis of a 
theory or model and a professional duty of care to fulfill a role as a designer 
(Blockley & Godfrey, 2000). This includes developing professional respect in 
the community, a respect that is enhanced by outstanding performances and 
demolished by manifested incompetence and unethical behaviors 
(Krippendorff, 2006). 
3.5 Creativity in design 
“Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is 
limited to all we now know and understand, while imagination 
embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and 
understand.” – Albert Einstein 
Edward De Bono argues that there is a fundamental difference between 
intelligence, the ability to analyze, and the ability to be able to operate in the 
real world: “Intelligence is concerned with the truth, while design is 
concerned with possibility and value: you can have truth about the past but 
you can only have possible value about the future” (de Bono, 2007:47). 
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Humans tend to develop categories and links between categories. In this way, 
standard situations and links are created that constitute patterns for their 
thinking. Due to our developed linking patterns between them, it is easy to 
connect issues belonging to already known categories to other categories. 
Consider the link between a certain symptom of a disease and the common 
treatment for this disease. The treatment becomes obvious once the symptoms 
are categorized. Similarly, we tend to prescribe solutions for buildings and 
road tunnels based on predetermined categories and linking rules, i.e., 
prescribed design rules (Blockley, 1980). The advantages of creative thinking 
are brought forward when one is able to see patterns which, at first, seem 
illogical. When the pattern is identified, logic is often found by hindsight (de 
Bono, 2007). 
Sometimes our pre-determined categories are narrow and single-minded. It 
may be hard to see that an issue should belong to one of our already 
developed categories of thinking. As such, we might miss the connection 
between this issue and some other important category. The result of such 
thinking is an emphasis on “what is” by the use of tools like analysis, 
judgment and argument. Although this is useful in many situations, it limits 
our perspective on thinking about “what could be,” which is more about 
constructive and creative thinking and “designing a way forward” (de Bono, 
1999:2). 
The engineering disciplines are sometimes associated with vertical thinking 
(ASCE, 2008). The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) illustrates 
the concept of vertical thinking by a silo of relevant knowledge for the 
specific field of engineering. Skilled engineers are those who have managed 
to develop a very deep silo of knowledge that they apply to the problems 
encountered. The cost of such thinking may be the lack of attention to 
knowledge outside the silo, which may lead into an intelligence trap. The 
intelligence trap is, among other things, characterized by defending a bad 
solution by the application of flawless logic. Lateral thinking, e.g., 
multidisciplinary thinking; multi-layer thinking; horizontal thinking etc., is a 
preventive measure in this respect. Lateral thinking involves expanding the 
repertoire of patterns in which we think about the world (ASCE, 2008:52; 
Blockley & Godfrey, 2000:119; de Bono, 1978, 1990). Designing in the 
constantly changing and complex world is about resolving issues in 
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multidisciplinary teams towards a specified purpose. The design problem does 
not present itself for standard problem-solving but needs to be developed and 
reframed as possible solutions emerge, taking into account the evolving 
design situation and the designers’ knowledge and skills (Blockley & 
Godfrey, 2000; Cross, 2011; Dorst, 2011; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Schön, 
1991). 
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4 SETTING THE SCENE 
In this section I introduce the targets of design, i.e., buildings and road 
tunnels, and the targets of my research, i.e., fire safety engineering and design 
processes. Fire safety design of buildings and road tunnels is dealt with by fire 
safety engineering using either prescriptive design rules or performance-based 
principles. Hence, a short introduction to these concepts is provided, followed 
by a short presentation of the common design process. 
4.1 Buildings and road tunnels 
A common trait with the artifacts we are concerned with in this thesis is that 
they are socio-technical systems. The artifacts are designed to serve one or 
more purposes, and these purposes are fulfilled by combining the properties of 
the physical construction and the human intervention within a situational 
context (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000; Checkland, 1999; Kobes, Helsloot, de 
Vries, & Post, 2010; Leveson, 2011b; Njå, 1998). The output, that is, the 
performance of the socio-technical system, leads to some smaller or larger 
change in the world that will feed back to the operation of the socio-technical 
system. See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Goal-achievement of socio-technical systems. 
The physical construction is the “hard” part of the system. In a road tunnel, 
for instance, it is the tunnel walls, the traffic signs, the emergency exit doors, 
the smoke ventilation fans and the signaling system. In a building, it may be 
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the structural load bearing system, the separating walls, the windows and 
doors, the alarm systems and so on. Practically all modern technical systems 
include some computerized control, which includes software. In this context, 
the computerized control and software are understood as part of the physical 
construction.  
Human intervention is needed for the system to perform and produce outputs. 
Hard systems are embedded in soft systems (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000). For 
instance, a residential building is not a home before someone starts living 
there, and concert arenas are not fulfilling their purpose before people are 
present. A situational context for the concert arena may be the occurrence of a 
fire caused by pyrotechnics on the stage. In order to produce favorable outputs 
in this situation, the physical construction need to be properly designed and 
maintained. The involved humans have to be prepared through procedures and 
training (crew and internal staff) and need to respond to the current situation 
(both crew and audience).  
In association with work on this thesis, we have had the pleasure of being 
involved in the Rogfast subsea road tunnel project. The Rogfast project aims 
to provide a ferry-free connection across the Bokn Fjord in Rogaland, 
Norway. Since the early visions of a project in the beginning of the 1980s, the 
number of alternatives has been effectively narrowed down to a single route. 
The proposed tunnel will be approximately 25.5 kilometers long due to the 
breadth and depth of the fjord, with an additional four kilometer tube to the 
island of Kvitsøy. It will be approximately 390 meters below the sea surface 
at its deepest point. The Rogfast will, if realized, be the longest and deepest 
road tunnel in the world. For more information about the Rogfast project, see 
Alsaker (1997), NPRA (2007), Dahle et al. (2006), Jenssen et al. (2006), 
Hokstad et al. (2012). 
Lately, there has been concern about whether steep and long descents and 
ascents may cause problems for heavy goods vehicles (see, e.g., NPRA, 2012; 
Nævestad & Meyer, 2012; Skogvang, Rokstad, Værnes, Øglænd, & Jenssen, 
2011). An important issue is whether or not the existing knowledge, 
regulations, and design process procedures are appropriate for this project. 
Using the existing framework involves extrapolating our knowledge into 
spheres of uncertainty. This has proven fatal before, for instance, when 
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looking at the history of bridge building (Petroski, 2006). In paper 7 (Bjelland 
& Aven, 2013), included in part II of this thesis, we look at the treatment of 
uncertainty in the Rogfast’s risk analyses and propose a framework for how to 
deal with uncertainty in a risk analysis context. In paper 8 (Borg, et al., 
Submitted), we scrutinize a new Bayesian network risk assessment model 
applied to the Rogfast case.  
4.2 Fire safety engineering 
Fire safety engineering (FSE) is often used interchangeably with fire 
protection engineering (Wilkinson, Glockling, Bouchlaghem, & Ruikar, 
2011). A common definition is that FSE is the “application of science and 
engineering principles to protect people and their environment from 
destructive fire” (Hurley, 2009). This involves activities associated with the 
identification and analysis of fire hazards: developing proposals for mitigating 
fire damage by design; constructing, arranging and using buildings and 
transportation systems; assessing the consequences of using different 
materials and structures; determining the feasibility and designing of fire 
detection and fire suppression system, and contributing to fire investigations 
and post-accident analyses. 
Although FSE often is associated with the application of “scientific” and 
“engineering principles,” fire safety design by the application of prescriptive 
solutions is often included in FSE. The reason may be that most fire safety 
designing activity is based on the application of prescriptive solutions 
(Bjelland & Njå, 2012a). Nevertheless, the mixture causes some confusion, as 
fire safety design based on prescriptive solutions can hardly be recognized as 
using scientific and engineering principles in the traditional sense of 
understanding these concepts. 
If we want to be clear about understanding FSE as the application of scientific 
and engineering principles to the design activity, we have to add the term 
“performance-based,” i.e., performance-based FSE. Performance-based FSE 
is commonly known within the FSE community as the design of a building by 
determining (1) performance goals and objectives, (2) analyzing fire 
scenarios, and (3) quantitatively assessing design alternatives against the fire 
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safety goals and objectives using engineering tools, methodologies and 
performance criteria (SFPE, 2000). 
FSE is a multi-disciplinary field of engineering. A complete fire safety design 
for a building often includes a sprinkler system, a fire alarm system, fire 
separating walls and fire-protected, load-bearing constructions. This involves 
interfaces with mechanical, plumbing, electrical and structural engineering, as 
well as architecture.  
In Norway, the responsibility for design of systems, subsystems and buildings 
is separated into two levels: “concept” and “detailed” design (NBRI, 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c). The fire safety engineering discipline is only responsible for 
concept design, while the other engineering disciplines and the architect are 
responsible for detailed design. For instance, in the case of a fire alarm 
system, the fire safety engineer specifies whether a system shall be present, 
what areas it shall cover and relevant dimensioning standards. The detailed 
design, i.e., the selections of detectors, spacing of detectors, programming 
design, etc., are conducted by the electrical engineer (and sometimes by a sub-
contracted fire alarm system supplier). Consequently, the Norwegian fire 
safety engineer has a limited effect on the detail design of the systems he/she 
proposes. The fire safety engineer supplies the other disciplines with 
necessary premises for detailed design. 
4.3 Design principles 
4.3.1 Safety by prescription 
The prescriptive codes may be viewed as a collection of design solutions or 
performance requirements which: (1) have been introduced to prevent the 
reoccurrence of a specific accident, and (2) are not yet proven to be 
inadequate in that respect. The prescriptive design rules are not falsified yet 
(Blockley, 1980). Prescriptive regulations may be seen as “IF-THEN”-rules 
(cf., Figure 3) (Blakstad, 2006). Necessary actions, measures, and activities 
are given in advance. For instance, IF you are designing a concert arena, 
THEN the maximum distance to an emergency exit should be 30 m. 
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Figure 3: Prescriptive regulations as IF-THEN-relationships. 
While the premodern designs and artifacts were quite simple and operated in a 
transparent environment, our contemporary designs are not. Introduction of 
modern technology, which, for instance, relies on computers and software and 
operates in a globalized environment of systems with tight couplings, has 
made it difficult to identify clear and isolated causes of accidents (U. Beck, 
1992; Leveson, 2011b; Perrow, 1999; Jens Rasmussen, 1997). The major 
challenge with a reactive safety approach and prescriptive regulations is 
illustrated by Figure 4. Our collective experience, which is documented 
through the prescriptive regulations, only covers a part of the possible 
universes of IFs and THENs that might be appropriate in a certain situation. 
This may be a problem when both the IFs and the THENs need to be 
determined in advance of a specific project or problem (Hale & Swuste, 
1998). Consider again the maximum distance to emergency exits in a concert 
arena. First, there are many ways of designing a concert arena, so the IF-side 
is not easy to determine. Second, there may be multiple means available in 
terms of satisfying the ultimate purpose: safe egress during fire. Hence, the 
THEN-side is not easily determinable either. 
 
Figure 4: Prescriptive regulations as IF-THEN-relationships. 
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4.3.2 Safety by clarifying objectives 
A focus on system performance is a focus on the “ends” (results/outcomes) 
rather than the “means” (measures or activities) during the design phase. This 
focus allows the implementation of any measure or activity that will fulfill 
performance objectives (Blakstad, 2006; Bukowski & Babrauskas, 1994; 
Bukowski & Tanaka, 1991; Hadjisophocleous, Benichou, & Tamim, 1998; 
Kirwan, Hale, & Hopkins, 2002; Meacham & Custer, 1995; Watkins, 2007). 
Fewer constraints are thus imposed on the designs, which possibly make it 
unnecessary to compromise some other important trait of the design for fire 
safety requirements. 
Performance objectives need to be developed to assess performance. The 
performance objectives state what the system is desired to accomplish on all 
levels of the socio-technical system (Maguire, 2008; Watkins, 2007). 
Developing performance objectives involves identifying the project’s 
stakeholders and their individual objectives. For a new building, this may be 
its future users, neighbors, owners, maintenance personnel, fire and rescue 
service and the society as a whole (represented by legislators). Paper 4 
(Bjelland, et al., Submitted) proposes as framework for fire safety engineering 
that builds from fire safety performance objectives that define the desired 
state of safety. 
4.4 Design processes 
Construction projects, whether buildings, road tunnels or offshore platforms, 
often follow the Capital Value Process (CVP) depicted in Figure 5 (Kjellén, 
2007). The CVP outlines the phases a project goes through from a business 
development plan to operation. At the end of each phase, there are decision 
processes, illustrated by decision gates (DG) in Figure 5, where one evaluates 
the foundation for decision-making developed in the preceding phase. The 
project may not proceed to the next project stage before the requirement given 
in the DG is fulfilled.  
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Figure 5: The Capital Value Process (CVP) from business development to 
operations (Kjellén, 2007). 
The CVP is linear. The process is initiated with a design problem, for instance 
one developed from the societal need to cross a fjord. As the CVP progresses, 
the level of detail associated with the design increases. In the feasibility study, 
one could consider several alternatives: a subsea road tunnel, a ferry-
connection, a floating bridge, a suspension bridge, doing nothing, etc. The 
level of detail is coarse, but the assessments need to point to the important 
factors that separate the different options. When one comes to the preparation 
for the execution phase, the concept has been selected and many decision 
variables have been locked. At this stage, the assessments need to point to 
consequences of selecting different products, equipment or measures, such as 
what fire alarm system is required, where the detectors should be placed, and 
what sensitivity the detectors need. 
4.5 Putting it together 
In summation, then, we have future buildings and road tunnels that are to 
serve some purpose and cover human needs. In most cases, safety is an 
important function. For instance, residential buildings are designed to give 
people shelter from the elements, and road tunnels may be designed to replace 
accident-prone stretches of the open road. However, all our activities lead to 
some future consequences, some of which may be considered as losses or 
negatives. At the time of design, the future consequences are uncertain. We do 
not know whether they will occur or what their magnitude will be if they 
should occur. This is the risk that is involved, for someone, with carrying out 
an activity. The major challenge is to balance different concerns and 
fundamentally to attain designs that are fit for their purpose (Blockley & 
Godfrey, 2000). 
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A large system is involved in reaching decisions about design and safety. For 
instance, we have professionals, such as safety scientists and fire safety 
engineers, whose aim is to develop new knowledge and systematize existing 
information and knowledge. The work they are doing is based on fundamental 
worldviews, scientific methods and conventions, models, techniques and 
principles. Moreover, we have safety legislation, either prescriptive or 
performance-based, and we have design processes that create interactions 
between those having a need, designers and other stakeholders. Safety 
legislation is dependent on the status of science and engineering knowledge. 
For instance, should the height of a timber-frame constructed building be 
limited by political consensus, or are we in a position to trust science and 
engineering to reach appropriate decisions? Furthermore, safety legislation 
affects the way design processes are organized. For instance, the actors who 
are involved in a design project and at what time they are involved depend 
upon national requirements for competency and building application 
processes. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore elements of this complex system for 
attaining designs that are fit for their purpose. Especially, the focus is on the 
perspectives of risk-informed thinking (e.g., Aven, 2012a) and systems 
thinking (e.g., Leveson, 2011b) for safety engineering. A fundamental 
question is associated with the appropriateness of the scientific foundation, 
connected to the nature of engineering knowledge and thinking, and the nature 
of complex socio-technical systems and design processes. 
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5 RESEARCH APPROACH 
5.1 Background for the research 
The major issue on which it was hoped that this work could shed some 
additional light is: what promotes and inhibits performance-based safety 
management of design processes? Factors associated with this question may 
be considered the dependent variables. From the definition of fire safety 
engineering (FSE), performance-based safety management is the application 
of scientific and engineering principles and judgments to accommodate 
specified performance objectives. As depicted in Figure 1, the research was 
focused around these units: (A) fire safety engineering practice, (B) safety 
science in general, and fire safety science in particular, and (C) safety 
regulation. The question could thus be rewritten: what, in (A), (B) and (C), 
promotes and inhibits performance-based safety management of design 
processes? 
Lincoln & Guba (1985:251) emphasize the value of lengthy experience with 
the field of study in terms of increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
the formal work. Hence, it should be mentioned that an important background 
for this work is the author’s professional experience with the fire safety 
engineering business in one of Norway’s largest consulting companies since 
2004, being involved in some 20-30 projects each year. This involves both 
fire safety design projects and peer reviews of other consultant companies’ 
designs. A crucial issue, which should be kept in mind here, is the experience 
that the current performance-based safety management regime is not working 
properly. Generally, the application of prescriptive design rules is the norm of 
practice, while scientific principles and discussions of performance objectives, 
are rather rare exceptions. This background has affected the research approach 
in terms of narrowing down the research questions and the selections of units 
for analysis.  
During the project the author had the opportunity to be involved in national 
and European standardization committees. The national work involves 
participating in Standards Norway Committee SN/K 227, which in 2012 was 
responsible for the revision of the Norwegian standard NS 3901 Requirements 
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for risk assessment of fire in construction works (SN, 2012). The European 
work concerns participation and responsibility for developing a work item 
concerning risk assessment and evaluation criteria in Task Group (TG) 1 Fire 
Safety Engineering, which is organized under CEN Technical Committee (TC) 
127 Fire Safety in Buildings. Participation in these committees was helpful in 
identifying how major concepts in fire safety engineering are interpreted by 
different actors. The CEN-work also triggered collaboration with Swedish 
colleagues and a contribution to a paper (Cronsioe, Strömgren, Tonegran, & 
Bjelland, 2012) that discusses the revised Swedish building regulations as a 
possible model for performance-based fire safety legislations in Europe. The 
participation in the standardization committees showed that the identified “a-
priori challenges” with maintaining a functional performance-based fire safety 
management regime was also a major European concern. Generally, the major 
issue is debates about how to verify that a certain design has an acceptable 
safety level. Discussions are especially connected to the deterministic fire 
modeling approach. For instance: What design fire scenarios are appropriate? 
What occupant loading scenarios are appropriate? What tolerability criteria 
are appropriate (temperature, toxic concentration, visibility etc)? The risk 
analysis (probabilistic) approach is also discussed. However, it seems to be a 
common view that universal risk acceptance criteria are lacking; hence, 
developments of this approach may be postponed until such criteria exist. 
This focus on universally true or appropriate values (for scenarios, tolerability 
criteria and risk acceptance) makes sense in a technical rationality regime for 
safety science, but is rather meaningless in a holistic, constructivist 
perspective. This kindled the idea of investigating the scientific framework as 
one of the independent variables in this study. 
5.2 General research strategy 
An underlying topic through the preceding sections has been the contrast 
between technical rationality and an alternative, holistic approach to safety 
science. This contrast also influences the research approach, i.e., the 
fundamental paradigm in which the research is conducted (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985:250). The technical rationality regime favors research methods 
associated with the natural sciences. For instance, the hypothetico-deductive 
method (Popper, 2002) is the foundation of a framework where propositions 
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are deduced from hypotheses, which are tested using controlled and clearly 
defined experiments. The experiments will either falsify or corroborate the 
propositions. Generalizing research findings is a major objective of science, 
and focus is directed at a few clearly defined variables, holding the situational 
context at an arm’s length. The researcher is detached from the situation, 
collecting “hard” quantitative data that are analyzed in formal language.  
The “scientific method” associated with the technical rationality regime has 
produced a great amount of important knowledge in the natural sciences. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that it will be appropriate in other 
fields of research and phenomena, especially phenomena associated with the 
social sciences and the increasing complexity of socio-technical systems 
(Checkland, 1999; Wallace & Ross, 2006). An alternative perspective to the 
technical rationality approach includes taking a naturalist approach to research 
(Hammersley, 1990; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Ritchie, 2008). In a naturalistic 
enquiry, there is less connection between the scientific paradigm and research 
methods. According to Hammersley (1990:153) a naturalistic research 
approach “respects the nature of the social world.” The goal is to understand 
the world as it is, preferably without seeing it through the spectacles of a 
predetermined theory or a rigid scientific method.  
This thesis builds on a holistic systems perspective on safety science. 
Buildings, infrastructures and the activities associated with them are complex 
socio-technical systems. They involve interactions among components that 
are non-linear, and they involve people with intentions. The system you may 
want to test in a scientific experiment one day may be a completely different 
system the next day. In accordance with a holistic perspective on science and 
the phenomenon involved in this research, it was decided to adopt a research 
strategy based on case studies (see, e.g., Andersen, 1997; Blaikie, 2000; 
Gagnon, 2010; Host, Rainer, & Runeson, 2012; Wellington & Szczerbinski, 
2007; Woodside, 2010; Yin, 1981, 1994). According to Yin (1994:13) a case 
study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” 
A case study focuses on an individual or single object, rather than a 
representative sample from a large population (Andersen, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 
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2006). The key issue is not representativeness, in the statistical sense, but the 
knowledge that can be attained through studying the specific object. The 
object refers here to a social unit, such as an individual, a group, a profession 
or an activity. The formulation of the research questions defines what “the 
case” is (Yin, 1994). In this study a major focus has been directed at 
professional, scientific and regulative practice as units for investigation in 
order to identify possible variables that affect performance-based safety 
management. 
Designing is a social activity that involves actors with different knowledge, 
ambitions and goals. Moreover, there are external frame conditions, such as 
political decisions and national economy, which may affect a certain design 
project. Hence, the object of study is approached holistically, i.e., the case 
study acknowledges the importance of context in the research situation. The 
major objective is to achieve a deep understanding of the cases that are being 
researched. Researchers are encouraged to adopt several methods for data 
collection and also to obtain data/evidence from different sources. All 
evidence is of some use, and nothing is automatically disregarded as 
irrelevant. There is a continuous weighing of the importance/relevance of 
evidence, checking and corroborating. The aim is to develop a chain of 
evidence (Yin, 1981, 1994). In this thesis the major issue has been 
investigated from different angles, through different case studies and using 
multiple types of data/evidence. 
5.3 Case studies 
In order to shed light on the major issue of this project, research has been 
conducted as a series of case studies. Six case studies have been conducted in 
total, each of which aims to cover its specific part in the overall goal to shed 
light on the dependent variables associated with the question: what promotes 
and inhibits performance-based safety management of design processes? 
Table 1 provides an overview and description of the different case studies. 
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Table 1: Overview of case studies. 
# Description of case study Unit of study Variables 
A Fire safety engineering practice in 
Norway in the period from 1997-2012. 
Important contexts are the performance-
based fire safety regulation regime that 
was introduced in 1997 and the 
contributions/interactions with fire safety 
science and general safety science. 
A professional 
practice 
Methodology, 
building 
characteristics, 
deviations from 
prescriptive design 
rules, regulative 
framework  
B Fire safety science’s treatment of major 
concepts associated with the 
measurement of safety levels and safety 
margins. Important contexts are 
philosophy of science, general safety 
science and engineering epistemology. 
A scientific 
practice 
Scientific 
foundation, 
methodological 
issues, approaches 
for decision 
making  
C 40 different fire safety configurations 
(fire safety strategies) of multi-story 
residential apartment buildings. 
Important contexts are the fire safety 
engineering practice and the fire safety 
regulations. 
An engineering 
methodological 
practice 
Building 
characteristics, fire 
safety measures, 
value of model 
parameters 
D Application of an engineering approach/ 
methodology to a specific design 
example: a concert hall. Important 
contexts are the regulative and 
scientifically methodological 
assumptions about decision making in 
FSE.  
An engineering 
methodological 
practice 
Building 
characteristics, 
methodological 
issues, scientific 
foundation, 
regulative 
framework 
E Risk analyses and uncertainty 
management in the Rogfast road tunnel 
project. Important contexts are the 
Norwegian safety regulations for road 
tunnels and risk analysis research. 
An engineering 
process 
Uncertainty 
treatment, risk 
concept 
understanding, 
regulative 
framework 
F Application of the TRANSIT Bayesian 
Network model for risk analysis in road 
tunnels generally, and the Rogfast tunnel 
specifically. Important contexts are the 
engineering practice and epistemology 
and risk analysis research. 
An engineering 
process 
Risk analysis 
practice, decision-
makers’ needs, 
road tunnel 
characteristics, use 
of models 
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Table 2 shows the connection between the research questions (RQs), the case 
studies and the papers included in Part II. The RQs presented in section 1.5 
are repeated here: 
• RQ 1: What characterizes current fire safety engineering practice after 
the introduction of performance-based regulations and promotion of 
scientific engineering principles? 
• RQ 2: How are the concepts of “safety” and “safety level” reflected in 
the fire safety engineering research community? 
• RQ 3: Why are current fire safety engineering practice, fire safety 
science and fire safety regulations focusing on “relative safety” and 
the associated “equivalence approach” for evaluating fire safety 
levels? 
• RQ 4: What can we learn from current engineering practice, safety 
science and regulations in order to promote performance-based safety 
management of design processes in the future? 
Table 2: Connection between RQs and the case studies A-F. 
RQ # Case studies 1) Papers 2) 
A B C D E F 
1 M S S S - - 1,2,3,(4) 
2 S M S S - - (3),4 
3 - - M M - - 5,6 
4 S M S S M M 4,7,8 
1)
 M = Main contribution, S = Secondary contribution 
2)
 A paper’s secondary contribution illustrated by parentheses 
 
5.4 Sources of data/evidence 
The different sources of data/evidence for the thesis are described in Table 3. I 
have tried to illustrate how the different sources of data/evidence connect with 
the research questions and case studies. For instance, literature surveys were 
relevant as data to all four research questions and all six case studies. Another 
example is that fire and smoke simulations were conducted using the Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (McGrattan, McDermott, Hostikka, & Floyd, 2010) as 
input to answer research question 3 in case studies C and D. 
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Table 3: The sources of data/evidence and connection with research questions 
(RQ) and case studies. 
Sources of data/evidence 
What promotes and inhibits 
performance-based safety 
management of design processes? 
Input to 
case 
studies: RQ 1 RQ 2 RQ 3 RQ 4 
Literature surveys: fire safety 
science, safety science and 
design science 
X X X X A,B,C,D,E,F 
Fire safety regulations in the 
building industry  
X  X X A,B,C,D 
Safety regulations in the road 
tunneling industry 
   X E,F 
Documentation from FSE 
projects 
X  X  A,D 
Fire and smoke simulations: 
available versus required safe 
egress time (ASET versus 
RSET) 
  X  C,D 
Risk analyses   X  C 
Papers 1,2,3,(4) (3),4 5,6 4,7,8  
 
5.4.1 Literature surveys 
Literature searches were performed on several topics to develop an 
understanding of current research developments. The following databases 
were mainly used: Scopus, Science Direct, IEEE Xplore, SpringerLink, 
Bibsys (Norwegian public library search engine), Google Scholar and Google, 
and ISI Web of Knowledge. In addition, searches were conducted on public 
databases associated with recognized institutions within their fields of 
research (e.g., Lund University, Sintef Norway, SP Sweden, National Institute 
of Standards and Technology and the National Research Council Canada). 
Literature surveys have been conducted on the subjects: fire safety science; 
general safety science; risk research and design science. 
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5.4.2 Documentation from fire safety engineering projects 
Data were collected from current Norwegian fire safety engineering projects 
in order to answer research question 1, which is related to understanding 
current practice. It was decided to collect documentation from construction 
projects since 1997, when a performance-based regulation regime was 
introduced. There is no public archive for design documentation in Norway. 
The documentation was thus requested by sending an initiating letter to 
approximately 50 private and public property developers/owners. To follow 
up, we emailed the initial letter to the original recipients of the letters and 
called them. We received documentation on 75 different projects from 21 
different property developers/owners (Bjelland & Njå, 2012a, 2012b). 
Another approach could have been to collect data directly from fire safety 
engineering consultant companies. Given that the companies had been willing 
to participate, it would probably have been easier to collect the data. 
Nevertheless, the main reason for not asking consultant companies was the 
risk of receiving only “favorable projects,” i.e., projects where the consultant 
company were especially satisfied with their work. 
The data covering current fire safety engineering practice were analyzed by 
investigating central concepts and methodologies. Selection of the analysis’ 
focus was based on personal experience with the business and major emerging 
trends from the documentation. For instance, a major issue was related to how 
fire safety engineers used the risk concept and evaluated a safety level. This 
issue has been heavily discussed in the business, both nationally and 
internationally, since the introduction of a performance-based fire safety 
regulation regime in the 1990s. A qualitative methodology was applied, with 
an aim of understanding the meaning of central concepts and the 
characteristics of design processes. 
5.4.3 Fire and smoke simulations and risk analyses 
Risk assessments and simulations were conducted to pinpoint the 
methodological challenges, the task associated with research question 3. The 
analyses and simulations may be regarded as case studies, based on the 
foundation of collected documentation from construction projects and work 
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carried out in the author’s master thesis (Bjelland, 2009). The risk 
assessments were conducted by the application of a standard methodology 
(identified through current practice) of 40 variants of possible fire safety 
designs for residential apartment buildings (Bjelland, 2009; Bjelland & Njå, 
2012c). The analyses included event trees, Monte Carlo simulations and fire 
development simulations using the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). The FDS, as well as egress calculations, was 
also applied to analyze and compare a prescribed reference design against an 
alternative design in order to demonstrate challenges with “the equivalence 
approach” in Bjelland & Borg (2013). 
5.4.4 Participating in the Rogfast planning process 
A colleague Ph.D. student and I also had the opportunity to participate in the 
Rogfast subsea road tunnel project in Rogaland, Norway. The project was 
considered especially interesting for this thesis, as it will be the longest and 
deepest road tunnel in the world, challenging the limitations of prescriptive 
regulations. The Rogfast may be a good example of the type of “novel design” 
in which we are most interested here. Participation in the project involved 
meetings with the project management team and project meetings with the 
rescue services and members from the affected municipalities. Resulting data 
include notes and minutes from the meetings that express the different parties’ 
concerns about risk, safety and uncertainties in the project and design 
specifications and documentation, which comprised the fundamental data 
material for paper 7 (Bjelland & Aven, 2013).  
5.5 Developing methodology 
The case studies initiated in this project initially had a descriptive, or 
interpretative, purpose (Andersen, 1997). The goal was to achieve better 
understanding of fire safety engineering practice, fire safety science and its 
relation to fire safety regulations (cf., Figure 1). Nevertheless, with increased 
understanding it becomes possible to pinpoint insufficiencies, and possible 
solutions to such insufficiencies may emerge. A fundamental assumption of 
case study research is to keep an open mind: “In naturalistic case study 
research, theorizing emerges. That is because you cannot usefully theorize in 
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the absence of evidence, or on very little. The evidence you look at is initially 
dictated by your broad aims. But increasingly it is directed by your 
successively revised theories or explanations. And it is negative or 
complicating evidence that precipitates these revisions” (Gillham, 2010:35). 
 
Figure 6: Deepening understanding in case study research. 
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of my process from my initial position and 
worldview to my current position and worldview. The initial aim was to 
research the application of risk analysis methodology in fire safety 
engineering. This aim was based on personal interest and my current 
experience with the Norwegian fire safety engineering business. It seemed as 
if there was a gap in knowledge and methods with regard to implementing 
risk analyses effectively in the Norwegian building sector. Research was 
initiated with a case study on Norwegian fire safety engineering projects 
(Case Study A), which revealed the need to read up on fire safety science and 
risk research. This led to a revised and broader position of the reality (revised 
position 1). 
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A fundamental realization at this point was that risk analyses and the risk 
concept played a minor role in Norwegian fire safety engineering practice. In 
order to understand why, a literature survey was made into design science and 
safety science in a broader sense. At this point, an alternative could have been, 
for instance, to interview fire safety engineers or conduct protocol analyses of 
engineering-in-action. However, design science deals with, among other 
things, how practitioners, i.e., designers, think and work, and how design 
processes evolve. As such, it was anticipated that knowledge gained from 
design science research could deepen understanding of fire safety engineering 
practice as well, and parallel with developing a broader view on safety 
science, a new worldview emerged (revised position 2). 
The final development towards my current position involves tackling 
problems related to dealing with socio-technical system complexity. This led 
to research into systems thinking and systems safety. The current position is 
described in section 5 in paper 4 (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). A proposed 
framework that builds on a constructivist systems thinking approach to fire 
safety engineering emerged from the data (in a broad sense). The next step 
would be testing the theory empirically, although that is outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
5.6 Discussion of research approach 
The major issue of the thesis was to identify what promotes and inhibits 
performance-based safety management of design processes. Generally, the 
performance-based approach is most fruitful in cases where there are no 
prescriptive design rules. This often involves novel cases, often those with 
large complexity. The case study research strategy was selected due to its 
ability to include complexity and context. The focus is on what is particular 
and special to the case, not necessarily on what is generalizable. Moreover, 
the case study approach allows inclusion of several methods for obtaining 
data or evidence. Finally, a case study of a particular and special case will 
always lead to the creation of new knowledge. The question is whether this 
new knowledge has any significance or relevance. In what follows, I will 
discuss some issues that may be subjected to criticism when using the case 
study research approach and its use in this project. 
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5.6.1 Sources of data/evidence 
Within the technical rationality regime, quantitative data and analyses are 
preferred to qualitative (Wallace & Ross, 2006). The idea is that quantitative 
data and analyses lead to more precise results and are easier to reproduce. 
However, quantitative data and analysis do not guarantee an appropriate result 
on their own. There is, for instance, a need to determine beforehand what 
variables to measure and how to categorize them. Thus, the discussion about 
the “inherent appropriateness” of certain types of data and analysis is 
considered meaningless. The real issue is whether the data and analyses have 
managed to capture the essence of the phenomena studied and whether the 
data are represented accurately enough for others to replicate the study. 
Generally, no source and type of data or analysis methods have been favored 
or disfavored. The most appropriate method, considering the available data, 
has been selected. For instance, if more data material had been obtained in 
case study A, a quantitative analysis may have been conducted. In order to 
obtain good results from case study research, the application of multiple 
methods and data sources is encouraged. The idea is that if data from different 
sources converge towards the same result, confidence in the results may be 
increased. This is also known as triangulation (e.g., Blaikie, 2000; Yin, 1994). 
The case studies investigate the subject from different angles in order to gain 
a broad perspective, or a deep understanding, of the major issue. Case study A 
involves a qualitative empirical analysis of project documentation from the 
Norwegian fire safety engineering industry.  
Case study B is a discussion of theory developed in fire safety science on the 
concepts of safety level and safety margin. The discussion points to 
weaknesses in the current framework from a holistic perspective, which leads 
to methodology development in order to improve such weaknesses.  
Case study C, associated with 40 different fire safety concepts for residential 
apartment buildings, and case study D, the application of a fire safety 
engineering approach to a specific building, are quantitative studies that aim 
to test the current practice. Both these case studies may be seen as examples 
of attempts to falsify current fire safety engineering and regulative practice. 
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Case studies have been developed in which the current practice should have 
been efficient, and it is shown that the current practice is not efficient. 
Case studies E and F both involve the Rogfast road tunnel project, but the unit 
of study is different. In case E the unit of study is an engineering process, i.e., 
the risk analysis and uncertainty management process. In case study F, the 
unit of study is an engineering process using a new Bayesian Network model 
for risk analysis. Both case studies involve theoretical discussions with 
respect to what is good engineering practice in uncertainty management and 
risk analysis. Based on the theoretical discussions and comparisons with 
empirical findings, inconsistencies are identified. The resulting suggestions 
for improving current practice may be seen as examples of developing 
methodology on the basis of evidence/data. 
In sum it is argued that the case studies cover the major issue from a broad 
scientific and empirical foundation. The work may be seen as an evolution 
towards the current position (cf., Figure 6). At this point, challenges with the 
existing engineering, scientific and regulative practices have been pointed out 
and suggestions for improvements have been developed. The next stage 
would be to test the developed methodology with new data (cf., section 9.2). 
5.6.2 Generalizability 
Case studies are criticized for their inability to produce generalizations, but 
this is a misunderstanding (Andersen, 1997; Blaikie, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Wellington & Szczerbinski, 2007). In order to accommodate such a critique, 
the researcher may initiate a search for “typical cases.” The idea, then, is to 
create generalizability through inductive statistical inference. However, this is 
not the kind of inference that is relevant to case studies. Rather, the aim is to 
enable generalization from the individual case to new instances through 
logical inference. Logical inference “is the process by which the analyst 
draws conclusions about the essential linkage between two or more 
characteristics in terms of some systematic explanatory schema – some set of 
theoretical propositions” (Mitchell quoted in Blaikie, 2000:223). Hence, 
instead of being concerned with “representativeness” of the individual case in 
a narrow sense, it is more appropriate to be concerned with the 
appropriateness of the case. For instance, the degree to which findings from 
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the Rogfast case study will be generalizable to new instances depends on the 
Rogfast case’s appropriateness in pinpointing critical issues also relevant to 
the new instances. The point is that, although the studied case is unique in 
some sense, it also has similarities with other cases, and this is where the 
knowledge may be generalized. Yin (1994), on the other hand, is more 
concerned with multiple case studies that may cumulatively produce 
generalizations. In this sense, the total set of case studies conducted in this 
project with the aim of supporting a common major issue may be seen as a 
way of working towards a generalization. 
5.6.3 The case studies’ coverage of the major issue 
The major issue of this thesis is quite broad in asking what promotes and 
inhibits performance-based safety management of design processes. It was 
decided early on to look only at engineering practice, safety science and 
regulations. Still, this is quite a broad task for a Ph.D.-project. Six case studies 
have been conducted to provide a foundation to shed light on the major issue. 
An obvious critique to this approach is that the case studies only cover a 
fraction of what may be important to answer the major issue. For instance, 
what about the role of national/European standardization or the management 
of individual projects? It is certain that the case studies conducted in this 
project do not cover all relevant issues for the major issue. This must be 
considered a major risk to the theories developed. However, I believe that the 
traditional framework for fire safety engineering has been broadened. 
Moreover, the proposed frameworks to future safety engineering (see Bjelland 
& Aven, 2013; Bjelland, et al., Submitted; Borg, et al., Submitted) are open to 
include new knowledge. In Bjelland et al. (Submitted) we argue that the key 
issue is that “systems need to be designed for change.” This may also be said 
about models and frameworks for the design activity (LeCoze, 2005). 
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6 MAJOR FINDINGS 
The major findings from the papers are presented in this section. The research 
associated with the thesis started by exploring the field of fire safety 
engineering (research question 1) in a search for factors that promoted and/or 
inhibited performance-based safety management of design processes. The 
findings from the initial research led to the development of new research 
questions and focus areas.  
For instance, it was found that the practitioners had few reflections around 
concepts such as “safety level” and “safety margin.” The concepts seem to be 
closely connected to design solutions from prescriptive fire safety codes. 
Similar findings were obtained from the road tunneling sector. In both sectors, 
risk assessments has been introduced and promoted as a tool to show that 
alternative solutions (than specified in the prescriptive code) have an 
equivalent safety level. Hence, it should be possible to evaluate fire safety 
design rather independently of the prescriptive code/guide. This has not 
happened, which led to development of research questions 2 and 3, dealing 
with fundamental understanding of the concepts of safety level and safety 
margin and the methodological challenges in current fire safety engineering 
practice. 
The research associated with research question 1, 2 and 3 is mainly concerned 
with current practice, safety research and regulations. Based on findings from 
these efforts, it should be possible to make some claims about the future 
direction of safety engineering towards what promotes and inhibits 
performance-based safety management in design processes. This is what we 
are mainly concerned with in part 4 and what leads to the following structure 
of this section: 
• Part 1: Understanding current fire safety engineering practice 
• Part 2: Broadening understanding of major concepts: safety level and 
safety margin. 
• Part 3: Understanding current methodological challenges 
• Part 4: Relevant learning for the future 
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Table 4: Structure of findings, research question and associated papers. 
Part 
no. 
Research question Paper 
no. 
1 What characterizes current fire safety engineering practice 
after the introduction of performance-based regulations and 
promotion of scientific engineering principles? 
1, 2, 3 
2 How are the concepts of “safety” and “safety level” 
reflected in fire safety engineering research? 
4, (3) 
3 Why is current fire safety engineering practice, fire safety 
science and fire safety regulations focusing on “relative 
safety” and the associated “equivalence approach” for 
evaluating fire safety levels? 
5, 6, 7 
4 What can we learn from current engineering practice, safety 
science and regulations in order to promote performance-
based safety management of design processes in the future? 
7, 8 
 
6.1 Current fire safety engineering practice 
Although performance-based regulations exist within the Norwegian building 
industry, fire safety engineering based on prescriptive design rules is, by far, 
the most common approach. Fire safety requirements for buildings are 
determined by classifying them into predetermined categories dependent on 
characteristics such as their expected usage, height, floor area, and so on 
(Bjelland & Njå, 2012a, 2012b, 2012d). This is also common within the 
Norwegian road tunneling industry (Bjelland & Aven, 2013).  The 
performance-based aspect of the legislation seems to be relevant to handle 
deviations from the prescriptive design rules. When deviations from common 
design rules are introduced, there is a focus on verifying that the alternative 
solution is at least equally safe as the prescribed solution (“the equivalence 
approach”) (Bjelland & Aven, 2013; Bjelland & Borg, 2013).  
In the building industry, fire safety engineers usually adopt a deterministic 
analytical approach, for instance the calculation of available safe egress time 
(ASET) versus the required safe egress time (RSET). The concept of risk and 
probabilistic analyses are uncommon. Uncertainties are seldom addressed 
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specifically in the analyses. Rather there is a focus on identifying and 
applying “conservative assumptions” (Bjelland & Njå, 2012b). 
The current practice in fire safety engineering leads to a narrow view on what 
is relevant design knowledge. The focus on prescriptive design rules fails to 
emphasize special characteristics of the projects. Instead of discussing safety, 
it is often a discussion of whether it is “better or worse” than a prescriptive 
solution. This may include great emphasis on finding an appropriate 
prescriptive reference building, rather than focusing efforts on safety 
engineering (Bjelland & Borg, 2013; Bjelland & Njå, 2012b). Similar remarks 
apply also for the road tunneling industry (Bjelland & Aven, 2013). 
6.2 The concepts of safety level and safety margin 
Research into current practice in fire safety engineering showed that 
reflections about major concepts such as safety level, safety margin and risk 
were given little attention (Bjelland & Njå, 2012b, 2012d; Bjelland, et al., 
Submitted). It was hypothesized that the knowledge from fire safety science is 
reflected in fire safety engineering practice. Hence, it became important to 
also investigate how major concepts are reflected upon in fire safety science. 
It was decided to focus on safety level and safety margin. 
Our main findings are that fire safety science builds on the ideals of the 
natural sciences. The original phenomena research in fire science aims to 
discover the underlying relationships that govern, for instance, fire growth and 
human behavior in fire situations. This view is denoted “technical rationality,” 
where knowledge is mainly gathered from scientific experiments, i.e., using 
“the scientific method.” When fire safety engineering became more common 
in engineering practice, fire safety science increasingly started focusing on 
decision making. Many methods and associated decision rules were 
suggested. A common trait for these methods is that the focus is on decision 
making rather than on discovering the truth. This may be seen as more of a 
pragmatic instrumentalist approach to science. Major efforts have been made 
in previous decades to mechanize decision making to obtain consistency in 
fire safety engineering. This largely involves research into methodologies 
such as fire and egress modeling, risk ranking methods and risk analyses. Lots 
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of knowledge has been produced, but the goal of mechanizing decision 
making has still not been reached. Safety is usually considered relative to a 
prescribed reference-design or as the inverse of risk, and in both cases there is 
a fundamental focus on the equivalence approach for evaluating safety 
(Bjelland, et al., Submitted). 
Our analysis suggests that the concept of safety is linguistically flexible. 
There is no need to restrict it to other concepts, such as risk or safety 
measures. Originally safety referred to an ideal situation or state. This is also 
our interpretation in paper 4, where we suggest a framework for fire safety 
engineering that circumvents the use of the concept of risk (Bjelland, et al., 
Submitted). It is suggested that buildings may be perceived as continuously 
changing systems, where safety must be managed in order for the system to be 
kept within a safe state. The system is kept within a safe state by imposing 
safety constraints on the system’s behavior or freedom, inspired by system 
theoretical perspectives adopted from, for example, Perrow (1999), Leveson 
(2004, 2011b), Blockley and Godfrey (2000), Checkland (1999) and 
Rasmussen (1997). Based on a constructivist view of safety measurements, 
the ideal of a mechanistic decision process is rejected. Instead, it is argued for 
a clear separation between analysts and decision makers. The role of the 
engineers is to explore system performance against safety objectives and 
possible loading scenarios, where the aim is to develop a control structure for 
safety management. It is suggested that the strength of the engineers’ 
documentation may be built and judged on the basis of general coherence 
principles (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). 
6.3 Methodological challenges 
As stated earlier, the application of analytical approaches to engineering is 
usually introduced only when there are deviations from prescriptive design 
rules. In order to verify that the fire safety goals are fulfilled, we find that the 
fire safety designers often use subjective and qualitative arguments. 
Quantitative analyses involve deterministic modeling using empirical 
equations from the fire safety science literature and simulation models for fire 
and smoke spread and egress. There is seldom any reference to guidance 
documents that have been published in order to standardize the design 
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processes on a national level. Moreover, there were generally lacking 
references to international guidance documents published, for instance, by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN), the British Standards Institution (BS), 
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the Society for Fire 
Protection Engineers (SFPE) (Bjelland & Njå, 2012a, 2012b). 
In cases where analytical approaches are applied, safety is usually considered 
relative to a prescribed design solution, i.e., using the equivalence approach. 
This causes several challenges, for instance:  
- Lack of consistency: Bjelland & Njå (2012c) present the findings 
from a comparative analysis involving a total of 40 different variants 
of fire safety design solutions for residential apartment buildings. An 
important finding from the analysis is related to the lack of 
consistency of prescribed solutions using the common conceptions 
and methods of thinking about fire safety. It is nearly always possible 
to find a prescribed design variant that has a higher risk than that of 
an alternative design. 
- Wrong analytical focus: The application of the equivalence approach 
directs attention towards finding an appropriate reference design and 
assessing the differences. This leads to less focus on assessing the 
safety of the proposed design (Bjelland & Borg, 2013).  
- Cannot handle novel designs: Prescriptive design rules are based on 
prolonged experience. Consequently, for novel designs there cannot, 
in principle, be any applicable prescribed design rules. Hence, the 
equivalence approach fails to guide decisions in such situations 
(Bjelland & Aven, 2013). 
Borg et al. (Submitted) discuss the proposed application of a risk analysis 
methodology based on Bayesian Networks (BN) in the road tunneling 
industry (TRANSIT). A major challenge is associated with the transition of 
the full range of engineering knowledge into probabilistic knowledge. For 
instance, engineering knowledge may be tacitly understood. Hence, the 
engineers do not always know why or how they know something (Polanyi, 
1962; Rust, 2004; Schön, 1991; Wood, et al., 2009). When this knowledge is 
to be transformed into conditional probabilities or distributions, there is a 
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chance that something “gets lost in the translation.” The resulting perspective 
on relevant knowledge for design becomes narrow. We find this unfortunate 
from a design research perspective (Borg, et al., Submitted).  
6.4 Contributions to the future of safety 
engineering 
6.4.1 Learning – a challenge for the engineer 
Design problems are seldom clearly stated but co-evolve along with possible 
problem solutions in a spiral process. In order to reach good design solutions, 
the designer constantly must reframe the problems and situations (Dorst, 
2011; Schön, 1991). This is an inherently creative process, where thinking 
outside the common conceptions, categories and linking patterns is a vital 
ingredient (de Bono, 1990).  
Standardized safety assessment processes and mechanized decision processes 
tends to lead to the opposite. The major purpose of the analytical safety 
assessments becomes quality assurance or verification with reference to the 
legislation. Instead of promoting a lateral thinking process, it will lead to 
vertical, or “silo,” thinking. The focus will be on gaining greater knowledge 
about the predefined categories and linking patterns. The depth of the silo 
determines the status of the knowledge. For instance, in the TRANSIT case 
(Borg, et al., Submitted), this may result in gaining knowledge about the 
defined variables and conditional dependencies among them. The more 
knowledge we gain on these variables, the deeper the silo gets. This focus 
may block the ability to see that there may be other important variables or 
other linking patterns that are not included in our common way of thinking. 
That is, we need to see beyond the silo and search for connections that may 
not be obvious within our conventional categories. 
6.4.2 Dealing with risk and uncertainties 
There are different views on how to understand risk in the academic 
environment and among practitioners, as well as different views on how 
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important uncertainties are with respect to decision-making processes. Our 
perspective on risk is broad by defining risk as the two-dimensional 
combination of consequences and associated uncertainties (Bjelland & Aven, 
2013). The risk assessments should focus on prediction of observable events 
and consequences and on description of uncertainties. The uncertainties are 
related to our lack of knowledge about whether these events and 
consequences will occur, not to the deviation between estimates and true 
values of thought-constructed parameters of probability distributions, which is 
the dominant view. 
Through our proposed framework, we argue that greater emphasis will be 
placed on the background knowledge on which the risk assessments are 
conditioned. This will hopefully lead to discussions and assessment about the 
quality of the background knowledge, as decision-makers would be made 
explicitly aware of what assumptions are needed to support a conclusion or 
recommendation. Consequently, the decision-makers must not only consider 
the conclusions of the assessment but also the background knowledge on 
which is it based (Bjelland & Aven, 2013). 
6.4.3 Focusing on safety performance 
In Bjelland et al. (Submitted), we explore the possibility of examining safety 
performance of systems without using the risk concept. Current fire safety 
engineering practice shows that the risk concept is not commonly adopted. 
Still, fire safety science perceives the risk concept as fundamental to solving 
future fire safety engineering problems. The previous couple of decades show 
a vast number of articles that focus on developing methods for calculating risk 
and making decisions from risk results. However, the search for objective risk 
and decision criteria seems futile (Bjelland, et al., Submitted).  
Fire safety in buildings, it is argued, is a system property. It involves technical 
systems, people and interactions with the environment. Systems are 
continuously changing, as are our perceptions of what is an acceptable level 
of safety. It all boils down to perceiving decisions about safety as subjective. 
It could be argued that a framework based on the risk concept and the 
methods of quantitative risk assessment leads to mathematical rigor and 
precision. In a positivistic worldview, such a framework makes a lot of sense, 
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and the positivists influence on risk assessments has been dominant (e.g., 
Aven, 2012a; Renn, 1992; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). However, if we 
acknowledge that decisions about safety are subjective, there might not be the 
same need for mathematical rigor and precision. Recently, we have seen that 
the field of risk research and risk assessment is rejecting the positivist 
worldview and adopting more of a constructivist approach. For instance, it is 
acknowledged that uncertainty is more than probabilities (Aven, 2012a). In 
practice, this calls for a clear distinction between the analysts and decision 
makers, acknowledging that the application of mechanistic risk acceptance 
criteria is excessively simplistic.  
It could be questioned, then, what advantage safety assessments based on the 
risk concept have on safety assessments based on other concepts, such as the 
concept of safety itself. It could be argued that approaches to safety based on 
the risk concept is one language, while approaches to safety based on the 
safety concept is another language. Both may be applicable in certain 
situations. However, in paper 4 we argue that engineers may be more 
comfortable speaking the language of safety rather than risk. Discussing 
safety performance of systems and the behavior of important phenomena is 
simply closer to the engineering epistemology than probabilities and 
uncertainty. 
Inspired by authors such as Perrow (1999), Rasmussen (1997), Blockley and 
Godfrey (2000) and Leveson (2004, 2011b), we set out to develop a 
framework for fire safety engineering based on the concepts of safety and 
safety margins. The framework is founded on the principle of safety 
constraints, based on coherence theory, resilience engineering and systems 
theory, combined with fire modeling approaches (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). 
6.4.4 Safety regulations 
Papers 4 (Bjelland, et al., Submitted) and 7 (Bjelland & Aven, 2013) may be 
seen as two different approaches to safety engineering. In paper 7 we address 
the risk concept and associated engineering approaches, while in paper 4 we 
address safety engineering simply by applying the concept of safety itself. As 
argued in the previous section, the two approaches may be seen as two 
different languages of safety engineering. 
MAJOR FINDINGS 
74 
A common foundation for both approaches is the need for a performance-
based legislation regime. Paper 4 is concerned with fire safety engineering in 
the building industry, while paper 7 is concerned with the road tunneling 
industry. 
A major disadvantage with the current road tunneling legislation is the lack of 
operational safety goals and performance-requirements. Safety is generally 
defined through the set of prescribed solutions based on tunnel classes within 
the handbooks (NPRA, 2010). There is no difference between the concept of 
safety and the means to achieve safety. This promotes comparative analyses or 
the equivalence approach, with the weaknesses described in section 6.3 (see 
also Bjelland & Borg, 2013; Bjelland & Njå, 2012b). This may lead to design 
processes going into the intelligence trap, which may be described as 
providing logically sound answers to the wrong problems. Consequently, one 
may end up selecting poor designs even though the analyses conclude the 
opposite. 
Although a performance-based legislation regime is present in the building 
industry, we find that it is more common to apply the option of using 
prescriptive solutions there as well. There may be many reasons for this. 
However, in order to meet the challenges represented by novel design 
proposals, the performance-based option should be strengthened.  
To increase the impact of information gained from safety engineering and to 
promote good risk or safety assessment processes, we argue for a transition 
from prescriptive to performance-based regulations within the road tunneling 
sector (Bjelland & Aven, 2013) and for a strengthened focus on safety 
objectives in the building industry (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). In both cases, 
it involves making clear what we want to achieve by our designs and 
structures. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
The following sections will discuss the traditional safety engineering 
framework with regard to engineering practice; scientific practice, and 
regulative practice in light of the research findings and theoretical framework 
of this thesis. The discussion is based on the following set of assumptions 
from the technical rationality regime, which may be questioned: 
- There exists an objective threshold that describes an acceptable level 
of safety. 
- The objective threshold for acceptable safety is given (although 
implicitly) by the prescribed solutions. 
- Only the variables manipulated by prescriptive solutions are relevant 
for safety design. 
- Analyses have the main purpose of verification, i.e., to reveal the 
relative differences between a design proposal and a reference design. 
7.1 Engineering practice 
Aven, et al., (2004) provide a general model for safety management, in which 
safety is managed through the identification of safety goals and associated 
means to achieve these goals (cf., Figure 7). In addition there is a need to take 
into account the frame conditions by which goals and means are derived. The 
model is sensitive to what level of the system hierarchy it is being used. For 
instance, regulations are an important part of the frame conditions for 
engineers and designers in a construction project. However, for the national 
authorities the regulations are the means by which safety is managed. 
DISCUSSION 
76 
 
Figure 7: A model for safety management (adopted from Aven, et al., 
2004:68). 
The traditional approach to safety engineering builds on a technical rationality 
framework (Bjelland & Aven, 2013; Bjelland, et al., Submitted). Such a 
framework will affect how the safety management model is perceived. For 
instance, safety will be regarded as an objective property of the designs. This 
may affect how goals are stated, emphasizing clear distinctions between 
acceptable and unacceptable safety. Moreover, in order to evaluate whether 
safety is acceptable or unacceptable, the traditional approach includes 
decomposition of systems into their constituent parts, where quantitative 
models are available. Hence, focus is naturally directed towards the technical 
(hard) part of the system. This system view is part of the frame conditions, 
which affect both how goals are stated and what means are considered 
appropriate to achieve the goals. For instance, focus on the hard part of the 
system tends to increase focus on the reliability of technical components and 
strategies like redundancy or defense-in-depth (Leveson, 2011b; Perrow, 
1999).  
The traditional approach to safety engineering is challenged through work 
within a constructivist scientific framework to safety and risk (e.g., LeCoze, 
2005, 2012; Nilsen & Aven, 2003; Wallace & Ross, 2006) and systems 
thinking (e.g., Blockley & Godfrey, 2000; Checkland, 1999; Leveson, 2011b). 
The alternative approach to safety engineering will greatly affect the boundary 
conditions in terms of how a system is perceived. While the traditional 
approach makes a clear distinction between a closed system and its 
environment, the systems approach views complex socio-technical systems as 
open to the environment. This affects the boundaries of engineering analyses 
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in terms of broadening the scope of what to include in the system and who is 
to be included among the system’s stakeholders. This will affect the way 
goals are stated and what means are relevant for safety management. 
The major issue here is that the fundamental view of science, engineering and 
safety affects all important parts of the safety management process. For 
instance, it affects what type of knowledge is perceived as good or bad; whose 
opinions are worth taking into account; how systems are defined; and how 
safety is achieved. A too narrow framework on the fundamental issues 
(science, engineering and safety) could lead to great restrictions on the safety 
management process. This may be of minor importance in normal design 
processes that deal with standard buildings and infrastructures. The potential 
for improving safety may be minimal, and tradition has led to an evolutionary 
development of designs that function appropriately. However, when faced 
with novel needs, problems and design proposals, tradition may be a deceitful 
companion. The traditional approach to safety engineering may be more of a 
straightjacket that inhibits creativity and innovation than a fruitful framework 
for safety management. A broader framework may be needed. Although 
Newton’s theories still are appropriate for the majority of practical cases, 
Einstein’s theories have a greater explanatory power in certain special cases 
and, thus, may be regarded as more fruitful for future scientific endeavors 
(Checkland, 1999). With no comparison of the theoretical significance, the 
point is that, although the traditional framework seems to function 
appropriately in the majority of cases, it may still be contested – and more 
appropriate theories may be adopted. 
7.1.1 Knowledge in safety engineering 
In general, the traditional approach has an impersonal focus of knowledge. 
The idea is that knowledge may be formalized into structural models, standard 
data, quantitative laws, and predetermined decision criteria. Consequently, it 
should not matter who is designing a building as long as the designer is in 
possession of the standard, relevant knowledge within the engineering 
discipline. 
This view of relevant designer knowledge stands in sharp contrast with how 
great designers think and work in practice (Bjelland & Njå, 2012a, 2012b; 
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Cross, 2011; Lawson & Dorst, 2009; Schön, 1991). Although quantitative 
models may lead to rigorous results, they are only useful to some extent and 
do not tackle the most important and fundamental problems of design. 
Technical rationality cannot bring clarity in cases of ill-structured and multi-
faceted problems the way skilled, experienced practitioners (reflective 
practitioners) can. 
A fundamental challenge associated with the traditional engineering regime is 
the simplifications that are necessary in order to impose the tools of technical 
rationality. For instance, it is necessary to assume that the actual problem to 
be solved is clearly defined. This is seldom the case in design projects. 
Although the project owner has some idea about what he/she wants, the 
underlying goals and values may not be clearly defined before several design 
proposals have been tested. Moreover, there are many stakeholders who 
similarly may be unaware of their concrete values and goals. Design processes 
are, thus, more circular than linear processes, going back and forth while 
testing different aspects associated with the design. Designing is an act of 
balancing different values and goals. Hence, to assume that goals can be 
predetermined in an objective way, at least in a precise, quantitative way, is 
another simplification. According to Krippendorff (2006), designers need to 
understand how others (the stakeholders) understand the design. Hence, 
designing is not mainly about calculations and evaluations against objective 
criteria but also about making sense of the designs to the stakeholders in a 
language they can understand. 
Designing is also inherently a creative task. It is about finding innovative 
solutions to new needs and problems. As a design tool, risk management is, 
thus, also dependent on creativity, especially in the hazard identification 
processes. In order to make predictions about the future, which is the goal of 
risk assessments, one must develop an understanding about what might 
happen if the system is operated. This includes looking at the system in 
different contexts and under different environmental situations. The ability to 
introduce new frameworks, categories and links may be fruitful, especially 
with respect to identifying accidents that have never happened before. 
A key characteristic of the objects involved in design processes is that they do 
not yet exist. They may come to exist in the future if their performance is 
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predicted to be a good solution to the problems at hand. Michael Polanyi 
(1962) describes the “logical gap between existing knowledge and any 
significant discovery or innovation.” In terms of designing, our current 
situation and understanding, combined with our needs and desires, makes us 
able to perceive an improved world, but we may be inhibited from seeing how 
to get there. 
A designer imagines possible future scenarios, including possible artifacts and 
environments. Consequently, the designer conceptualizes an improved world 
and how this world could function. The conceptualized world is imaginary, 
and there is freedom to adjust all the factors that seem relevant for the design 
without the boundaries of our current reality. Such imaginary worlds are 
optional realities on which we may employ known scientific and engineering 
principles. Furthermore, such imaginary worlds create an environment for 
catalyzing the application of tacit knowledge: knowledge of which we 
ourselves are unaware and that science cannot formalize (Rust, 2004; Schön, 
1991; Wood, et al., 2009).  
Consider the activity of designing a new building. The building owner may 
have a rather clear specification of what he/she wants before the project is 
initiated. However, as the designers bring the ideas to life through models and 
drawings in accordance with the specification, new needs may emerge from 
the new contexts, leading to the original specification being adjusted or 
clarified. Similar processes may be present within the design team. Although 
a design proposal solves the client’s original specified needs, there may be 
tacitly understood qualities that are not acknowledged or appreciated before 
the design is brought to life at some level of abstraction. For instance, when 
the floor plan is drawn, it is possible to picture the activities to be carried out 
in the building and assess how it will function in specific operational 
scenarios. Schön (1991:79-102) provides an example of what he calls a 
reflective conversation with the situation, which involves an architectural 
design student who, with the help of a skilled design professor, is working to 
make a building fit into the landscape. The process he is describing is circular, 
involving framing and reframing the problem based on the challenges posed 
by new design proposals. 
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Figure 8: Bridging the gap between current reality and improved realities by 
designing. 
According to Simon (1996:6), artifacts “have no dispensation to ignore or 
violate natural laws.” Consequently, designing future improved realities may 
be supported by our understanding of the natural phenomena that affect 
artifacts. Our current reality gives rise to scientific inquiry and the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge through the activities we undertake to 
understand why certain artifacts work and others do not. When faced with 
possible and suggested improvements, we activate this knowledge in the 
design process through scientific inquiry and tacit knowledge (cf., Figure 8).  
Our research into design science suggests that there is more to safety 
engineering than the application of knowledge obtained from the natural 
sciences. Fundamentally, we are interested less in finding the truth about 
safety than in the usefulness of the knowledge, models, methods and 
processes that are being used to propose improved artifacts. While the 
fundamental concepts of safety and risk may have a sound ontological status, 
their measurements may be more of an epistemological issue. 
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7.1.2 From verification of safety to identification of safety 
constraints 
Designing is about proposing artifacts that serve a purpose for some 
stakeholders. The artifact cannot be realized without its purpose being 
clarified (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000). However, a clear purpose of the artifact 
may not exist when the design project is initiated. As the previous section 
mentioned, the initiation of design projects with the conceptualization of 
possible improved futures may act as a catalyst, for instance, for the 
development of stakeholders’ goals, values and purposes. Hence, design 
processes are not linear. Working out a design proposal on an initiating set of 
goals and values may lead to the identification of a new set of goals and 
values (Cross, 2011; Dorst, 2011). 
Current design processes in the building sector assume linearity in terms of 
goals and values. The ideal design project progression is the selection of a 
design alternative early in the design process; this is increasingly detailed by 
engineers and architects as the project continues towards execution. Fire 
safety design is similarly crudely sketched during the preliminary design, 
assuming the solutions may be verified in a later project phase. 
A different approach would be to recognize that designing is not just about 
developing technical solutions but is also about developing the goals and 
values by which these technical solutions are to be judged. This implies a new 
way of thinking about the goal of fire safety design. Instead of assuming that 
there exists a universal and objective acceptable safety level against which the 
design should be evaluated, the goal could be to identify critical safety 
constraints associated with the selected design (Leveson, 2011b). 
It needs to be recognized that the design of an artifact proceeds in stages, e.g., 
following the capital value process (CVP) model (cf., Figure 5) (Kjellén, 
2007). The process owner does not want to spend a great deal of resources on 
verifying the safety level of a number of initial design alternatives. Such 
efforts would be wasted, as many early design alternatives are scrapped long 
before they are ever realized. In the early project phases, there is a need for a 
crude set of decision criteria that take into account a broad set of goals and 
values. For instance, how are the traffic flow across the Bokn fjord and the 
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environment affected by the different alternatives of a subsea road tunnel, a 
floating bridge, or gas-powered ferries?  
In this early phase, fire safety design must be implemented in terms of crude 
analyses, engineering judgments and rules of thumb. Detailed analyses at this 
stage are surely a waste of time and money, considering the nature of 
developing goals and values in design processes. In most cases changes will 
be made to early design proposals, rendering detailed analyses practically 
useless. Hence, flexibility is a keyword in the early stages of a design project. 
This applies not only to the safety engineers but also to the whole project 
team. In fact, it also applies to the definition of the system. The system is 
open to its environment (Checkland, 1999; Wallace & Ross, 2006), and, 
hence, to the development of goals and values, and the following design 
proposals also affect what are considered parts of the system and what are 
considered parts of the environment. For instance, the increasing weight 
placed on the value “autonomy” may lead to the exclusion of external 
stakeholders in the system. In a road tunnel project, increased weight on 
autonomy could, for instance, lead to focus on a “self-rescue” and internal 
preparedness approach, rather than reliance on the municipality fire and 
rescue service. As a consequence, the distance between emergency exits may 
be reduced; the alarm system may be carefully “human-centered designed” to 
different scenarios, and an automatic sprinkler system may be adopted. 
Finally, when the artifact is complete, safe operation must be assured. This is 
the first time the design is actually tested in reality, and the first time we are 
able to determine whether the design performs as intended. Our efforts during 
the design phase are directed into making the final artifact fit to its purpose in 
reality and the loads to which it is subjected. It makes no sense to state that 
the design is safe or unsafe on a general basis. The quality of the design is 
context dependent. Our available knowledge during design (e.g., models, 
methods, actors and data) makes us able, at best, to predict that the system 
will be safe during a set of situational circumstances (Bjelland, et al., 
Submitted; Checkland, 1999; Leveson, 2011b; Wallace & Ross, 2006). At an 
appropriate time in the design project, it is, thus, important to identify critical 
safety constraints for the system operation. Critical safety constraints may be, 
for instance, control actions that have to be imposed on any level of the 
system hierarchy, e.g., the “safety boundaries” within which one has to 
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operate. Examples of safety boundaries may include the maximum number of 
people in an assembly building, the maximum amount of fire load in a 
building, the maximum number of vehicles in a road tunnel, and so on. 
Every design effort during the project will lead to safety constraints. This is 
part of the knowledge created during the design process. Each design 
alternative is associated with a set of safety constraints that are communicated 
back to the decision makers, who, at each decision gate (see the CVP model in 
Figure 5), determine whether such safety constraints are acceptable. If the 
constraints are acceptable, the design alternative may be continued for further 
designing – if not, it is modified or rejected. A critical task in the early design 
stages is, thus, to identify possible safety constraints associated with 
alternative designs. Uncertainty may be present, and decisions need to be 
made about whether more knowledge is needed to reduce this uncertainty. In 
such cases, it may be decided to conduct risk assessments to look into specific 
issues of the design fairly early in the design process. Such risk assessments 
may clarify knowledge associated with the decisions by identifying, for 
instance, appropriate safety measures or boundaries. The point is that analyses 
may be needed during the whole design process, but their level of detail needs 
to reflect the decision that is to be made and the available information at that 
time. Too detailed analyses in the early stage of the project may be useless 
due to changes in later design stages, or they may impose unwanted 
constraints on creativity and innovation in the design process (Blockley & 
Godfrey, 2000:160). 
The end goal of safety engineering of a complex socio-technical system may 
be perceived as the development of an appropriate structure of safety 
constraints. Safety constraints are identified continuously during the process, 
but as more design variables are locked in, the more modeling and analytical 
detail may be introduced. Examples of safety constraints in a building may be 
a specified maximum number of people on each floor, maintaining a 
functional sprinkler system, maximum fire load and configuration on each 
floor, the specification of interaction between technical systems, such as the 
fire alarm system and electrical locks and light system, or the staff’s 
involvement in emergency situations. In a road tunnel, possible safety 
constraints may be the minimum required volume flow and distance between 
jet fans in the ceiling, the maximum gradient, the maximum distance between 
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emergency exits, the specification of interaction between technical systems, 
the maximum speed limit in specified situations, etc. Bjelland et al. 
(Submitted) describe a framework for identifying safety constraints from 
functional requirements to safety in a design project. 
The design process should end by completing the list of safety constraints and 
examining the specified level of detail. In some cases the final identification 
of safety constraints for operation may be the collection of constraints 
identified in earlier project phases. In this case the work may consist in 
finishing a “safety case” document. In other cases, early crude analyses and 
decisions made by rules of thumb may be associated with great uncertainty. 
For instance, the maximum number of people in a concert arena may be 
estimated to be in the range of 3,000 – 4,000 people under different situational 
circumstances. This may be an acceptable safety constraint for the project 
owner, and the process is terminated. However, more detailed analyses, using 
updated variables of the design and the most detailed models available, may 
show that 5,000 people may be appropriate under certain situational 
circumstances.  
Finally, the following points are introduced to summarize this section in order 
to clarify why the focus on verification should be shifted towards 
identification of safety constraints: 
- Safety is not an objective property of a design that may be measured 
in terms of universal laws and values. Measures of safety cannot be 
separated from who is measuring the safety level. Thus, the focus on 
verification of safety levels is unfortunate and impossible in the 
universal sense. Safety is constantly challenged through a strong 
focus on optimization. A constructivist approach acknowledges that 
safety descriptions are social constructions. There is an inherent 
subjectivity in the descriptions, which need to be judged on the basis 
of the analysts’ background knowledge. In this approach, focus is 
shifted from discovering the truth to identifying the appropriate 
solution that considers all relevant stakeholders’ goals and values. 
- The focus on verification of safety levels indicates that a building is 
either safe or unsafe independent of context. This is not true and may 
lead the users to be “passive believers,” assuming that the building 
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may be appropriate for “everything.” Safety is context dependent, 
which may be illustrated with car safety: A Volvo has a good 
reputation for being a safe car, but if the car is driven by an 
inexperienced, drunken driver on a narrow, icy road during the night, 
safety will be compromised. Consequently, safety is an emergent 
property of the car-driver-environment system (Wallace & Ross, 
2006). A focus on identifying safety constraints implies efforts spent 
on understanding the conditions under which one would expect safe 
operation, which, to a greater extent, activates different stakeholders 
on the various levels of the system’s hierarchy (Checkland, 1999; 
Leveson, 2011b; Wallace & Ross, 2006).  
- Verification may be, and often is, used about compliance with safety 
objectives in the regulation. Thus, rather than verifying a safety level, 
per se, one verifies whether the objectives of the regulations are 
fulfilled. This may be possible if the safety regulations are 
prescriptive, when there is universal agreement about categorization 
of both the IF and the THEN side (cf., Figure 3). However, for novel 
designs there are no prescriptive regulations, and even, if there were, 
there will be disagreement about interpretations. Nevertheless, at best 
one would be able to verify that the design complied with the 
regulation at a specific point in time of the design phase. During later 
design phases, the construction and operation phases, it is likely that 
something is changed, rendering the verification work useless. If 
verification was substituted for identification of safety constraints, 
focus would be on the future performance of the system under 
different situational circumstances, or, more precisely, the focus 
would be on how the system can change while being maintained in a 
safe state (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). This is also relevant in the 
cases where prescribed solutions are adopted. Technical safety 
measures are a necessary, but insufficient, ingredient for achieving 
safety. The fact that some set of technical safety measures was 
designed and assumed present at some point in time is a poor 
indicator of whether or not safety will be maintained over time. In any 
case, it will be crucial to understand what recognizes the boundaries 
of safe operation of the artifact, whether or not the design is based on 
performance codes or prescriptive codes.  
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7.1.3 Developing goals and values 
Traditional safety design based on prescription makes a clear distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable safety. Either there is compliance, or 
there is not. In the former case the design is safe, and in the latter it is unsafe. 
However, this is based on an assumption that everything else, besides 
technical safety measures, is equal. For instance, an office building is just an 
office building no matter where it is located; who works there; what 
maintenance procedures are implemented, and so on. 
In a constructivist’ system thinking framework, there is no such clear 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable. The constructivists argue 
that safety is socially constructed; hence, one would possibly find some parts 
of a society that find any solution acceptable. Systemic thinking regards safety 
as an emergent property of the system as a whole. Hence, in a systems 
perspective all technical designs could, in principle, be considered acceptable 
given the right system conditions. For instance, a low technical fire safety 
standard might be accepted by introducing severe safety constraints on the 
operation of the building. Consider handguns: they are acceptable, but only in 
the hands of people who live by moral standards shared by the society.  
This begs the question of how to separate good designs from bad designs. It 
may seem like everything is relative and that speculative project owners 
focusing only on profit could get away with everything they want. This must, 
of course, not become the case. The fundamental difference is how one thinks 
about safety, by rejecting the major simplifications associated with perceiving 
safety as an objective property in a reductionist framework.  
The quality of a system design may be determined and measured by its fitness 
for the intended purposes (Blockley & Godfrey, 2000:159). Hence, quality 
comes down to values about what purposes are relevant and how these values 
are prioritized, e.g., based on the importance of the stakeholder. 
In general we can say that some stakeholders’ values are universal when 
stated in a broad and general form. For instance, the following objective, 
representing society’s values, may be considered a universal fire safety value: 
“The building shall be designed and constructed so that there are appropriate 
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provisions for the early warning of fire, and appropriate means of escape in 
case of fire from the building to a place of safety outside the building capable 
of being safely and effectively used at all material times” (UK-Gov, 2000:13). 
However, if the objective is more detailed, for instance by specifying the 
measures to accommodate early warnings and the maximum distance to an 
exit to accommodate appropriate means of escape, it is difficult to perceive 
them as universal. There may be cases where a certain alarm measure or a 
specific maximum egress distance will create unwanted restrictions. To 
determine if 30 m or 60 m is an appropriate distance to an emergency exit 
depends on the situation and can hardly be a subject of universal agreement. 
Hence, in a design project it is necessary to develop a structure of the goals 
and values. Blockley & Godfrey (2000:157) distinguish between goals that 
are necessary (must achieve), highly desirable (should achieve), desirable 
(could achieve), and those which may be seen as a bonus (want to achieve). 
The development of this structure of goals and values is an important task of 
engineering practice in design projects in order to evaluate quality as fitness 
for purpose. Bjelland et al (Submitted) propose a new framework for fire 
safety engineering in which the identification of safety goals is a fundamental 
component. 
7.2 Safety science practice 
The fire safety science literature contains a rich catalogue of normative 
studies. For instance, there are a number of papers concerned with how to 
state appropriate fire safety objectives (e.g., Bukowski & Babrauskas, 1994; 
Bukowski & Tanaka, 1991; Hadjisophocleous, et al., 1998; NKB, 1994) and 
examples of tools that may be used to evaluate if these objectives are met 
(e.g., V. R. Beck & Yung, 1990; ISO, 2009; Lundin, 2005; Olenick & 
Carpenter, 2003; SFPE, 2000). During the 1990s there was a great focus on 
promoting performance-based fire safety codes, but it is difficult to find 
scientific contributions that describe why the introduction of performance-
based fire safety codes was a good idea. Some common arguments were the 
unnecessary barriers that prescriptive codes imposed on global trade and that 
performance codes would lead to a higher safety level at a lower cost. From 
the fire science community’s perspective, the introduction of performance-
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based codes would lead to a need for scientific engineering principles and 
tools. Hence, it could be argued that fire science, itself, had a strong motive 
for the introduction of such codes. 
In Norway, performance-based fire safety codes were introduced in 1997. 
Investigations into the fire safety engineering practice (Bjelland & Njå, 
2012a) show that the old principles based on a prescriptive practice still 
dominate the field. Similar findings are common internationally and are 
reflected, for instance, through papers and keynote speeches presented at the 
Society of Fire Protection Engineers’ (SFPE’s) International Conference of 
Performance-Based Codes and Safety Design Methods (SFPE, 2010, 2012). 
The problems encountered in engineering practice may not come from the 
introduction of performance-based fire safety codes. In a fast evolving world 
with constantly new problems and needs, a prescriptive code will just not be 
able to keep up with technological innovation. As such, the introduction of 
performance-based codes may be seen as more or less inevitable.  
Fire safety engineering is a rather new engineering discipline that gained great 
interest through the introduction of performance-based codes. According to 
common community definitions, fire safety engineering is the application of 
science, engineering principles and expert judgment/experience to protect 
people, property and environment from the effects of fire. A question of great 
interest in regards to the work of this thesis is what goes into the definition of 
science and engineering principles. Based on our literature review (see 
Bjelland, et al., Submitted), it could be argued that these concepts are strongly 
associated with the natural science approach, leading to a preferred 
application of ideas such as scientific realism, reductionism, and favoring of 
quantitative laws over qualitative discourse. For instance, the leading journal 
in the field of fire safety science, Elsevier’s Fire Safety Journal, includes the 
following statement in its scope: “Original contributions (…) are invited, 
particularly if they incorporate a quantitative approach to the subject in 
question” (Elsevier, 2013). 
A major issue associated with the work of this thesis has been directed at 
developing a better understanding of the current fire safety engineering 
practice, mainly in Norway. There is a sharp contrast between the focus on 
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natural sciences and quantitative laws of fire safety science and on common 
fire safety engineering practice. The models of natural science are being used, 
to some extent, but they are simply not covering the full range of engineering 
problems. In order to solve practical problems, qualitative discourse and 
engineering judgment seem to have a greater importance. This places 
emphasis on the designer’s individual skills (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; 
Schön, 1991), rather than generalized methods and principles. This finding led 
to a theoretical investigation into design science (section 3), systems thinking 
(section 2.2) and some major concepts seen in the light of different 
philosophies of science (Section 2.3) and (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). Based 
on these investigations, it could be argued that fire safety science could 
benefit strongly from gaining a better understanding of the problems of design 
practice and how this would affect the scientific framework adapted to 
support this practice. 
7.3 Regulative practice 
7.3.1 Limitations of prescriptive regulations 
The use of prescriptive regulations can sometimes be viewed as “thinking 
inside the box,” or to lend credibility to “what is” and “what has been 
appropriate before.” As we have argued in section 3.5, humans tend to 
categorize situations and use a common, or standard, pattern of links between 
the categories that are known to us. Prescriptive design is a good example of 
categorization and common pattern. It states that a design proposal with 
certain characteristics should be placed into category X or Y. Once the 
category is selected, the solution becomes obvious (cf., Figure 3): We just 
apply the common pattern of linking between categories X or Y to the 
prescribed solutions. This is obviously a useful way of thinking in many 
cases. Figure 9 depicts a situation where such thinking is useful. Design 
proposal A is categorized to fall within the “domain of prescriptive 
performance levels.” In this case we use the prescribed performance levels 
that apply for the category into which design proposal A falls. The approach 
provides consistency about practical solutions in cases of great similarity, and 
it reduces the efforts spent on design, that is, it saves energy and money. 
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Figure 9: Design proposal A falling inside the domain of prescriptive 
performance levels. 
The limitations of such thinking becomes apparent in cases when the design 
proposal seems to fall outside an apparent category, like design proposal B 
depicted in Figure 10. First, there are no predetermined categories where 
design proposal B can be placed. Second, since we have no known category 
for B, we have no link between the design proposal and possible practical 
solutions. This is the case with all novel designs: i.e., those designs that are 
pure innovations, that stretch the limits of our previous experience, e.g., 
buildings being increasingly higher or subsea road tunnels being increasingly 
longer and deeper below sea-surface, that are combinations never seen before, 
i.e., a fusion of previously known designs into a new mixture, like airports 
also being shopping malls and hotels and designs we have seen before but that 
contain new activities and hazards, and so on. 
 
Figure 10: Design proposal B falling outside the domain of prescriptive 
performance levels. 
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From the research associated with this thesis, we have seen a trend in which 
engineers are molding designs of type B into known categories. Great efforts 
are spent discussing and defining the design proposal such that it will fit into 
our common categories, which again visualize a standard pattern of linking a 
“design problem” to a “design solution.” This trend is depicted by the arrow 
from design proposal B inside the domain of prescriptive performance levels. 
A major limitation with this approach is that many resources and much energy 
are put into the semantic molding of design proposal B. Different and 
inconsistent rules within the prescriptive regulations are often combined in 
order to either fit design proposal B into a known category, or to expand the 
scope of a known category so it will fit design proposal B. Nevertheless, all 
this molding may be conducted without considering the real hazards and traits 
of design proposal B. 
A good example of this approach within the Norwegian fire safety 
engineering community is related to floor area limitations within the 
prescriptive regulations. The example is about combining two inconsistent 
rules within the guide to the regulation in order to expand a known category 
of prescribed solutions. The first rule states that when a building is provided 
with an automatic sprinkler system, the floor area per story not separated with 
a fire wall may be 10 000 m2. The second rule states that a compartment may 
have an open connection across three floors. The combination of the two rules 
leads to an argument that it is allowed to include 30,000 m2 into a 
compartment not separated by a fire wall. Consequently, a design proposal 
including a one-story building of 30,000 m2 would now fit the prescribed 
category, although the initial limit was 10,000 m2. All that was needed was 
some “linguistic molding.” If we would like to draw this line of thinking even 
further, we may say that, according to the guide to the regulation, a building 
may be built with, say, 8 floors. Each floor may be 10,000 m2 and have an 
open connection across three floors. So, for every third floor, we would have 
to include a fire separating barrier with 60 minutes fire resistance. The 
situation is depicted in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Section of an 8-story building having a floor area of 10,000 m2 on 
each floor and separated by a fire resistant barrier every third floor (depicted 
by a red floor separator). 
This design is based on the same logic as the first example. We are combining 
the different prescriptive design rules in order to stretch the scope of a 
prescribed category. The end result of this latter example is that one would be 
allowed to include 80,000 m2 inside a fire section before having to erect a fire 
wall. However, for each 30,000 m2 one would have to include a fire 
separating barrier of 60 minutes. Again, if we would like to erect a one-story 
building we would now, based on our logic, allow it to cover 80,000 m2 
before erecting a fire wall. Remember that the first limit was 10,000 m2.  
There are several lessons to learn from these examples. First is the issue of 
thinking inside the box. As discussed above, we tend to mold anything as 
much as possible in order to make it fit with our common conceptions and 
patterns. The consequence of this activity is that real issues associated with 
the proposed design are neglected and treated in a generic way. Information is 
only relevant as long as it is related to the categories we already have created. 
Since our categories are only concerned with whether a sprinkler system is 
present or not present, it is hard to see how one is able to affect the quality of 
the sprinkler system. There are many ways to construct a sprinkler system that 
finally will affect its performance during a future fire. A similar concern is 
related to organizational factors. Our categories do not include organizational 
fire safety factors. Even though our design proposals, implicitly or explicitly, 
includes assumptions about organizational factors, they are outside the scope 
of the building regulations. When the building is finished, a different 
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regulation takes over in order to implement organizational fire safety. The 
question, then, is how should one ensure that the designed building will match 
the organization? At best, one can make and state assumptions about future 
usage and about organizational fire safety measures. However, to attain a 
holistic perspective on fire safety, one must think “outside” the box. Fire 
safety in buildings and safety in road tunnels is more than what is reflected by 
our common conceptions from prescriptive design rules.  
Second, there is the concern that the fire safety engineering community 
sometimes falls into some sort of an intelligence trap (Blockley & Godfrey, 
2000; de Bono, 1978). We are so focused on defending our proposed design 
that we become unable to look for alternatives. Our logic may be flawless, 
based on the premises of the argumentation. Still there should be concerns 
whether the final result, the design, will be appropriate. After all, all the 
thinking was done without even considering any properties of the design 
proposal. This issue is mainly related to what we consider relevant or credible 
knowledge in the safety community today, and it is closely related to the first 
point of thinking inside the box. The engineering community is traditionally 
concerned with the application of knowledge gained from science, and mainly 
natural science, to come to conclusions. In this tradition, logic and empirical 
evidence have a strong position. Thus, all arguments and knowledge that are 
derived from logic and empirical evidence will be favored before other types 
of knowledge. A major problem, however, is that one can question the 
premises of the logical arguments, as they often build on the assumption that 
the guidelines reflect the “truth” about safety. Novel designs falls outside the 
scope of prescriptive performance requirements, and there is no truth about 
safety. Nevertheless, there are good and bad designs. Judgments about quality 
need to be made by competent people in a rigorous engineering process where 
all relevant knowledge is brought to the table for decision making. 
Third, the examples illustrate that floor area may be a poor indicator of fire 
safety. The floor area requirements are introduced to limit material damages 
and societal consequences of a fire. However, a square meter floor area is not 
of constant value. Two quite similar buildings, say two schools in two 
different municipalities, may be of different value to the local community. 
The first school is located within a municipality having many other schools. If 
the school is lost in a fire, there will be redundancy in the municipality to 
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handle pupils that lost their original school. In the second municipality, there 
is just a single school. There will be no other alternative available if the 
school is lost to fire. No matter how many square meters are lost, this will 
have a huge consequence to the community. Thus, other indicators than floor 
area should be used to assess the consequences of a fire. More specifically, 
the societal goals and performance requirements should be clearly stated 
instead of specific indicators and safety measures. This would allow for a 
safety concept that is tailor made for the specific, proposed design and design 
situation/context. We need to remember that novel design proposals are 
outside the domain of prescriptive performance levels. They do not 
necessarily fit previously-accepted categories and linking patterns. There is no 
correct or true solution to the design problem. In fact, we may have to start 
designing and investigating the design proposal and the design context before 
we are able to develop the design problems that we are to solve. In such cases 
there is a need to think “outside the box,” or use what De Bono (1990) calls 
lateral thinking. This is only possible within a framework that does not 
impose category thinking. A development of the goal-oriented framework is 
thus necessary. 
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8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In a time where there were only so many ways of constructing a building and 
only so many materials and products to use in the process, designing for 
safety was largely a matter of doing the things that worked yesterday or the 
last century. The slow pace of technological development made it possible to 
test and develop designs, and gain knowledge specifically associated with the 
individual designs. This is how the prescriptive design rules developed and 
led to an effective regulation of the construction industry.  
But that is not the same reality we are faced with today. Never have changes 
in the society occurred faster and complexity grown more rapidly as in the 
past few decades (e.g., U. Beck, 1992; Covello & Mumpower, 1985; Leveson, 
2011b). New knowledge is created in every little corner of the world and 
instantly shared with the international scientific online community. 
Technology that was state of the art last year is obsolete today. New 
knowledge about climate change, for instance, leads to new priorities when 
constructing buildings. The materials we adopt for our constructions should 
have a small environmental footprint and the energy consumption of the 
buildings should be as low and as possible and, preferably, renewable.  
This reminds us that the society’s needs, desires and values are flexible, 
continuously adapting to the global situation and the present state of affairs. 
And with new needs, desires and values come appeals for new solutions. The 
“boundaries of validity” of the old prescriptive design rules are increasingly 
being challenged and sometimes crossed. In some cases we are not even sure 
where we are in comparison with the old prescriptive design rules, such as the 
Rogfast case (Bjelland & Aven, 2013). The proposed design is breaking so 
many conventions that it becomes impossible to keep track of the total 
consequences of deviations. This is where designers come in, and this is 
where “performance” comes in. Never before has performance-based safety 
engineering been more appropriate. Moreover, the demand for performance-
based safety engineering will grow in line not only with evolving needs, 
desires and values but also with the increasing complexity that involves 
component interactions and tight couplings among socio-technical systems.  
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The aim of this dissertation has been to investigate what promotes and inhibits 
performance-based safety management of design processes. When 
considering the outlook for the future of safety engineering and the limitations 
of prescriptive design rules, this issue is generally justified. The focus has 
been on safety engineering practice, the scientific foundation and safety 
regulations. 
From the study of Norwegian fire safety engineering practice, presented in 
papers 1, 2 and 3 (Bjelland & Njå, 2012a, 2012b, 2012d), it was found that 
performance-based engineering is only used to a limited extent, even though 
performance-based legislative policies were introduced in 1997. Deviations 
from prescriptive design rules exist in practically all the studied projects, but 
there was always a reference to the prescriptive design rules with regard to 
determining whether the level of safety was acceptable. This is a major 
challenge, since the purpose of performance-based safety engineering is to 
function as a framework when the validity boundaries of the prescriptive 
design rules are exceeded. The research points to the high status of 
prescriptive design rules as an inhibitor for effective performance-based 
engineering. This is associated with how the various legislative policies are 
stated with regards to clarifying functional safety objectives. Currently, there 
is too strong a connection in the legislation between safety goals and safety 
measures. For instance, instead of clearly stating a functional objective, 
property fire protection is directly linked with fire compartmentation (KRD & 
MD, 2010:§11-7). 
Research into current fire safety engineering practice also showed that safety 
levels were usually measured in terms of qualitative arguments and 
judgments. The risk concept, which is found to be a preferred measure in the 
fire science literature, is not commonly adopted in practice. If quantitative 
analyses are conducted, they are usually scenario analyses using deterministic 
fire models, where the results are compared with tolerability criteria, e.g., for 
human exposure to heat from a smoke layer and toxic substances. This finding 
is also corroborated by research into international fire safety engineering 
practices. Paper 4 deals with the scientific foundation in fire safety science on 
the concepts of safety level and safety margin. It is found that the concepts are 
understood in two rather narrow, traditional, technical rationality perspectives: 
one whose underlying assumption was that measurements of safety or risk 
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have an ontological status, i.e., a positivist view, and another that had a more 
pragmatic or instrumental focus (Bjelland, et al., Submitted). The major 
challenge of both perspectives is associated with scientific reductionism, 
which aims to explain system performance by decomposing it into its 
constituent parts. This approach has been successful in the natural sciences 
and may also have been appropriate for the simple, technical systems of the 
past. However, modern buildings are packed with technology and software 
controls that create interactions that are practically unforeseeable by the 
designers. Hence, the traditional technical rationality framework places too 
much emphasis on technical problem solving while excluding important 
aspects of a designer’s knowledge, e.g., tacit knowledge. A need exists for a 
broader scientific framework for safety engineering in order to both 
accommodate this kind of complexity in designs and cover the way designers 
think and act and how design processes evolve. A possible solution points in 
the direction of a constructivist-oriented, systems thinking perspective. Such a 
perspective would provide a holistic treatment of fire safety in buildings and 
road tunnels. An important consequence would be the rejection of mechanistic 
decision processes. Rather, there needs to be a clear separation between 
engineers/analysts and formal decision makers who have the necessary 
oversight to make a balanced decision. 
Some limitations with the current framework for fire safety engineering, 
including engineering practice, science and regulation, are pinpointed by 
papers 5 and 6 (Bjelland & Borg, 2013; Bjelland & Njå, 2012c). The focus of 
the papers is on methodological issues, especially those associated with “the 
equivalence approach.” Although safety scientists have been searching for a 
universal quantified level of acceptable risk for decades, no such level has 
been found. While waiting for this discovery, a practice has developed in 
which calculated risk for alternative designs is evaluated against the risk 
implicitly acceptable in the prescriptive regulations. Papers 5 and 6 show that 
this practice leads to a disproportionate focus on identifying an appropriate 
reference design, rather than focusing on the safety of the specific design 
proposal. In practice, due to inconsistencies in the prescriptive regulations, it 
will nearly always be possible to find a prescriptive reference that comes out 
poorly in this comparison. The major point of the analysis, though, is that the 
methodology fails to capture the important issues associated with safety. The 
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methodology is reductionist by excluding vital issues associated with the 
socio-technical system hierarchy; for instance, the management resources, the 
user organization, the municipality resources and the actual performance of 
safety systems. The comparison is made on a coarse level, focusing on 
differences between the alternative design and the reference design, using 
standardized data. Hence, it is not really an analysis of safety but rather of 
some kind of technical standard that may, or may not, contribute to a safe 
performance of the building during operation.  
According to Leveson (2011b), safety must be designed into the system from 
the beginning of the design process. To assume that the system will be 
operated in accordance with how the designers intended it to be operated is a 
matter of sheer luck if expectations from the users are not communicated and 
taken into consideration in the design process. Of course, it is currently 
required for engineers to clarify the assumptions about operating limitations, 
but the point is that these issues are held as boundary conditions to the design 
process, rather than as resources or measures that can be actively manipulated 
during design (cf., Figure 7). Papers 4, 7 and 8 (Bjelland & Aven, 2013; 
Bjelland & Borg, 2013; Bjelland, et al., Submitted) aim to contribute to a 
broader framework for risk and safety analyses that enables application of all 
relevant knowledge to reassure the best possible preconditions for safe 
operation of complex, socio-technical systems during the full life cycle. 
Complex socio-technical systems are constantly adapting to changes within 
themselves and the environment. Designing for safety, then, is not about 
verification but, rather, about creating a management structure that enables the 
system to change safely. It may be that mathematical rigor has to give way to 
more qualitative and discursive processes, but this may not be such a bad 
thing. After all, what is really gained from rigorous solutions to problems that 
are simply not relevant? 
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9 FURTHER RESEARCH 
9.1 Safety research and design research 
In this thesis I have tried to combine safety research and design research. 
After all, safety research is fundamentally design research. While the 
technical rationality framework still has a strong position in the pure safety 
research, the design research community seems more open to a holistic 
perspective on science. This affects what scientists perceive as, for instance:  
• What are important research questions? 
• What is important knowledge for practitioners, i.e., safety engineers? 
• What is the nature of design processes? 
• How do we distinguish successful designs from bad designs? 
Some work has been done in this thesis with regards to pointing to the link 
and visualizing some opportunities. However, the next step would be to 
explore how safety issues could be investigated in a broad design research 
framework. Along with aesthetics and functionality, for instance, safety is an 
emergent property of the system as a whole. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that safety should be an integrated part of the design task as a whole 
and not just an add-on characteristic. To achieve this, there is a need for 
interdisciplinary research to promote truly interdisciplinary design processes. 
9.2 Empirical testing 
The research associated with this thesis has resulted in the proposal of 
alternative safety engineering frameworks. These proposals may be seen as 
grounded theory, and, as such, explain the problems encountered in this 
project with the particular focus of this project in mind. However, there may 
be other solutions, as scientific theories may be underdetermined by the data 
(Stanford, 2009). The major issue, then, is whether the proposed framework is 
actually useful to safety engineering. At this point, I can say that I believe it 
will be, since it is built on the basis of identified weaknesses in the current 
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framework, but I cannot be sure until it has been tested in practice and 
empirical evidence of its performance is gathered. 
Critical issues to test and develop further are those associated with 
determining quality in the safety engineering process and with how to enable 
effective decision making based on the engineering efforts. For instance: 
• How should stakeholders be involved in the design projects, and who 
are the relevant stakeholders to involve? A broad framework involves 
data and values stated in many different ways. There will not be a 
mechanistic way to optimize all concerns. Decision making needs to 
be a matter of striking a balance between relevant concerns, without 
compromising the important traits of the design and important values 
of society, such as safety. 
• What are indicators of a good design with regards to safety?  
• What kind of data or evidence is needed in the analyses? Obvious 
sources are data from accident investigations and learning from 
rescue services. Less obvious are data from good safety practice, i.e., 
from systems that have not experienced any failures. Also, how do we 
distinguish between the individual engineers? What distinguishes an 
expert from a novice in safety engineering (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
1986), and how do we configure the design processes to take 
advantage of these differences? 
• How do we determine the quality of the engineering documentation? 
The legal system, for instance, is making critical decisions under 
uncertainty every day, but probabilities are seldom incorporated 
specifically. According to Graver (2009), principles of judging the 
coherency of all the presented evidence are more useful in this 
respect. Similarly, coherence principles may be useful in decision 
making about safety, but there is need to test this in practice and to 
gather empirical evidence as to how effective it can be. 
9.3 Project management 
A design project is assumed to progress in clearly defined phases, from 
concept exploration to construction (cf., section 4.4 and Figure 5). However, 
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in practice the boundaries between the different phases will be less clear. For 
instance, it is not uncommon that designing is conducted during construction 
or that fundamental conceptual questions are posed during detail design. It has 
been pointed out in this thesis that design processes are nonlinear. Design 
problems and solutions co-evolve as the project develops. 
There are several ways for the project owner to involve the different actors in 
the project with regards to, for instance, when and with what responsibility. A 
major issue is related to when the contractor should be involved. Some form 
of turnkey contracts (e.g., Merna & Smith, 1990) are often used in Norway. A 
design project is conducted in accordance with the CVP under the 
management of the architect or a hired project manager, for example, up until 
the detailed design phase. Then the contractor is involved. The contractor 
becomes responsible for designing during the detailed design phase and the 
construction phase. A new design team may be hired by the contractor, and 
technical solutions may be redesigned, which enable the contractor to increase 
profit by making it easier and/or cheaper to build.  
From a systems thinking perspective, and taking into account the circular 
nature of design processes, it seems reasonable that the knowledge of the 
contractor should be included from the beginning of the design project. To 
include the contractor in the detailed design phase, or even later, may lead to 
suboptimizations, made from the contractor’s perspective. The final building 
may be cheaper for the project owner, but it is far from certain that it will be 
better. 
In order to gain the best possible foundation for successful and safe buildings 
and infrastructures, the project management and contract issues should be 
included into the framework. Possible research questions are: 
- What contract model is preferable in a systems engineering 
perspective? A possible model may be the Designer-Builder 
contractor (Chan & Yu, 2005), where the contractor is responsible for 
both the design and construction during the whole design project. 
- What precautions are needed to assure system safety when applying 
different forms of construction contracts? For instance, what 
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precautions must be taken if one is to use a turnkey contract as 
discussed above?  
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Abstract: Experience with fire safety engineering under a performance-based fire safety 
regulation regime shows that the majority of the analyses performed are scenario-based. A 
comparison with purely pre-accepted performance requirement is made in order to assess the 
relative safety level of the alternative design compared to the pre-accepted design. We find this 
approach problematic because it undermines the value of performing analyses. The approach 
accepts oversimplification and justifies unrealistic assumptions on the basis that it will not affect 
the comparison. This distances the analyses from reality and reduces their value to answer a yes/no 
question on acceptability. The considerable time and resources spent on searching for and 
analyzing a pre-accepted design could be spent on analyzing the design at hand. If fire safety 
analyses are to have any real impact on design, it is necessary that regulators strengthen the 
position of analytical design. This must include a provision of a clear set of performance goals, 
which are possible to transform into quantitative evaluation criteria by the engineers, to avoid 
comparisons with pre-accepted performance requirements. 
Keywords: fire safety, analytical design, comparative analyses, performance-based regulations 
1. Introduction 
Fire safety in Norwegian buildings is usually provided in two ways: 1) by specifying pre-accepted 
performance requirements from the guide to the regulations (DiBK 2010) alone, or 2) by a 
combination of pre-accepted performance requirements and deviations. Pre-accepted performance 
requirements are provided by the national authorities and constitute a set of performance levels 
that, through the test of time, are regarded as acceptable. However, the Norwegian fire safety 
regulations are performance-based. This implies that alternative fire safety designs deviating from 
the pre-accepted could be selected if deemed appropriate. In theory, any alternative design could 
be chosen as long as it is shown that the functional requirements in the regulations are fulfilled. In 
practice, pre-accepted performance requirements function as a base for the fire safety design in 
every project (Bjelland and Njå 2012a). This saves time for the fire safety engineer and provides 
predictability for the client. Predictability because this approach have become a discipline standard 
and is rarely questioned. Designing for fire safety in this way thus ensures a “smooth” design 
phase.   
 
Since the pre-accepted performance requirements are generic, deviations are almost unavoidable in 
any project. When deviations are introduced the fire safety engineers become responsible for 
showing that the alternative design has an acceptable safety level. The common way of doing so is 
to show that the alternative design is as good as the pre-accepted design. In many cases this is 
done through comparative analysis, which means that scenarios are introduced to analyze the 
difference between the pre-accepted design and the alternative design (Bjelland and Njå 2012a, b). 
 
Performing a comparative analysis of this kind simplifies responsibility issues, as there is no need 
to actually relate to the safety level of the design. The fire safety engineer simply assumes that the 
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pre-accepted performance requirements are safe and the safety level provided by the alternative 
design is assessed relative to the pre-accepted design. Our hypothesis is that such an approach 
undermines the analysis process by creating a distance to reality. The introduction of comparable 
pre-accepted designs and assumptions is often a mere thought construct. As such, the analyses 
have the single purpose of covering the fire safety engineer’s back in terms of responsibility. The 
actual results have no meaning outside the scope of the thought-constructed framework and are 
thus of very limited use to the client and society in general. 
 
In Section 2 of this paper we will introduce some perspectives on the purpose of an analytical 
approach to safety design. In Section 3 we provide a simple example of a fire safety analysis in 
combination with pre-accepted fire safety design. Our purpose is to illustrate both a common 
practice and the limited value of this practice. In Section 4 we discuss the implications of our 
analysis for fire safety engineers and regulators, followed by some conclusions in Section 5. 
2. Analytical Approach to Fire Safety Design 
2.1 Expectations to Performance-based Engineering 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s there was considerable momentum with respect to 
introducing fire safety science into the design of buildings, by moving from a prescriptive to a 
performance-based fire safety regulation regime in many countries. Emmons (1990) and Friedman 
(1990), amongst others, discuss the advances, challenges and future possibilities of fire safety 
science. Although progress has been made, the scientific field is still faced with large gaps in 
knowledge. Some parts of the fire phenomena are adequately understood and computer models 
have been developed, but there is still a long way to go before comprehensive models to 
investigate the wide variety of fire safety aspects are available. According to McGrattan et al. 
(2007) the ability to include model predictions of complicated fire phenomenon, such as fire 
growth and burning of complicated targets, lacks the empirical understanding of the phenomenon. 
Although the relevant physics is well understood, the actual process of combustion, radiation and 
solid phase heat transfer is more complicated than the mathematical representation currently 
available in the models. As a result the fire growth rate and maximum heat release rate is usually 
described by the analyst, and not predicted by the model. In fire safety design, however, there are 
also uncertainties related to future fire scenarios and what the consequences will be, i.e. future risk.  
 
New engineering methodologies and models, discussed by Emmons (1990), Lucht (1989, 1992), 
Friedman (1990) and others, were introduced along with performance based codes. Some of the 
advantages associated with such codes were their ability to address unique aspects of the building 
and/or its use, address a client’s specific needs, increase engineering rigor by introducing tools for 
evaluating fire safety, the possibility of addressing the overall fire safety of the building instead of 
treating each system in isolation, cost-effective solutions and an improved knowledge of the loss 
potential in the buildings (Meacham and Custer 1995). 
 
The risk concept and risk assessment tools have been discussed in the fire safety science literature 
during the past few decades for possible introduction into fire safety engineering (see e.g. Hall and 
Sekizawa 1991; Watts Jr 1988; Frantzich 1998). However, our experience is that risk assessments 
are not a commonly used tool to measure fire safety levels in building designs (Bjelland and Njå 
2012a, b). The most common tool, when analyses are being performed, is a scenario-based 
approach. Formal guidance for this approach has been provided, amongst others, by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Society for Fire Protection Engineers 
(SFPE). The basic principle in this approach is to develop a trial design which the engineers must 
verify to comply with the regulations. The trial design is based on the client’s (or architect’s) 
proposal, where fire safety measures are introduced in an intuitive way by the fire safety engineer 
such that the design is expected to meet performance requirements. Possible fire and situational 
scenarios must be identified and a set of design scenarios must be selected from these. The design 
scenarios are to be evaluated against performance criteria which define some critical limits of 
human tolerability, e.g. a temperature limit which leads to human incapacitation or a visibility 
limit which restrains motion. If the design scenarios lead to violation of the performance criteria, 
e.g. visibility is too low when people are still present in the building, a modified trial design must 
be developed and the process repeated until all performance criteria are met (SFPE 2000; ISO 
2006). 
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2.2 Comparative analyses 
Comparative analyses assess the performance of the alternative design relative to the code 
compliant design given a fire. The parameters of interest may be related to life safety, for example 
the available safe egress time (ASET) and the required safe egress time (RSET), or property 
protection, for example the thermal load on the structure or fire and smoke spread. 
 
When considering the appropriateness of the comparative analysis it is important to address the 
reasons for choosing this approach in the first place. One argument for choosing a comparative 
analysis is that a performance based fire safety code rarely contains explicit acceptance criteria for 
fire safety. The desired function of the building, in terms of fire safety, is given by the fire safety 
code. However, the “translation” of the desired function into an explicit safety requirement is only 
reflected in the proposed pre-accepted performance requirements. This means that for example the 
transformation of the functional requirement; “... occupants should be provided with adequate 
means of escape,” into explicit quantitative requirements, is only given by examples in the pre-
accepted performance requirements. 
 
Generally there are two situations where a comparative analysis is applied:  
1) To assess the level of safety obtained in a building through inclusion of the pre-accepted 
performance requirements and compare the answer to the level of safety obtained in the 
alternative design. 
2) To apply the pre-accepted performance requirements for fire safety as far as possible and 
assess the consequences of the deviations on a case by case basis. 
In both cases the decision to accept an analytical design solution is reduced to a simple yes or no 
answer. In the following the two situations for comparative analysis are assessed. 
 
Level of safety based on pre-accepted fire safety design: 
In some design situations the engineer may be required to document an analytical design solution 
by assessing the overall level of safety in the building or construction. One of the main challenges 
for the engineer in this case is that the required level of safety is not stipulated in quantitative 
terms. A comparative analysis will hence be an attractive approach. 
 
In order to conduct a comparative analysis in this case it is necessary to construct a reference 
building based on pre-accepted performance requirements. An issue with this approach is that the 
prescriptive code provides the engineer with several design options. However, the level of safety 
provided by these various choices is not consistent (Bjelland and Njå 2012c). This issue is 
illustrated in Fig. 1 by the following example: Consider a 6-story office building with a footprint 
of 2000 m2 where the engineer is faced with at least the following pre-accepted performance 
requirements: 
• Structural fire safety: steel, or concrete. 
• Active fire safety measures: sprinklers, or smoke ventilation. 
• Egress: access to the stairs directly, or via a corridor / lobby.  
In practice there are even more design options, but these alone would result in 8 different 
combinations, all of which would lead to an acceptable design in Norway and in accordance with 
DiBK (2010). 
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Fig. 1 Illustration of possible combinations leading to a set of different pre-accepted designs 
 
Fig. 1 illustrates the issue of selecting a valid basis for comparison amongst several options with 
different safety levels. Let us suppose, for example, that the building under consideration was 
planned to include a sprinkler system: one may argue that choosing a pre-accepted design without 
a sprinkler system for comparison is not valid. On the other hand, one may argue that it is when 
the pre-accepted performance requirements are pushed to the limit that the actual minimum safety 
level provided by the code is revealed. 
 
Case by case analysis of the deviations:  
Another situation where a comparative analysis is used is in a case by case analysis of the 
deviations from the pre-accepted performance requirements. This means that the fire safety design 
follows the pre-accepted performance requirements as far as possible, and a comparative analysis 
is conducted for the deviation only. The study made by Bjelland and Njå (2012a) showed that a 
majority of analyses in fire safety engineering are conducted in this manner. The methodology is 
illustrated in Fig. 2, where the design follows a set of pre-accepted performance requirements to a 
certain point before a deviation is introduced.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Illustration of the implementation of a deviation leading to a pre-accepted reference building 
and an alternative/deviating design 
 
In practice the analytical design in this case consists of a deviation from the pre-accepted 
performance requirements including a compensatory measure which is compared to a strict pre-
accepted design. The acceptance criteria for the design are found by measuring a quantity in both 
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cases, for example time to untenable conditions, and the design is acceptable if the quantity is 
equal to, or better than, the value provided by the pre-accepted design. An example of this 
approach is given in the next section.  The positive aspects of this method are largely the same as 
in the method above. It is also effective, as areas that follow pre-accepted performance 
requirements do not require in-depth analysis. However, a major issue here is whether all risk-
influencing factors are included in the analysis. 
3. Life Safety in Case of Fire in a Concert Hall 
In this section we introduce an example that will illustrate some of the problems of performing 
comparative scenario analyses. The example represents a common decision problem within fire 
safety design: will our alternative design perform as good as or better than a pre-accepted design 
with respect to life safety in case of fire? The example is inspired by our findings with respect to 
common practice (Bjelland and Njå 2012b). The common practice is to introduce the available 
safe egress time (ASET) versus required safe egress time (RSET) concept. If ASET is larger than 
RSET, with an acceptable safety margin, life safety is provided. The safety margin is the difference 
between ASET and RSET. 
 
Safety margin = ASET – RSET 
 
In the example we are considering a single story building with characteristics in accordance with 
Table 1. Our design, referred to as the alternative design, deviates from pre-accepted performance 
requirements in terms of exit width. According to the guide to the regulation (DiBK 2010), the exit 
width should be 30 m, distributed over at least 10 exits. It is argued that a ceiling height of 6 m is 
far more than what could be expected in a pre-accepted design, where the minimum requirement is 
2.7 m. In the example we have used 3 m ceiling height. Since we know that a tall ceiling will 
increase ASET, by delaying the hot smoke layer from reaching the persons underneath it, we find it 
acceptable to allow for a larger RSET, as long as the safety margin stays the same.  
 
A tall ceiling means that the smoke detectors will be slower to respond than in the case of a low 
ceiling. To compensate for this we assume the installation of a more sensitive alarm system based 
on optical line detection. Other factors such as the time of day, occupant characteristics, building 
location, preparedness measures, structural fire resistance, materials on internal surfaces etc. are 
assumed to be equal and not relevant for the purpose of the analysis. As such, the assumptions 
made in this example are in accordance with common practice for this type of analysis. 
 
Table 1 Building characteristics 
 Alternative design Pre-accepted design 
Floor area 1 800 m2 (30 m x 60 m) 1 800 m2 (30 m x 60 m) 
Number of people 3 000 people 3 000 people 
Ceiling height 6 m 3.0 m 
Maximum distance to exit Less than 30 m Less than 30 m 
Number of exits 13 x 1.2 m 12 x 2.4 m + 1 x 1.2 m 
Total exit width 15.6 m 30 m 
Sprinkler system No No 
Alarm system Yes, optical line detection Yes, common smoke detection 
 
3.1 RSET Calculation 
RSET is defined as the sum of time for detection, warning, pre-travel and travel (ISO 2009). In 
this case warning and pre-travel time are treated as constants for both designs, i.e. it is assumed 
that they are equal. Consequently, detection and travel time are the only relevant variables when 
calculating RSET in this case. Since there are large uncertainties associated with the time it takes 
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before people start moving towards an exit in case of fire it would be hard to justify such an 
assumption outside a comparative framework. Travel time, ttrav, is calculated as the sum of the 
time it takes to reach an exit, twalk, and the time taken to queue and pass through the door, tque 
(NBRI 2006b): 
twalk = L/v 
tque = N/F 
F = v × ρp × B 
where; 
L is the maximum length to an exit [30 m]. 
v is the walking speed [0.6 m/s]. 
N is the number of persons [3000 persons]. 
B is the effective width of the exit [m], which is 0.15 m less than the free width. 
F is the flow of people through an exit [person/s]. 
ρp is the occupant density [1.67 person/m2]. 
Time needed to walk to the exits, twalk, is calculated to be 50 s for both the alternative and pre-
accepted design. Time spent queuing and passing through doors is dependent on the flow capacity 
of the doors. The flow capacity is calculated to be 13.7 person/s and 28.1 person/s for the 
alternative and pre-accepted design respectively. Resulting travel time is presented in Table 2.  
According to Norwegian guidance documents a line detection system can be assumed to have a 
response time of 20-40 % of a regular smoke detector (NBRI 2006a). Response time for common 
smoke detectors is given as a function of ceiling height and fire growth in BE (2000). For rooms 
with a ceiling height of 3 m and 6 m and a fire growth of tg = 225 s it prescribes a detection time of 
60 s and 90 s respectively. This leads to a detection time of 36 s (40 % of 90 s) for the alternative 
design and 60 s for the pre-accepted design. 
Table 2 The components of RSET for the alternative and pre-accepted design 
Detection time Reaction time Travel time RSET 
Alternative design 36 s 180 s 270 s 486 s 
Pre-accepted design 60 s 180 s 157 s 397 s 
3.2 ASET Calculation with Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
ASET is the available safe egress time, and is here assumed to be the time from when a fire occurs 
until the visibility measured at a height of 2 m above floor level reaches 10 m on average. A 
complete ASET assessment should include other factors, for instance heat exposure and toxicity, 
but our experience is that lack of visibility is often the first indication of the occurrence of ASET. 
Hence, for the sake of this example, lack of visibility is considered sufficient as an indicator of 
ASET.  To evaluate ASET for the two situations described above, computational fluid dynamics 
(CFD) models have been made using the computer software FDS version 5.5.3. FDS is a model 
for fire-driven fluid flow developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
and it solves a version of the Navier-Stokes governing equations applicable for in-compressive 
low velocity flow, which makes it applicable for fire modeling (McGrattan et al. 2007). 
Although the example is included for illustrative purposes, efforts have been made to follow best 
practice in constructing the model. No grid sensitivity study to determine the grid resolution has 
been conducted but the well-known criteria: D*/δx has been assessed, where δx is the grid 
resolution (in meters) and D* is the characteristic fire diameter (McGrattan et al. 2010): 
3
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where; 
Q& is the heat release rate [kW] 
is the density of air [kgm-3] 
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 is the thermal heat capacity of air [kJkg-1K-1] 
 is the ambient temperature [K] 
g is the acceleration due to gravity [ms-2] 
 
Guidelines for required grid resolution vary depending on the scope of the analysis, and values of 
D*/δx  normally range from 4 to 16 (McGrattan et al. 2010). Similar guidelines for required 
resolution are provided elsewhere such as in Hadjisophocleous and McCartney (2005) and 
U.S.NRC (2007:6-5). In the example the value D*/δx  = 12.5 which is assumed to be an 
appropriate resolution for this model given the scope of the analysis, which is to compare two 
design alternatives, and calculating the heat and mass transfer from the fire to the hot smoke layer. 
The area of the fire is chosen as a function of the maximum heat release rate, such that the 
dimension-less quantity, Q*, is in the order of 1, as recommended for accidental fires by NRC 
(NRC 2007:6-4). The quantity, Q*, is a relationship between the heat release rate, , and the 
diameter of the fire, D: 
2* DgDTpc
QQ
∞∞
=
ρ
&
 
 
Table 3 lists some of the properties of the FDS model. 
 
Table 3 Properties of FDS model 
Factor Input Comment 
Heat release model Q& = αt2 α = 0.01975 
Time to reach 1 MW, tg 225 s  
Heat release rate per unit area, 
HRRPUA 
2 291 kWm-2 Leads to Q* = 1.03 
Burning material Dry wood Original set-up 
Polyurethane/wood Sensitivity study 
Soot yield burning material, Sy 0.01 Dry wood 
0.07 Polyurethane with reduced soot 
yield to represent a mixture of 
plastics and wood. 
Radiation fraction 0.35 Default value in FDS (McGrattan et 
al. 2010)  
Grid size, [dx, dy, dz] 0.2 m, 0.2 m, 0.2 m Leads to D*/δx  = 12.5 
Simulation length 900 s  
Room temperature 20 °C  
Outside temperature 10 °C  
 
Fig. 3 depicts the reduction of visibility as a function of time for a measuring point 2 m above the 
floor in the example. The measuring point is the same in all graphs and shows both the pre-
accepted design and the alternative design for a soot yield of both 0.01 and 0.07. The fire growth 
rate, tg, is assumed to be 225 s in accordance with common practice in Norway for this kind of 
occupancy (BE 2000). The results are summarized in Table 4. 
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Fig. 3 Reduction of visibility as a function of time for a measuring point 2 m above the floor for 
two different designs and two different soot yields 
Table 4 Comparison of safety margin for the alternative and pre-accepted design 
 ASET RSET Safety margin 
Alternative design, Sy = 0.01 546 s 486 s 60 s 
Alternative design, Sy = 0.07 428 s 486 s - 58 s 
Pre-accepted design, Sy = 0.01 387 s 397 s - 10 s 
Pre-accepted design, Sy = 0.07 157 s 397 s - 240 s 
 
When assuming that the burning material is pure dry wood, with a soot yield, Sy, of 1 %, we find 
that the safety margin is positive for the alternative design and marginally negative for the pre-
accepted design. When using a different soot yield, Sy, of 7 %, representing a combination of wood 
and plastics materials, we find that both designs have a negative safety margin. 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Interpretation of the results from calculation example 
The main purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the use of scenario analysis in combination with 
prescriptive fire safety requirements, which very often implies a comparative analysis 
methodology. In a previous paper we have documented that more or less appropriate assumptions 
are justified by the fact that the analysis is comparative (Bjelland and Njå 2012b). This means that 
for example the soot yield is not considered specifically, since it is assumed that this yield is equal 
for both the alternative design and the pre-accepted reference building.  
 
In the previous section we have provided an example of an analysis which we would expect to find 
in real life projects. From our main scenario analysis we find that the safety margin between ASET 
and RSET is positive only for the alternative design. Hence we can conclude that the alternative 
design is better than, or as good as, the pre-accepted design with respect to life safety. Based on 
the results presented, the alternative design would have been found acceptable, since it performs 
better than the pre-accepted design. 
 
It could be argued that a safety margin of 60 s is too small in any case. This would of course be an 
appropriate concern, but then we would also have to question the safety level of the pre-accepted 
design, which has a negative safety margin for the same scenario. This illustrates our main 
message: as long as you can “hide” behind pre-accepted performance requirements, it is hard to 
question the results of the analysis. Consequently the overall application of comparative analyses 
and the information value from such analyses should be questioned. This is not least the case when 
the pre-accepted performance requirements are highly generic, as is the case in Norway, and when 
there is no guidance on how to select a valid reference design. 
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To illustrate what happens when we consider a different soot yield, representing a combination of 
wood and plastics, we have provided an additional ASET calculation. We find that the safety 
margin is negative for both the alternative and the pre-accepted design. Paradoxically, the 
conclusion remains the same as the alternative design is better than the pre-accepted design, since 
the safety margin is less negative for the alternative design. Consequently the alternative design 
could be selected on this basis. However, the soot yield could probably be reduced to a value 
which leads to a positive safety margin, so that the message of the analysis does not become 
excessively alarming for the client. After all, the attractive trait of the comparative analysis is that 
it does not matter what quantity is used, as long as they are treated equally in both designs. 
 
In an earlier paper (Bjelland and Njå 2012c) we have shown that the pre-accepted performance 
requirements do not provide a single consistent safety level. Thus, knowing that an alternative 
design is better than a pre-accepted design would not provide much information about the safety 
level in the building. However, one important benefit of this knowledge is that the fire safety 
engineer need not take on responsibility for the fire safety level. It is simply implicitly assumed 
that the safety level is sufficient based on the pre-accepted design. This is an appreciated property 
of the approach for the fire safety engineer and one which implies a low liability risk.  
 
Our experience is also that clients make very few demands with respect to fire safety design, and if 
they do there is usually a reference to the pre-accepted performance requirements as a maximum 
level of fire safety, although these are supposed to represent a minimum level (DiBK 2010). 
Consequently, fire safety design is closely related to pre-accepted performance requirements, both 
for the sake of simplicity and responsibility issues for the fire safety engineers and because it is a 
low priority for the client. A large number of deviation assessments are performed in most 
projects, but none of them has any information value in terms of describing a fire safety level 
(Bjelland and Njå 2012a). 
4.2 Problems of Comparative Scenario Analyses 
From an analytical point of view the use of comparative assessments is problematic. By an 
analytical point of view we mean an analysis of design issues made with the purest intentions and 
goals. Analyses are tools to aid the designer when there is uncertainty, i.e. lack of knowledge, 
related to the consequences of the design. With respect to fire safety, this could be uncertainty 
related to how the building will perform during a fire and how people in the building will be 
affected by the fire.  
 
In our example in Section 3 we introduced many assumptions to simplify the problem, justified by 
the fact that we were only interested in the difference between an alternative and a pre-accepted 
design. First of all, we only considered one scenario for each design under the assumption that 
other scenarios would show the same tendency of difference in favor of the alternative design. It is 
difficult to determine that this is actually so without performing a systematic search for possible 
scenarios. However, our experience is that this is the common way of verifying fire safety design 
when deviations are introduced (Bjelland and Njå 2012b).  
 
If we were to gain insight from the analysis with respect to safety, we would have to introduce the 
factors that actually affect safety level and question whether the models used were sufficiently 
accurate or appropriately tuned for our purpose. For the example provided in this paper this would 
include a thorough assessment of the possible fire scenarios in the actual building. This would 
include an analysis regarding the impact the ceiling height has on the actual fire, the fire load in 
the building and the occupants escaping. In addition this assessment would be necessary to 
determine required level of safety in the building on the basis of the use of the building and the 
characteristics. 
 
The reasons for performing a performance based analysis in fire safety engineering are due to the 
fact that the building, or construction, in question falls outside the prescriptive regime. As such it 
is our view that the analysis should aim to accommodate the unique features of the building in 
both the fire scenarios and methodology adopted in the analysis. This is important in order to 
assess the features of the building that makes it inappropriate for prescriptive design in the first 
place. However, the current approach seems to acknowledge oversimplification in fire scenario 
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selection and methodology. Questionable assumptions is justified on the basis that it will not affect 
the assessment as a comparative analysis is undertaken. 
 
One of the main traits of performance based design regime is that the fire safety engineers should 
have the opportunity to explicitly assess the level of fire safety required in a building, or a 
construction. In a consequence analysis this implies that the fire scenarios selected for the analysis 
are appropriate, and include the characteristics of the building. This would typically be done 
through an assessment where specific parameters which influence the fire scenario, such as the fire 
load, occupancy, ventilation, materials and surfaces, are assessed. Our experience is that the fire 
scenario itself is seldom analyzed in such assessments, and only a few generic scenarios are 
chosen as the basis for a comparison (Bjelland and Njå 2012b). 
4.3 Implications for Fire Safety Regulators 
In a performance-based fire safety regime the ideal would be to have quantifiable performance 
requirements which the results of the analysis could be evaluated against. This is not an easy task 
since there are large gaps in current knowledge of the causal relationship between fire safety 
requirements and the resulting risk to the lives and health of occupants and fire and rescue 
personnel, and property protection. It seems unrealistic to expect fire safety designs to be based on 
pure performance requirements in the near future. A combination of best practice performance 
requirements and analytical approaches is inevitable, but as our knowledge of the phenomena and 
causal relationships grows, the analytical part can be expanded. The regulators need to take on 
responsibility for creating a framework for the development of important fire engineering 
knowledge. Today, feedback from real fires and firefighting actions are nearly non-existing, 
leading to analyses which makes use of very generic data. 
 
However, what we consider a matter of urgency is the provision of a framework for analytical fire 
safety design that does not involve comparisons with pre-accepted designs. This must include a set 
of precise functional requirements and performance goals to be addressed by the analyses. 
Furthermore, a set of fire and situational scenarios seems necessary, including tolerability criteria 
to compare the scenarios against. The level of detail in the description of scenarios seems to be a 
matter of trust in the fire safety engineering community. Under the assumption that all complex 
fire safety designs must be subject to independent control, it is possible that the community will 
adhere to the best practice and that a limited level of detail is necessary. This will infer a drive 
towards more knowledge-based designs. Today it is routine-based, requiring little or no specific 
knowledge. 
 
The main goal of encouraging more analytical designs should be the introduction of updated 
knowledge into design decision problems. A first step is to acknowledge that the pre-accepted 
performance requirements have great limitations with respect to covering the variety of complex 
buildings expected to be erected in the future. Other countries have taken steps to improve the 
current situation of analytical fire safety design. Examples are new guides on analytical fire safety 
design in Sweden (Boverket 2011) and New Zealand (DBH 2012). Both countries have made 
efforts to provide clearer performance goals and minimum requirements to the selection of design 
scenarios and tolerability criteria for evaluation. The work in these countries will hopefully lead to 
analyses having more impact on the decisions to be made. 
4.4 Implications for Fire Safety Engineers 
Although the authorities need to take steps to improve the situation, the organizations dealing with 
fire safety engineering represent both high competency and capacity with respect to developing the 
discipline further. It is necessary that fire safety engineers contribute to regulative development 
and that they build and sustain competency on analytical design. 
 
In the current situation it could be questioned to what degree fire safety engineers contribute with 
any valuable knowledge by performing comparative analyses. They are to some degree managing 
the requirements from the authorities by considering if the alternative designs are just as good as, 
or better than, pre-accepted designs. The phrasing “to some degree” is used because the selection 
of reference buildings, or pre-accepted designs, for comparison is often a thought-construction and 
the validity of the selections could be questioned. However, it is towards the demands of the 
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clients that the fire safety engineers fail to make any real influence. Even though most clients fail 
to state any explicit fire safety requirements, it does not mean that they do not have any. But 
clients need to address many functional requirements, and fire safety is just a small part of the 
whole design. If fire safety engineers are to have any impact on the client, the decision maker, they 
must show that their work benefits the overall design and project costs. An appropriate way 
forward would be to perform analyses which are as close to reality as possible, without introducing 
disturbing reference designs which really does not exist. Then it would be possible to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of fire safety measures and take part in an optimization process involving other 
disciplines. 
5. Conclusions
To accommodate the principles of performance-based fire safety engineering, the industry has 
adopted a methodology largely based on scenario analyses in combination with pre-accepted 
performance requirements and deviations, through comparative assessments. This is unfortunate 
with respect to achieving important goals of performance-based engineering, for instance the 
ability to address unique buildings and build awareness about safety levels. Fire safety engineers 
find it appropriate to introduce assumptions and simplifications which distance the analysis from 
the actual situation. It is argued that important issues, most likely to affect fire safety in the 
building, are not relevant for the purpose of comparative analyses. The only goal is to show that 
the alternative design is just as good as, or better than, a pre-accepted design. Hence, the analyses 
do not provide any insight into issues which really affect the safety level, and are only useful 
within the framework of the comparative assessments. Since important factors are left out, e.g. the 
way different people will react to a fire, differences in their walking speed and variations in fire 
development and characteristics, only a limited amount of information is transferred from the 
engineer to the building operator.  
Our view is that analyses should only be performed when there is uncertainty, i.e. lack of 
knowledge, which prevents one from making a decision on fire safety design. That is why the 
focus of the analyses should be on gaining knowledge which is important to the decision makers. 
When comparative analyses are performed, much time is spent on defining and analyzing a pre-
accepted design, which is not relevant for the design at hand. We find this to be an inappropriate 
use of resources. Furthermore, since pre-accepted designs are loosely described, it is often possible 
to find a pre-accepted design with a lower safety level than the one you are designing.  
Scenario analyses are, and will probably always be, important in fire safety engineering. The 
current engineering framework is designed in such a way that scenario thinking is encouraged. 
Furthermore, the models used in fire safety engineering are usually deterministic and are based on 
a certain fire, situational and behavioral scenario. The challenges involved in gaining probabilistic 
information on human behavior, i.e. a foundation for developing uncertainty distributions, will 
also favor deterministic scenario analyses in fire safety engineering.  
If scenario analyses are to be successful in fire safety engineering, all factors affecting fire safety 
level should be incorporated. Regulators need to develop a clear set of performance requirements 
to fire safety, capable of being readily transformed into performance criteria by the designers. 
Regulators should also impose requirements on the engineering process and the competency of the 
designer. We find it appropriate to separate between two approaches: 
1. Design by the use of pre-accepted performance requirements.
2. Analytical design.
Most buildings will fall into category one. Hence, less competence and assessment effort should be 
required by enterprises dealing with pre-accepted design. This is in accordance with the system in 
Norway today. A major change, however, should be that no deviations are allowed within 
approach one. A more extensive guide to the regulations, i.e. pre-accepted performance 
requirements, should be implemented. This guide should have a clear range of application and 
presumably be arranged specifically for building types, or service category. In this way, common 
deviations that we find today can be incorporated into the pre-accepted performance requirements, 
which would lead to both flexibility and predictability for the designer and building owner. 
When approach two is selected, it is recognized that there are no pre-accepted performance 
requirements to compare with. The design must be based on analyses and the regulators should 
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establish a procedure which includes the development of fire safety goals and performance criteria 
and stakeholder involvement. In addition, some minimum requirements should probably be 
imposed on the scenario selection and the use of models. Furthermore, specific data is needed for 
the analyses, which imply the need for a feedback loop from real fires and firefighting operations. 
Designers following the analytical approach should continuously be able to document a high 
competency in fire safety engineering. Under the present Norwegian system responsibility is 
assigned to the enterprise as a whole. As competence might differ amongst different engineers 
within the enterprise, project-specific quality requirements seem more appropriate. The 
documentation of competency should be a part of the project. An independent controller should 
have the task of considering whether competency is appropriate. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we review and discuss the use of risk assessments in the design of the world's longest and deepest 
subsea road tunnel, the Rogfast. We show that there is a discrepancy between the existence of uncertainties in 
both phenomena and assumptions on the one hand, and the way these uncertainties are assessed and handled in 
the risk assessment and risk management processes on the other: considerable uncertainties and risks are 
neglected. The main purpose of the paper is to point to this situation and present a more suitable framework for 
how to assess and manage this type of risk and uncertainties. 
Keywords: Sub-sea road tunnels, risk, risk assessments, uncertainty 
1. INTRODUCTION
The Rogfast subsea road tunnel project is based on a vision from the early 1980s of replacing the heavily 
trafficked ferry connection across the Bokn fjord in Rogaland county, Norway (Alsaker, 1997). It will be an 
important link in the transport corridor on Norway’s west coast, and its existence holds the promise of a more 
reliable and effective transportation system. This could lead to new jobs and housing markets and a growth in 
the regional economy. The benefits of the project are considered numerous and the proponents outnumber the 
opponents. Societal cost benefit analyses also show, in contrast to many other Norwegian road projects, that the 
benefits outweigh its costs. 
On the other hand, the Rogfast will be the world’s longest and deepest road tunnel if realized, and this causes 
concerns about the safety of its users and rescue personnel in the case of accidents. Many drivers experience 
anxiety when driving in large road tunnels (Amundsen, 1994; Flø and Jenssen, 2007; Vashitz et al., 2008). This 
can lead to unwanted behavior and accidents. Monotony due to lack of visual stimulation is also considered a 
problem in the long tunnel (Jenssen et al., 2006), which can lead to people falling asleep while driving. 
Furthermore, the consequences of road accidents always have the extra potential of being catastrophic when 
they occur in tunnels. If a fire or explosion occurs, the tunnel geometry will affect fire and smoke spread 
(Carvel, 2004; Lönnermark and Ingason, 2006; Melvin and Gonzalez, 2009; Nilsen, 2011) and explosion 
pressure waves (van den Berg and Weerheijm, 2006), with the potential of exposing a large number of people to 
fatal danger. Furthermore, the longer the tunnel, the longer the distance to safe areas and response times for 
rescue services (Manca and Brambilla, 2011). 
Safety in Norwegian road tunnels is generally handled within a prescriptive regulatory framework. Rogfast, on 
the other hand, falls outside the scope of the prescriptive regulations Handbook 021 Road Tunnels (HB 021) 
(NPRA, 2010) due to its length. The standard does not provide solutions for tunnels longer than 10 km, while 
the main tubes of Rogfast is planned to be approximately 25.5 km, plus a 4 km intersected tube to Kvitsøy (Fig. 
1). Furthermore, the planned tunnel route results in a gradient of maximum 7 %, with the lowest point at 390 m 
below sea level. In such cases the safety design is to be based on risk assessments, and additional safety 
measures (with respect to the prescriptive regulations) should be introduced if necessary. Two risk and 
vulnerability assessments have been conducted in the Rogfast project on behalf of the project management: one 
in 2006 (Norconsult, 2006) and another in 2011/2012 (Sintef/Cowi, 2012). The second assessment builds upon 
the first and is intended to provide a more detailed analysis, with special emphasis on events with a large loss 
potential, i.e. fires and explosions.  
Fig. 1 The Rogfast route from Randaberg (Harestad) to Bokn (Arsvågen) with an arm to Kvitsøy 
In this paper we review and discuss the findings from the risk assessments in the Rogfast project. Our starting 
point is that the regulatory framework/system has limited experience with handling projects of this size and 
complexity. We question whether the existing regulatory framework is appropriate, or whether there is a need 
for improvements. Our first part of the review focuses on the general risk assessment framework and 
methodology. Our hypothesis is that the regulative framework undermines the value of the risk assessments. 
Secondly, we are interested in the message contained in the risk assessment. When prescriptive regulations are 
insufficient as decision support with respect to safety and emergency response design, the risk assessment 
becomes an increasingly important document for both internal and external decision makers. However, it is easy 
to understand that a project of this size and complexity is associated with large uncertainties with respect to 
analyzing causes and consequences of accidents, regional development due to the tunnel, the impact of length, 
depth/gradient, intersection, smoke ventilation system and more. The second part of our review focuses on how 
the risk analysts manage to analyze and describe the broad picture of risk and uncertainties, and as such, manage 
to provide an informative tool for decision making. Our hypothesis is that, although uncertainties are recognized 
by the analysts, they are not adequately reflected in the risk assessments and descriptions. Hence they do not 
provide a proper basis for making decisions about tunnel safety design and emergency response. 
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present our key findings from the review of the risk 
assessment process, and discuss the implications of our findings with respect to the risk assessment framework 
and methodology, and the informative message from the risk assessment. In Section 3 we provide a general 
discussion of our findings and suggest a solution for this and similar cases. Finally, in Section 4 we provide 
some conclusions. 
2. REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE ROGFAST SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
2.1 Regulatory Framework and Methodology 
2.1.1 Regulating Safety in Norwegian Road Tunnels 
Safety in Norwegian road tunnels has traditionally been governed by a prescriptive regulation regime, and it still 
is. Handbooks describe minimum safety requirements as a function of tunnel length and traffic load. In 2004 
the European Parliament adopted the directive on minimum safety requirements for tunnels on the Trans-
European Road Network (TERN) (EU, 2004). The aim of the directive was to improve and standardize tunnel 
safety on the TERN by specifying minimum safety requirements, measures and equipment. As a member of 
TERN, the directive was fully implemented in Norway. As such, the directive played an important part in the 
regulative changes that took place at the time of implementation. Now, however, the requirements from the 
directive are implemented in the national prescriptive regulations. This means that a deviation from the 
Norwegian prescriptive regulations is a deviation from the European minimum requirements. Consequently, the 
European Commission is to be informed about cases where alternative risk reducing measures are introduced to 
justify deviations (EU, 2004). 
The new minimum requirements were more stringent than earlier Norwegian requirements, and also different 
than Norwegian construction practice. For instance, emergency exits shall be provided where the traffic volume 
is higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane (EU, 2004:2.3.6), which has not previously been the practice in Norway. 
The Norwegian practice of using a longitudinal ventilation concept was also contested, and should now only be 
allowed on the basis of a risk assessment. But perhaps the largest discrepancy between the new directive and 
Norwegian road tunnel construction practice was with respect to longitudinal gradients. The directive states that 
a gradient above 5 % shall not be permitted in new tunnels. This is a requirement which makes Norwegian 
subsea fjord-crossing tunnels hard to realize without having to increase the length extensively. While there are 
examples of older subsea tunnels with a gradient of 12 %, Norwegian legislation now limit the gradient to 7 % 
(NPRA, 2012:3), which is also the maximum gradient in the Rogfast tunnel. Due to this discrepancy in 
construction practice, many of the tunnel projects since 2004 have required a risk assessment. In fact, it has been 
decided that a risk assessment shall be performed for all tunnels longer than 500 meters (NPRA, 2007b). The 
purpose of the risk assessments is twofold: 1) to found a basis for emergency preparedness plans, and 2) to 
“determine if it is necessary with additional safety measures and/or safety equipment to achieve the safety level 
required in handbook 021” (NPRA, 2010:48). It is interesting to notice that “the safety level of handbook 021” 
is the reference, the definition of safety, so to speak.  
To be able to describe and discuss the risk regulating regime we have established a model of it, see Fig 2. It is 
showing a hierarchical safety regulation structure which depicts possible means of achieving compliance with 
safety regulations. The model is representing a regulation regime where the requirements in the regulation are 
stated in terms of safety goals and performance requirements. The model is separated into four levels: 1) the 
general tunnel safety regulations, which are common to all tunnels, 2) the design principles, 3) engineering 
analysis principles, and 4) evaluation principles. 
 
Fig. 2 Tunnel safety regulations and safety engineering principles to reach a decision on safety level 
The evaluation principle level might need a more detailed description:  
• The compliance principle includes checking the proposed design against prescriptive regulation 
requirements, which in the Norwegian tunneling industry implies handbooks, e.g. HB 021.  
• The implicit principle includes comparing alternative designs against similar prescriptive designs. I.e. 
the safety measures might be different but the analysis methodology is similar. One is interested in 
checking whether the alternative design has an equivalent, or higher, level of safety than that of the 
prescriptive reference design. Thus, one uses the safety level which is implicitly stated by the 
prescriptive regulations as a reference for measuring the relative safety level of the alternative. 
• The principle of using deterministic performance criteria includes comparing results from consequence 
analyses, e.g. fire and explosion simulations, against tolerability criteria such as temperature levels, 
toxic gas concentrations, explosion pressure levels, etc. 
• The low risk principle includes the use of risk acceptance criteria (expressed by risk matrices, F-N 
curves or other metrics) to determine whether the presented risk level from the analysis is high or low. 
The ALARP principle, i.e. that risk should be as low as reasonably practicable, would also fall under 
this category. 
• The selecting the best option principle is related to decision theory concepts, where the ideal is to select 
the decision alternative which is most useful and beneficial to the society. The decision alternative 
having the highest expected utility or benefit-cost ratio should be selected. Utilities, benefits and costs 
should be considered on a broad societal level. 
What we find in the Norwegian road sector is that the tunnel safety regulations are prescriptive, and hence the 
top level of Fig. 2 is non-existent. Neither is the “performance-based” design principle option. Consequently, 
there is generally no separation between the concept of safety and the means to achieve safety within the 
Norwegian road sector regulation regime. The regulations do, however, allow for alternative designs which 
deviates from the prescriptive regulations, as long as it can be demonstrated that the alternative design has an 
equivalent, or higher, safety level than a prescriptive design. Using the model in Fig. 2 we could say that the 
safety issues in the Rogfast project has been treated using a design/regulation principle of prescriptive solutions 
with deviations. To analyze the consequences of the deviations accident frequency calculations, qualitative risk 
analyses and deterministic scenario analysis have been conducted. The results from the analyses are evaluated 
using the implicit safety principle and, to some extent, the low risk principle, by introducing risk matrices.  
Handbooks and minimum requirements are important tools to achieve safety for the large mass of road tunnels 
and to enhance efficient and consistent planning and construction processes. However, when a project with the 
characteristics of Rogfast appears on the drawing board, it could be argued that such prescriptive handbooks 
have severe limitations. In fact, the main challenge of a prescriptive regulation regime is to handle innovative 
designs, which falls outside the scope of existing practice. Nonetheless, it could be argued that the safety issues 
of the Rogfast project are treated just like any other road tunnel project with respect to methodology within the 
regulatory framework. Two risk and vulnerability analyses (Norconsult, 2006; Sintef/Cowi, 2012) have been 
produced in accordance with the requirements in NPRA (2010) and the guideline for risk analysis in road 
tunnels (NPRA, 2007b). The risk and vulnerability analyses could be separated into the following main parts, 
which also constitutes the three obligatorily analysis parts in the regulation’s guidelines: 
- Calculation of accident and fire frequencies with the “TUSI” model. TUSI is a model which uses statistical 
data from existing roads and road tunnels to predict future accident and fire frequencies (NPRA, 2007b). 
Both works include TUSI calculations. 
- Coarse qualitative risk analysis of a set of specified unwanted events. Both analyses include a qualitative 
analysis. 
- Quantitative risk analysis of a set of fire scenarios. Only the latest analysis includes such an analysis. 
In the following we will discuss the regulation-required analyses in relation to their applications and limitations 
in the Rogfast project. The discussion is here related to the rationale of the Norwegian regulative framework. 
We will come back to the content and information value, in terms of how risk is presented, of the analyses in 
section 2.2. 
2.1.2 TUSI calculations: accident frequencies 
The use of the TUSI model is required in every project which includes a road tunnel longer than 500 m. 
Accident and fire frequencies are calculated on the basis of accident statistics on existing roads and road tunnels. 
It is possible to take into account variables like speed limit, gradient, length, the number of tubes, etc. (NPRA, 
2007b).  
Describing uncertainty, often through probabilities, or expected values over a certain time period (frequencies), 
is an important part of a quantitative risk analysis. In some cases, probability models could be used to predict 
future occurrences of accidents, while in other cases a physical model, like an event tree or fault tree, could be 
employed. TUSI is an example of the latter: a physical model which describes causal relationship between 
certain characteristics of the tunnel, and quantifies them by the use of statistics. In any case, whether you choose 
a probability model or a physical model, the analyst must justify the application, i.e. show that the model is 
appropriate to describe what it is supposed to describe. We argue that the relevancy of this model in the Rogfast 
project and hence the purpose of its application can be challenged. 
It could be questioned whether it is reasonable of the Norwegian Public Road Authorities (NPRA) to require a 
TUSI calculation in every road tunnel project on a general basis. However, to require such calculations in the 
Rogfast project seems meaningless, as the model is outside its scope of application. The statistics on which it is 
based do not include any tunnel which resembles the Rogfast. Nonetheless, the model has been required and 
applied, and the results are important premises for the risk assessments. Although the latest risk analysis 
(Sintef/Cowi, 2012) discusses the appropriateness of using the TUSI model, it places more emphasis on 
justifying its results, than on analyzing and describing the uncertainty associated with accidents that might occur 
in the future. This is not to say that TUSI calculations could not provide useful information to the analysts, also 
in the Rogfast project. The problem is related to the regulatory requirement of using this tool, which places too 
much weight on this specific tool and on the frequencies that it provides. 
2.1.3 Coarse qualitative risk analysis 
A thorough and systematic qualitative analysis is generally considered an important part of a risk assessment. 
Common practice in the Norwegian road sector is to carry out hazard identification (HAZID) processes, where 
possible threats to the system are identified along with their causes and consequences. The process is usually 
organized as seminars, where experts on different areas of the tunnel system, or emergency response system, are 
gathered to feed information into the analysis. The major trait of the methodology is associated with both the 
systematical process (often by the use of checklists) and the involvement of experts. Consequently, it should be 
possible to reveal specific safety problems to any new design. However, the quality of the results is mainly 
related to the knowledge of the group, and how the management of the process is able to reveal this knowledge.  
What we find in the Rogfast project is that a standard set of unwanted events have been considered, and we find 
no documented attempt to identify any new threats. In fact, the threat of terror (intended events) has deliberately 
been omitted from the latest analysis, based on instructions from NPRA (Sintef/Cowi, 2012). In order to provide 
the broadest possible foundation for further analyses, creativity should be encouraged in the HAZID processes. 
The list of standard unwanted events in the guideline might limit creativity, but seems necessary to make sure 
that previous experiences are not overlooked in new analyses. Hence, it becomes the responsibility of the 
analysts to include the relevant competency in the HAZID processes and to document that a broad creative 
process has been conducted. We argue that this is lacking in the Rogfast project.    
The Norconsult analysis  mentions a team of reference, when discussing relevant unwanted events, but the 
competency of the team is not documented. The Sintef/Cowi analysis (2012) is based on an internal 
identification of unwanted events, and has therefore not included any knowledge from e.g. local emergency 
response services or tunnel operators. An information meeting with the emergency response services, where the 
results of the risk analysis were discussed, was organized in December 2011, shortly before the analysis was 
published.  
The apparent lack of both a systematic procedure and involvement from external experts and stakeholders, when 
conducting the qualitative risk analysis, is an obvious weakness of the process. However, in this case it could be 
argued that the weakness is related to the implementation of the analyses, not the regulatory framework. 
2.1.4 Quantitative risk analysis 
In accordance with the guidelines for risk analysis of road tunnels, the level of detail of the analysis should 
increase as a function of tunnel complexity (NPRA, 2007b). For subsea tunnels and tunnels with ramps and 
intersections inside the tunnel, a detailed risk analysis should always be carried out. In less complex cases, a 
coarse risk assessment might be sufficient. The risk assessment carried out in 2012 (Sintef/Cowi, 2012) was 
supposed to increase the level of detail from the first analysis (Norconsult, 2006) and thus comply with the 
requirements from NPRA (2007b).  
The guidelines on detailed risk analysis from the NPRA are not strictly defined but allow the analysts to plan 
and execute the analysis as it is found appropriate. In the Rogfast project it has been decided to conduct a 
detailed risk analysis of some specific fire events, on the basis that these events were considered to represent 
high risks in the coarse qualitative risk analysis. Hence, the quantitative risk analysis does not present an overall 
picture of risk in the Rogfast tunnel. However, our major concern at this stage is related to the combined 
methodology of risk analysis principle and evaluation principle (see Fig. 2). 
To evaluate the risk, the NPRA has instructed the analysts to compare the Rogfast tunnel with a pre-accepted 
reference tunnel, designed in accordance with HB 021 (Sintef/Cowi, 2012). This is a common approach in the 
road sector, as one of the two purposes of a risk analysis is to consider whether the safety level of HB 021 is 
fulfilled. The approach is founded on the premise that there are no nationally quantified risk acceptance criteria, 
so the implicit safety levels of the pre-accepted designs are being used instead. In most cases it is possible to 
imagine a pre-accepted version of the road tunnel to be designed. There might be some small deviations 
regarding for instance the distance to an emergency exit, or the use of a slightly different geometrical tunnel 
profile. In these cases it is relatively straightforward to analyze the consequences of the deviations, and conclude 
what additional safety measures are needed to level out the differences. In these cases it might not be that 
important to provide a detailed description of risk, as long as the necessary factors for the comparison are 
considered. However, we see that the concept of safety in this approach is closely related to the validity of the 
prescribed reference design, and how the consequences of the differences between the designs are represented 
by the analysis methodologies. 
In the Rogfast case it is not possible to imagine a design in accordance with HB 021, and this makes it 
problematic to introduce a reference tunnel. It could be argued that any tunnel designed in accordance with HB 
021 has an acceptable risk level, and thus should be an appropriate reference tunnel. However, if this was so, the 
risk of the reference tunnel would have to be analyzed and described on a detailed level, incorporating every 
relevant causal factor for accidents and associated consequences. This could have formed the basis for adopting 
the low risk evaluation principle according to Fig. 2. Such detailed analyses have not been conducted for the 
reference tunnel in the Rogfast project. Simplifications in the analyses are justified by choosing an evaluation 
strategy based on the implicit safety principle. As argued above, this increase the importance of selecting a valid 
reference for the comparison, as one deliberately excludes knowledge from the analyses which one would have 
included using a different evaluation principle. 
The reference tunnel, which is chosen for the comparison, is 10 km and has an average annual daily traffic 
(AADT) of 50 000 vehicles per day. Since both the frequency of accidents and fires, and the number of exposed 
persons, is largely dependent on AADT within the common models used to calculate risk, it comes as no 
surprise that the reference tunnel has a higher risk, measured as the expected number of fatalities. As such, much 
work is carried out to justify that the Rogfast has a lower risk than a thought-constructed reference tunnel, which 
we, based on the premises for the comparison, knew before we started.  
Would it not be better if the risk analysis focused only on the Rogfast, and the specific threats of this tunnel? 
Should it be necessary to introduce highly discussable reference tunnels to make decisions about safety? In 
cases where we are faced with unique designs, like the Rogfast, we find it problematic to base decisions on risk 
on comparisons with pre-accepted designs. There is no support for the assumption that the new design will 
behave in an equivalent way to the reference design. The prescriptive regulatory framework may entail a too 
strong connection between the concept of safety and the solutions to provide safety, i.e. confusion about means 
and ends. This becomes especially evident when we look at novel designs and there are no overall safety goals 
or performance requirements to obtain from the regulations. This forces the analysts to choose a design process 
which is far from optimal if one wants to reap the benefits of a risk-informed approach to design. 
2.2 The presented picture of risk 
To form a proper basis for decision making about safety, a risk assessment should provide a broad and complete 
picture of the risks. Our concern here is whether the Rogfast risk assessments manage to do so. We have chosen 
to focus on: 
1. uncertainties related to input variables; 
2. uncertainties related to novel designs, and; 
3. uncertainties reflected by the presentation of risk. 
The three different aspects of uncertainty are discussed in the following sub-sections. The examples from the 
risk assessment are not exhaustive, and merely have the purpose of illustrating our point.  
To illustrate uncertainties related to input variables we take a look at the purpose of the tunnel and the possible 
regional consequences of the project, which mainly affect two important factors in the risk assessment: AADT 
and fraction and characteristics of heavy goods vehicles (HGV). While we know that there are great 
uncertainties associated with these factors, they are treated as constants in the risk assessments. The numbers are 
inputs from NPRA, and are not critically reviewed in the risk assessment process. Uncertainties related to novel 
designs are illustrated by the emphasis which is put on the vertical gradient, or lack thereof. We aim to show 
that the selection of analysis method and evaluation strategy has consequences in terms of excluding possibly 
important knowledge from the assessment. Finally, uncertainties reflected by the presentation of risk are 
illustrated by the focus the analysts have placed on vulnerabilities, averages and expected values. 
2.2.1 Uncertainties related to input variables 
The Rogfast will serve as an important connection for the flow of goods from Kristiansand to Trondheim, and 
regionally. When it is finished it will shorten the travel time across the Bokn fjord significantly. More precisely, 
it will involve areas on the north side of the fjord having less than one hour travel distance to Stavanger, which 
is not the case today. Consequently, it could be expected that the Stavanger area, which still experiences large 
economic growth due to the oil and gas industry, will attract a growing number of workers from the north side 
of the fjord. This could lead to a large growth in traffic across the fjord, both in private cars and public 
transportation.  
Recent experience with traffic forecasts in Norway shows that they underestimate future traffic volumes 
considerably (Hultgren and Bentzrød, 2012). Separate traffic forecasts have been conducted in the Rogfast 
project (NPRA, 2007a). We find that the traffic analysts describe the use of a “fresh model”, having large 
uncertainties, and which is not yet fully calibrated against the traffic in the area. The analysis describes a 
maximum AADT-number of 10 400 vehicles in 2014, in the case without a toll charge (NPRA, 2007a). Since 
the AADT is important information for the risk assessments, it could be argued that the uncertainties from the 
traffic analyses should have been pursued further, as a part of the risk assessment. However, such uncertainty 
analysis has not been conducted. An AADT-number of 13 000 vehicles, 20 years after opening, have been used 
in the risk assessment, based on input from NPRA (Sintef/Cowi, 2012).  We are not in a position to question the 
actual numbers in the assessments, but it seems reasonable to question whether the numbers used reflect all 
available knowledge about future traffic volumes. For instance, what future scenarios are reflected by the AADT 
numbers? What will happen if the Norwegian oil and gas industry continues its growth, or the opposite: takes a 
blow and is moved abroad?  
Heavy goods and dangerous goods transportation is closely connected to the needs of the industry in the region. 
Therefore it should be possible to estimate what kind of dangerous goods, and in what quantities, are expected, 
in the Rogfast under different future scenarios. However, we find that heavy goods transport is treated as a 
fraction of the AADT, and dangerous goods are superficially treated in the qualitative risk assessment. To 
compensate for this, a sensitivity study has been conducted for both the variables AADT and fraction of HGVs. 
AADT has been raised from 13 000 to 17 000, and the fraction of HGVs has been set to 25 % instead of 15 %. 
This raises the fire frequency by 45 % (Sintef/Cowi, 2012:125), which the analysts consider to be substantially. 
However, the message from these calculations is unclear: We are presented with numbers that imply that AADT 
and fraction of HGVs greatly affect risk, but since risk is only assessed relative to a reference tunnel, it is hard to 
see how the sensitivity study can lead to any change of the conclusion that risk is acceptable. It could be argued 
that the uncertainties associated with these assumptions are recognized, but neglected. In summary, we find that 
AADT, the number of heavy goods vehicles and dangerous goods transportations, is treated generically, where 
it is hard to see the specifics of the Rogfast tunnel and the way this tunnel will affect the region. Furthermore, 
the AADT is an annual average daily traffic. Maybe focus should have been directed to a greater extent at the 
traffic volume in general at different time and/or operative conditions. 
2.2.2 Uncertainties related to novel designs 
Another issue is the uncertainty associated with the uniqueness of the Rogfast. As mentioned above, this 
uncertainty has led to discussions on the appropriateness of standards and common procedures. Risk 
assessments are a common tool to deal with the uncertainties of new and unique designs, and, when it is decided 
to conduct risk assessments, it could be expected that the consequences of the uniqueness of the tunnel will be 
considered.  
Although the Rogfast tunnel looks like a standard two- tube road tunnel, only longer, the significance of its long 
descent and ascent could be questioned. After a serious fire in the Oslofjord tunnel (SHT, 2012), which has a 
gradient of 7 % over 3.5 km, in 2011, it was closed to heavy goods vehicles for nearly a year afterwards, due to 
recognition of the serious challenges such vehicles experience in long steep tunnels (NPRA, 2012). When 
driving towards north, the Rogfast will have a 7 km steep ascent, from the lowest point, at – 392 m, to the portal 
in Arsvågen. The gradient in the ascent will be 5 % the first 3.5 km, and then increase to 7 % the last 3.5 km, i.e. 
a considerably longer stretch than that of the Oslofjord tunnel. Furthermore, the risk assessment has questioned 
the efficiency of the ventilation system in this complex tunnel, especially in the event of a fire. Taking into 
account that Norway accepts heavier trailers than the rest of Europe, heavier than the standards against which 
brake systems are tested, and that malfunctioning brakes are common on heavy goods vehicles (NPRA, 2012), it 
should be expected that this issue would be extensively treated in the risk assessment. However, we find that the 
topic is only remotely treated when estimating the fire frequency using TUSI. Since the quantitative analysis has 
been conducted comparatively with a reference tunnel, the specifics of the Rogfast tunnel are toned down. One 
could say that the knowledge is excluded based on the assumption that it will behave as the reference tunnel, 
and that the reference tunnel do not have any problems with respect to vertical gradients. These might not be 
valid assumptions. 
It is concluded that the fire frequency of the Rogfast is close to equal with that of the reference tunnel 
(Sintef/Cowi, 2012). The length of the Rogfast is compensated by a high AADT in the reference tunnel, while 
the maximum gradient is the same. However, the distance of the descent and ascent is not the same, and the 
impact of this deviation is at the core of the question the decision makers need to consider. Will the geometrical 
layout of the Rogfast cause problems in the operation of the tunnel, causing a large number of fires in brakes 
and engines of heavy goods vehicles, and accidents due to large speed differences in descents and ascents?  
We find it hard to answer these questions on the basis of the risk assessments. However, a newly published 
document from the NPRA states that gradients of 7 % should not exceed a distance of maximum 1.5 km in new 
road tunnels (NPRA, 2012:19). We notice that there is a different conclusion in the Rogfast risk assessment, 
where the risk is considered acceptable. 
2.2.3 Uncertainties reflected in the presentation of risk 
Finally, the fire assessment is a substantial part of the 2012 risk assessment (Sintef/Cowi, 2012). The analysts 
have made two decisions that have a large effect on the information value of the fire assessment: 1) the 
assessment is a comparison with the reference tunnel, and 2) results are presented as the expected number of 
fatalities, given a fire scenario. Since we have discussed the use of comparative analyses in previous sections, 
and on a general basis in a separate paper (Bjelland and Borg, 2013), we will focus on the use of expected 
values in the presentation of risk. 
The fire assessment builds on the use of a set of scenarios describing location in the tunnel, traffic load at the 
time of the fire and the heat release rate of the fire. The probability of an initiating fire in the tunnel is calculated 
by the TUSI model as an annual frequency. As such, the probability of fire is interpreted as the fraction of time a 
fire incident is present in the Rogfast tunnel in the long run, when considering an infinite number of operative 
years of the Rogfast, or similar tunnel systems. Since we do not have operative experience with the Rogfast 
tunnel, the reference must be similar tunnels. However, as mentioned earlier, when discussing the TUSI model, 
there are not any similar tunnels, unless the definition of similar is interpreted quite loosely. Our point is that the 
use of relative fire frequencies, in this case, is hard to justify without having to introduce thought-constructed 
populations of similar systems. We will point to a more suitable alternative in Section 3, since the interpretation 
of the presented probabilities is important when a decision maker reviews the results of the analysis (Aven, 
2013). In the Rogfast case, however, the fire frequencies are just mentioned, but not used any further. It is 
concluded that the fire frequencies of Rogfast are in the same magnitude as for the reference tunnel, and the 
expected consequences, given a set of fire scenarios, are compared. Consequently, it would be wrong to say that 
the results are a presentation of risk, unless a very narrow perspective on risk is adopted; see discussion in 
Section 3. Rather, the expected value is to be considered a measure of vulnerability, given a fire. Subscribing to 
the view that risk would be an appropriate measure to describe the presence of safety, or lack thereof, in this 
case, we find it unfortunate that the analysis and presentation of results is restricted to vulnerability numbers. 
Firstly, it is not possible to identify the likelihood of the consequences of a given fire scenario. For instance, it is 
calculated that in the case of a 300 MW fire near the Harestad portal with a normal traffic load, the expected 
number of fatalities will be 9.7 persons if a bus is present in the accident’s influence area. If the same fire occurs 
at the lowest point of the tunnel, when the traffic load is high, the expected number of fatalities will increase to 
34.3 persons. At most, an expected number of fatalities of 250.3 persons is calculated, assuming that the 
ventilation system fails during a 300 MW fire. Our question is then: how should a decision maker deal with the 
message that 250 people are expected to die in an accident in the tunnel, when the associated uncertainties are 
not presented? The decision maker is provided with the additional information that the reference tunnel, to 
which the Rogfast is compared, will have an expected number of fatalities of 483 persons for the same scenario, 
but does that really improve the situation? Intuitively it sounds like both tunnels have an unacceptable risk, and 
the society should be spared from the existence of them both. However, the risk of the Rogfast is judged 
acceptable by the analysts without any additional safety measures, besides standard requirements from NPRA’s 
HB 021 (NPRA, 2010). Consequently, it would confuse the decision maker when an extensive list of costly 
additional safety measures are evaluated and recommended by the risk analysts, for instance: reducing the 
distance between emergency exits from 250 m to 125 m, creating four large cavities to reduce monotony while 
driving through the tunnel and introducing a number of drivable crosscuts between the tubes (Sintef/Cowi, 
2012). It is difficult to see the link between the descriptions of risk and the recommendations provided by the 
analysts. 
Secondly, it could be questioned whether the use of expected values provides the decision makers with a broad 
and complete picture of the risks. The risk assessment is an important tool in emergency preparedness planning, 
and in order to dimension the emergency response services in the region appropriately, a broad picture of risks is 
needed. The emergency services are especially needed when the accidents develop further than expected. 
Scenarios not captured by the use of expected values are very interesting and relevant in this respect. This also 
applies the other way around: emergency response services should be incorporated into the risk assessments in 
order to develop performance requirements and possible weaknesses of the present system. A possible scenario 
is the transportation of a large number of commuters across the fjord every day. Is it not possible that the buses 
in this case will be quite full, and that there are several buses traveling at the same time in rush hours? Hundreds 
of bus passengers might be exposed to a fire in such a case. Should not the risk assessment enlighten this 
situation, making the decision makers aware of the possibility and providing some guidance on how to manage 
this risk? In our opinion this is not properly reflected when the risk assessment is limited to expected values and 
averages. Some examples are: the average number of bus passengers is 20 persons, the average number of 
people in cars is 1.5, and the location of the bus, relative to emergency exits, is considered “average” 
(Sintef/Cowi, 2012). 
3. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
In the following we will discuss the implications of our findings from the previous section with respect to the 
appropriateness of using risk assessments as decision support in large road tunnel projects. As indicated in the 
introduction and Section 2, we have separated our review and discussion into the two topics: regulative 
framework/methodology and presentation of the risk. 
If risk assessments are going to be an important and influential tool in decision-making in safety issues, and 
function as decision support for novel designs, which is the goal of both EU (2004) and the NPRA (2007b, 
2010), we argue that there is a need for a change in the regulatory framework. The change we are proposing is 
basically to separate between the concept of safety and the means to obtain safety. This is necessary to enhance 
risk-based thinking, which under the present regulation regime is restricted by a too narrow understanding of 
safety. Such a change implies a transition from a prescriptive to a performance-based regulation regime, where 
the concept of safety is defined by a set of safety goals and performance requirements, which pay due attention 
to the technical, organizational and human factors that interact in order to obtain safety (see e.g. Hopkins and 
Hale, 2002; Leveson, 2011; Reason, 1997).  
The changes we are proposing in the regulatory regime seem necessary to prioritize in order to create a 
functional framework for risk-based thinking, which seems to be the goal of the European and national 
authorities. The changes we are proposing with respect to the assessments and presentations of risk are in line 
with the way we understand the concept of risk. We acknowledge that there are different views on how to 
understand risk in the academic environment and amongst practitioners, as well as different views on how 
important uncertainties are with respect to decision-making processes. However, we claim that our 
understanding of risk is based on a sound scientific foundation and provides meaningful interpretations of 
otherwise narrowly understood concepts (see also Aven, 2010a; Aven, 2011). The change we are proposing is 
related to focusing on prediction of observable events and consequences, and description of uncertainties. The 
uncertainties are related to our lack of knowledge about whether these events and consequences will occur, and 
not to the deviation between estimates and true values of thought-constructed parameters of probability 
distributions which is the dominating view (Aven, 2003). This should lead to increased focus on the background 
knowledge on which the risk assessments are conditional on, and on what constitute good knowledge in order to 
solve the decision-problems created by the safety goals and the alternative design solutions. The change is in 
order to obtain a broader foundation for decision-making and a meaningful interpretation of the concepts 
involved. We argue that this does not necessarily using more resources on risk assessment, but using the 
resources somewhat differently. 
3.1 Regulative framework/methodology: the problem-solving strategy 
In the introduction we claimed that the regulative framework undermines the value of the risk assessment in this 
case. We find that the risk assessment is conducted in accordance with standard guidelines from the NPRA, 
adopting common models (e.g. the TUSI model) and methodologies (e.g. the coarse qualitative risk analysis). 
Furthermore, a fire risk assessment has been conducted for the Rogfast tunnel and a pre-accepted reference 
tunnel. This latter assessment represents a mixture of both analysis and risk evaluation, where only the 
differences between the tunnels are considered. This builds on the assumption that the reference tunnel has an 
acceptably low risk, and if the Rogfast has lower, or equal, risk, it should be considered safe enough. This 
methodology is common in road tunnel risk assessment and in other sectors (Bjelland and Borg, 2013; Bjelland 
and Njå, 2012). A major problem with this methodology is that it is difficult to apply when we face new risks, 
i.e. risks that are not managed by the safety measures provided by the standards. This is due to the fact that the 
concept of safety is closely related to the means of achieving safety. When one operates outside the scope of the 
prescriptive regulations, one does not have any objective safety goals or performance criteria to evaluate ones 
design against. Considering that the Rogfast will be the longest and deepest road tunnel in the world, it could be 
questioned whether it is appropriate to conduct a comparative analysis. Should it not be possible to analyze risk 
and make decisions based on the risk analyses without a reference to a pre-accepted tunnel? 
Funtowicz and Ravetz have developed a model for classifying problem-solving strategies based on the two 
dimensions (i) decision stakes, and (ii) system uncertainties (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). The model states 
that in the case of low decision stakes and low system uncertainties, the applied science perspective is 
appropriate to deal with problem-solving. This could be in the case of planning and construction of standard 
road tunnels, where both the consequence dimension (decision stakes) and the uncertainty dimension are well 
understood. On the other hand, when the decision stakes and the system uncertainties are high, the postnormal 
science perspective should apply for problem-solving. Climate change has been provided as an example where 
this perspective is appropriate (Aven, 2012; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Between these extremes we find the 
professional consultancy perspective, which applies when either decision stakes or system uncertainties are 
high, or both are on a “medium” level (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993).  
Using this terminology, it could be argued that problem-solving with respect to risk assessments in the Rogfast 
project has been in accordance with the applied science perspective. However, the characteristics of the tunnel, 
and questions from external stakeholders with respect to problem-solving strategies, could be taken as 
arguments that a different, more comprehensive, problem-solving strategy should have been selected. Our view 
is that we should be careful of adopting the standard (applied science) problem-solving strategy, when we face 
unique design challenges. However, we subscribe to the view that risk assessments have the potential of being 
valuable decision support in such situations, provided that a broad description of risk is provided. 
In order for risk assessments to be a valuable tool in decision making in the Rogfast project or similar projects, 
we argue that the regulative framework should separate between the concept of safety and the means to achieve 
safety. This would ideally imply the introduction of a performance-based regulation regime, where the society’s 
safety goals and performance requirements are stated in the regulations. Another approach would be to require 
that project-specific safety goals and performance requirements are developed in the case of novel designs.  
How to achieve these goals would be a matter of choice between prescriptive solutions, when available, and a 
performance-based approach (see Fig. 2). This would open all the possible ways of conducting risk analysis and 
risk evaluation illustrated in Fig. 2. The safety goals and related performance requirements should cover all the 
issues which are relevant for the design of the tunnels and could, for instance, include the following: 
• Life safety goals for tunnel users, maintenance personnel and rescue personnel. 
• Life safety goals for 3rd parties, e.g. persons which are located in the proximity of the tunnels. 
• Material/economic safety goals, e.g. related to replacements of structural elements and/or safety 
equipment, the time necessary to resume operation after accidents etc. 
• Environmental safety goals, e.g. related to spill of toxic substances, handling of contaminated 
ventilation air etc. 
It is important to emphasize that decision making about final design, and thus acceptability of risk, is outside the 
mandate of the risk analysts. The analysts’ task would end after evaluating the level of risk against the criteria 
specified by the evaluation principle chosen. Decision making about acceptability is the task of the project 
management, who is in a position to see the results of the risk assessments in association with other project 
goals and also reflect the limitations of the tools used. Consequently, a new regulative framework should 
include requirements to the risk management process, including, for instance, which stakeholders who should be 
included, and when, to allow for making decisions about risk. The structure of a proposed decision-making 
structure is presented in Fig. 3. 
 Fig. 3 Basic structure of the decision-making structure, adopted from Aven (2003:98) 
3.2 Presentation of the risk 
3.2.1 A framework for risk assessments focusing on describing uncertainty 
The Rogfast risk assessments lack a proper risk framework, which we have attributed to both the regulative 
framework (standardized methodology) and the analysts’ perspective of risk. The risk assessments do not 
provide a broad picture of the risks, as the presentation is fragmented by the use of semi-quantitative risk 
matrices and quantified expected losses, relative to a reference tunnel for some specific fire scenarios. We have 
argued that this risk description is not adequate if information about risk is to be a valuable contribution to 
decision making about safety in design and operation of the Rogfast and similar projects. 
We recommend an approach based on a perspective where risk is described by specific events A’, specific 
consequences C’ of these events, knowledge-based probabilities P of A’ and C’, and K, the background 
knowledge that these probabilities are based on. Formally this description can be viewed as a risk description in 
a risk framework where risk is defined as the two dimensional combination of events/consequences, A/C, and 
associated uncertainties, U (Aven, 2010b).  See Table 1. 
Table 1 Illustration of the separation between risk concept and risk descriptions 
Risk concept Risk description 
[A, C, U] [A’, C’, P(A’,C’|K), K] 
 
The risk assessment process could be separated into the following steps (Aven, 2011): 
1. Identify possible future events A’ and associated consequences C’. A model G could be used to describe C’. 
In such cases the model G links a set of input quantities X to the quantities of interest C’. C’ could for 
instance be the number of fatalities during a specific period of time, and C’ = G(X). 
2. Describe uncertainty associated with A’ and C’ by the use of knowledge-based (subjective, judgmental) 
probabilities P(A’,C’|K). If models are used, uncertainties are associated with the input quantities X, e.g. 
P(X≤x|K), which, by the use of the model G(X), leads to uncertainty descriptions of the quantity of interest, 
for instance P(C’≤z), the expected value EC’, or the variance VarC’. 
3. Assessment of uncertainty factors hidden in the background knowledge K, which extends beyond the 
knowledge-based probabilities. These could be related to quality of data or expert judgments and the 
significance of assumptions and suppositions.  
Fig. 4 depicts a performance-based regulatory framework where safety goals and performance requirements are 
stated for the relevant safety objectives of the activity. Risk assessments are used to assess the safety 
performance of the activity, and this includes identifying, for instance, accident scenarios, contexts and 
situations in which certain scenarios can occur, human response and tolerability to accident loads and 
performance of rescue operations. Although safety goals are stated towards individual objectives, the risk 
assessment process has a holistic perspective. It is necessary to see beyond the separate areas. For example, 
environmental safety might have an impact on life safety as well. This is shown by the double arrows between 
the different topics treated in the risk assessment in Fig. 4. These factors and associated uncertainties are to be 
described using the risk assessment framework, to establish a foundation for decision-making about tunnel 
safety. 
 Fig. 4 Relationship between regulatory framework and safety/risk assessment framework 
Following this approach, a risk assessment has the purpose of predicting future consequences and describing 
uncertainties. The uncertainty we are describing here is our lack of knowledge, i.e. epistemological uncertainties 
(Aven, 2011), about the unknown quantities, for instance the number of fires in HGVs, the number of injuries or 
fatalities in the case of accidents, or the performance of the ventilation system in the case of a fire. The 
challenge is to use the knowledge available today to predict the future consequences of the activity. This 
knowledge base includes all the information an analyst takes into account when measuring and describing 
uncertainty, for instance models (probability, physical, structural/causational), empirical data, expert judgments, 
and personal experiences/education. In the following we will discuss the importance of describing the 
background knowledge, the use of knowledge-based probabilities as a tool to describe uncertainties and 
uncertainties in assumptions. 
3.2.2 The importance of describing the background knowledge 
In our framework an uncertainty description cannot be separated from the background knowledge. An important 
part of the risk assessment is therefore to describe this background knowledge. As mentioned above, the 
uncertainties are due to our lack of knowledge. This implies that it is possible to improve predictions by 
increasing the background knowledge. This is important in a decision making context, because it implies that 
the risk assessment is not a definitive answer about risk. Other analysts, having different background 
knowledge, or weighing the importance of certain background knowledge differently, could come to different 
conclusions. Our review of the Rogfast risk assessment (Section 2) has led to the identification of a number of 
factors which are associated with great uncertainties. To illustrate the meaning of background knowledge, and 
how it could be treated within our framework, we consider the examples of AADT numbers and 
heavy/dangerous goods transport. 
Estimation of AADT is not a part of the risk assessment, but has been conducted as an individual task in the 
impact assessment by the NPRA (2007a). The AADT number is very important in the risk assessment, as it is 
considered by the analysts as one of the main components in both the frequency of accidents and the number of 
exposed people in the case of an accident. According to NPRA (2007a) the estimations of AADT are associated 
with large uncertainties, as we pointed out in Section 2. Having acknowledged the importance of this factor, we 
use our risk assessment framework for an uncertainty analysis: 
1. Identification of future scenarios, or events A’, as a result of Rogfast. The scenarios would include factors 
which are important for the development of traffic volume. For instance, how will the housing market 
change and, whit it, the associated commuting pattern across the Bokn fjord? What future scenarios could we 
anticipate with respect to industry development or reduction? The oil and gas industry and the aluminum 
industry are important in Rogaland. How would changes in these industries affect traffic volume? Having 
such concrete scenarios in mind, it would be possible to estimate the associated number of people having to 
travel through the Rogfast on a daily basis. 
2. Prioritize the set of future scenarios by ranking them in terms of likelihood. This could be conducted by the 
use of categories such as low, medium or high, or by the use of knowledge-based probabilities. The AADT 
number of 13 000, which is applied in the risk assessment, is surely a result of a thought-constructed 
scenario. Other numbers are also possible, based on other scenarios, and we could obtain the traffic volume 
categories (say): (< 5 000, 5 000 – 10 000, 10 000 – 15 000, 15 000 – 20 000, > 20 000) with the associated 
probability distribution (0.10, 0.20, 0.40, 0.20, 0.10). 
3. Assessment and description of the quality of the knowledge, i.e. informing the users of the risk assessment 
(the decision makers) about the foundation for the probability numbers or categories. A knowledge-based 
(subjective) probability distribution can be developed in any case. However, in some cases one could have a 
strong knowledge base, where appropriate models and data are available for prediction. In other cases, both 
models and data may be poor. Without the associated assessment of the knowledge base, the user of the risk 
assessment could be led to believe that the numbers are more precise than they really are. 
Similar analyses could have been conducted for the number of heavy goods vehicles and the number of 
dangerous goods transportations. Identification of distributors and receivers of goods and dangerous substances 
could lead to a set of future scenarios, with an associated number, and type, of heavy and dangerous goods 
transportations. It could be argued that such an analysis should be a part of the risk assessment process 
associated with early design development, because it will affect what safety measures to include (especially 
pumps, drainage systems, buffer tanks, reservoirs, or the need for fire extinguishment equipment) and operative 
procedures. 
3.2.3 The use of knowledge-based probabilities 
When we try to measure risk we need a tool to describe uncertainty, and probability is the most obvious tool. In 
our approach the probabilities are knowledge-based (subjective, judgmental), and reflects the assessor’s degree 
of uncertainty about A’ and C’, given K, P(A’,C’|K). The background knowledge, discussed above, could be 
strong or poor.  
In contrast with traditional frequency probabilities, there is no reference to a population of similar systems, 
where the probability of an event is considered as the relative fraction of time this event occurs in the long run 
when the activity is repeated. A frequency probability is considered a property of the system under consideration 
and the analysts provide estimates of this (true) probability in the risk assessments. The uncertainty descriptions 
in a frequentist framework are related to how close the estimate of the probability, Pf*(A’,C’) is to the real 
probability, Pf(A’,C’). When a similar population of systems cannot be appropriately defined, it is hard to 
provide a meaningful interpretation of a frequentist probability (Aven, 2011).  
Consider the uncertainty associated with fire in heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) in the Rogfast. An estimate of the 
fire frequency is provided, based on a TUSI-calculation. Uncertainty is related to how close this estimate is to 
the true frequency in a thought-constructed population of similar systems. The use of the TUSI model is 
discussed in the conducted study, and it is concluded that the model will yield appropriate estimates of the fire 
frequency (Sintef/Cowi, 2012). However, as we have pointed out in Section 2, the TUSI model cannot be 
justified in this case because it is built on statistical data from a population of systems with limited resemblance 
to the Rogfast. A major concern is related to this trust in an unjustified model, and to what degree it conceals 
real problems with the Rogfast design. For instance, there is no previous experience with a 5-7 % descent/ascent 
of length 7 km. This could lead to a great increase in the number of fires in HGVs, due to overheating in brakes 
and engines, compared with other Norwegian road tunnels. If knowledge-based probabilities had been 
introduced, the focus would also have been on the background knowledge K. Questions related to this K would 
be prompted: what do we know about fires in HGVs in long descents/ascents? How appropriate are the models 
(e.g. TUSI) we use today? Should we try to provide more knowledge before assigning a probability, or should 
we state that our knowledge base is poor? 
When considering the reliability of the ventilation system, it seems like the analysts have assigned knowledge-
based probabilities. There is no reference to a population of similar systems. Probability of failure for the 
ventilation system is assumed to be 0.02 (2 %) for the Rogfast system and 0.005 (0.5 %) for the reference tunnel 
(Sintef/Cowi, 2012:113). The probability assignment is based on a judgment that Rogfast is more complicated 
with respect to ventilation than the reference tunnel. However, we do not find a good assessment of the quality 
of K. We will argue that this probability alone does not provide a good basis for improving the system, or 
designing it according to relevant performance criteria. It is just assumed that the system is more complex at 
Rogfast, and thus should have a higher probability of failure. Causes and links are not investigated and 
described. It is stated that pessimistic values have been chosen because the ventilation system has not been 
analyzed (Sintef/Cowi, 2012:113). However, it sends a message that the subject should be treated 
comprehensively in a later stage of the project. 
 
3.2.4 Uncertainties in assumptions 
Probabilities are not a perfect tool to measure uncertainty. The probabilities are assigned on the basis of a set of 
assumptions, for instance about the behavior of people given a fire, the behavior of a heavy goods vehicle driver 
during the long descent in Rogfast, or the heating of the brakes or engines under certain loads. All risk analysts 
need to make assumptions. If an uncertainty analysis should be carried out for all possible variables, the risk 
assessments would be very time-consuming, and a large part of the work would probably not be relevant for the 
decision problem at hand. Consequently, there is a need to simplify, and assumptions are important in this 
regard. 
The fire frequencies in the Rogfast case are estimated by the use of the TUSI-model. A knowledge-based 
probability could also be based on TUSI, as long as the model is justified. However, a probability assignment 
based purely on TUSI would imply several assumptions: the extraordinary length of the steep descent/ascent of 
Rogfast has no special impact on the likelihood of fire, the intersection does not affect the likelihood of fire, or 
the additional tunnel arm does not affect the likelihood of fire to any special degree. Under different 
assumptions, the TUSI-model might have been rejected, and other probability assignments would have been 
provided by the analysts.  
Consider also the issue of predicting fatalities in the case of fire. The analysts assume a certain location of the 
fire, a certain fire growth, a certain maximum heat release rate, the effect of the ventilation system, the direction 
and speed of smoke spread, the number of vehicles near the fire, the location of the vehicles relative to the fire 
and emergency exits, the number of persons in a car or bus, the walking speed of the people in the tunnel, and 
the decision whether or not to use emergency exits. Due to the chosen comparative framework in the Rogfast 
case, it is implicitly argued by the analysts that the assumptions are not that important, as they would affect the 
reference tunnel equally. In our framework, these assumptions would greatly affect the assigned probabilities of 
specific consequences.  
Assumptions which are critical to the results of the assessment and decision making should be subjected to 
uncertainty analysis. A sensitivity study would normally function as a basis for considering the criticality of the 
assumptions, by showing how different uncertain input values affect the results of the risk assessment. The 
sensitivity analysis of AADT and the fraction of HGVs in the Rogfast case (see Section 2) reveal that these 
variables have the potential to affect the result substantially. As a consequence, the uncertainty associated with 
these factors should have been investigated further, for instance in accordance with our proposed framework 
above. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have reviewed and discussed the risk assessment of the Rogfast project. Our focus has been on 
the regulatory framework/methodology and the presentation of risk, and we argue that the risk assessment 
presents an unclear message to the decision makers and stakeholders. On the one side, they state that the Rogfast 
basis tunnel is considerably safer than the reference tunnel, and therefore should meet minimum requirements in 
the regulations. On the other side, they suggest extensive safety measures based on expert opinions, which do 
not seem to be supported by the risk analysis. This indicates that the risk assessment fails to reveal important 
aspects of uncertainty, which the analysts apparently are aware of. 
Therefore, we argue that the type of risk assessment carried out does not provide a proper basis for making 
decisions about tunnel design and emergency preparedness. The presented risk picture is too narrow. 
Uncertainties in regional development, accident phenomena, accident consequences and effectiveness of safety 
measures are neglected. The type of risk assessment carried out needs to be replaced by broader assessments 
that pay due attention to such uncertainties, and a more suitable framework for how to assess and manage the 
risks and uncertainties of a large road tunnel project is discussed in Section 3. The framework is based on the 
broad definition that risk is the two-dimensional combination of consequences and associated uncertainties. 
When describing risk, focus should be on the background knowledge, which cannot be separated from the 
probability assignments. Furthermore, uncertainty in assumptions needs to be explored by conducting sensitivity 
studies, and if necessary by undertaking more thorough uncertainty analyses for the critical assumptions. 
In order to realize the advantages of using risk assessments as decision support in novel design problems, when 
prescriptive requirements are not available, there is a need for a change in the regulatory framework. The major 
change is related to the need of separating the concept of safety and the means of obtaining safety. In other 
industries, this has been done by the introduction of performance-based regulations, which states safety goals 
and performance requirements instead of the required safety measures. This is necessary in order to reflect a 
holistic perspective on safety, which in addition to technical safety measures, also includes organizational and 
human factors. 
Our review is made from an academic standpoint and in hindsight of the process thus far. We do not have to 
restrict ourselves to operating within the existing regulative framework and standards, nor do we need to only 
play the part of the analysts or comply with any mandate, customers’ demands, tight time schedules and limited 
economic resources. The point we are making is that the reasons for the outcome of the risk assessment 
discussed in this paper, could be many. However, we are confident that the limited resources available in a 
construction project could be more efficiently used. This will require changes both with respect to the regulative 
framework and to the way risk is understood and assessed by the engineers/analysts. 
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